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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
1.1 The family in economics
Economic theory and empirical research traditionally concentrate on the impact
of economic incentives on individual's decision-making. Interdependencies be-
tween own choices and those of family members are often neglected. However,
members of the same household probably aect each other. They share resources,
and they jointly produce household commodities like children, meals, and love
(see Becker, 1973). Moreover, they care for each other and probably have a pref-
erence to spend time together which in turn may induce them to pay costs which
might not be rational from the pure egoistic point of view. At the same time,
economic decisions may alter the advantageousness of a marriage compared to
staying single or getting divorced. Thus, neglecting the component in life which
is most important for most people (see Section 1.2) can lead to biased theoretical
and empirical predictions concerning individual's decision-making process. For
the last 15 years, a growing number of economists have been dealing with this
problem. They have developed theories that model the behavior of a family tak-
ing into account that each member may have egoistic and altruistic intentions (see
e.g. Browning et al., 1994). Moreover, the improved availability of data sets that
provide information for several household members at the same time has enabled
researchers to obtain a better idea on the impact of the household context in
real life. However, there are still open questions concerning the interrelationship
between individual economic and family-related decisions.
The present thesis attempts to bridge part of this gap by analyzing the behavior
of couples in Germany. First, I study the inuence of the spouse on two specic
economic decisions, namely the decision to pursue a healthy behavior and to work
at an older age. The second part deals with the eect of spousal characteristics
on the risk of marital disruption. More precisely, I estimate whether similarity
between two spouses with respect to education and religiousness makes a mar-
riage more stable, and how the labor division between husband and wife aects
marital stability. Even though I take into account that children also play a vital
role in the household, my focus is on the two spouses. The reason is that the
latter should be the ones with the highest decision power within the household
and, moreover, they are usually confronted with similar economic decisions like
labor force participation.
The remainder of this introduction comprises some descriptive statistics about
families in Germany (Section 1.2), a short explanation of the data used in this
thesis throughout all chapters (Section 1.3), and in Section 1.4, I give a short
summary of all parts of the thesis.
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1.2 Families in Germany
In Germany, the Basic Law declares in Article 6 that marriage and family are
under the State's special protection. However, there is an ongoing public debate
whether and, if so, how this claim can be settled given the substantial changes
in family lives over the last 40 years. The attractiveness of a traditional fam-
ily consisting of a married couple and several children seems to decrease: birth
rates decline, the prevalence of cohabitation increases, and divorce rates are on a
persistently high level.
Table 1.1: Marriages and divorces in Germany
Marriages Divorces
total no. per 1,000 total no. per 1,000
Year in 1,000 inhabitants in 1,000 inhabitants
1950 750 11.0 135 2.0
1960 689 9.5 73 1.0
1970 575 7.4 104 1.3
1980 497 6.3 141 1.8
1990 516 6.5 155 2.0
1995 431 5.3 169 2.1
2000 419 5.1 194 2.4
2002 392 4.8 204 2.5
2004 396 4.8 214 2.6
2005 388 4.7 202 2.5
2006 374 4.5 191 2.3
2007 369 4.5 187 2.3
2008 377 4.6 192 2.3
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2008, 2009a)
For instance, Table 1.1 shows the development of marriages and divorces in Ger-
many. In 2008, about 377.000 couples married, whereas 192.000 got divorced.
This means that the number of marriages has decreased by 50 % compared to
1950. The ratio per 1,000 inhabitants has even declined from 11.0 to 4.6. At the
same time, the number of divorces per 1,000 inhabitants has more than doubled
between 1960 and 2000, however, it has remained rather constant around 2.4 in
the last 8 years. This change in family life is also reected in Figure 1.1. It shows
the distribution of the German population in 1991 and 2008 by marital states.
The proportion of married individuals has declined from almost 49 % to 45 %,
whereas separated and divorced people make up now 8.2 % compared to 5.3 % in
1991. Moreover, the proportion of singles has increased by two percentage points.
However, even though marriage and having children have become less prevalent,
these trends do not necessarily mean that family have become less important
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of marital states in 1991 and 2008
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1991 2008
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2009b)
for individuals. Table 1.2 shows results of interview questions from 2008 asking
about the signicance of dierent aspects in life. The numbers give the propor-
tions of individuals who state that a respective life facet is \very important" or
\important" for them, dierentiated by marital status.
Leading a happy marriage or partnership is important or very important for more
than 99 % of married people. Moreover, even 87 % of singles, 82 % of separated
and divorced, and 72 % of widowed individuals state this. The importance is,
however, lower for divorced and widowed women than for men. In addition, for
older people, this aspect seems to be less relevant. Despite declining birth rates,
\to have children" is still an important element in life, for 91 % of the married
and for 58 % of singles. Women are in each case more aliated to children than
men. Nevertheless, having children seems to be less relevant than experiencing a
happy partnership.
These questions are part of the German Socio-Economic Panel which also provides
the data for this thesis. Therefore, in the next section, the advantageousness of
this data set is discussed in further detail.
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Table 1.2: Importance of dierent aspects in life (2008)
% stating \Very important"/\Important"
Married Single Sep./Div. Widowed
Happy partnership
Total 99.10 86.94 81.70 72.20
Men 99.04 84.87 84.07 76.24
Women 99.15 89.14 80.00 71.05
Age groups
Age 16{30 98.78 91.67 97.22 no obs.
Age 31{45 99.58 86.07 89.23 90.48
Age 46{60 99.16 67.49 84.28 80.77
Older than 60 98.67 41.96 63.83 70.36
To have children
Total 90.81 58.28 77.59 88.00
Men 89.79 52.10 67.82 85.95
Women 91.83 64.78 84.58 88.57
Age groups
Age 16{30 93.47 62.69 86.11 no obs.
Age 31{45 92.24 57.69 81.79 100.00
Age 46{60 89.53 29.00 76.09 84.62
Older than 60 90.74 34.51 73.96 88.14
To be there for others 92.48 91.81 90.93 88.93
Polit./Social particip. 21.78 19.50 19.74 18.08
To aord something 83.07 87.68 79.36 72.78
To develop oneself 61.57 83.51 67.62 46.50
Success at work 67.64 86.79 73.38 40.13
Own house 63.90 41.39 30.09 46.73
Traveling 39.14 51.10 39.70 32.80
Source: SOEP, 2008; own calculations
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1.3 Data
Throughout all chapters of this thesis, data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP) is used. The advantages of this data set provided by the DIW
Berlin are manifold. Therefore, I will only stress the most important aspects for
my research questions. For more detailed information about the SOEP, see e.g.
Wagner et al. (2007).
First, the SOEP is a rather long (and still ongoing) time series with 25 waves
in 2009. For marital-related research, it is essential that couples can be followed
over a long period. For Chapters 4 and 5, it is particularly important that I am
able to identify when couples get married and to observe them in the course of
their marriage until they potentially get separated. Second, not only the head of
the household, but all adult household members are asked the full questionnaire.
Thus, in all estimations, I can include individual information of both spouses,
which makes the SOEP of great value. Moreover, it allows for a considerable
sample size. The original sample of 1984 consisted of about 6,000 household
and 12,000 individuals. In 2008, almost 11,000 households and more than 20,000
individuals were sampled. Since I focus on couples and in addition, on couples
in the age range from 50 to 65 (Chapter 3) or that marry during the observation
period (Chapters 4 and 5), only a comprehensive data set like the SOEP makes it
possible to carry out reasonable estimations. Another important aspect are the
numerous socio-economic characteristics that I can either analyze or control for.
The SOEP contains a wide range of variables including various health indicators,
monthly calendars about labor force participation, and time use questions.
The data used in all chapters was extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz
v2.0 Nov. 2007 for Stata. PanelWhiz (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written
by John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). For more information about
it, see Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006). Any data or computational errors are
my own.
1.4 Overview and summary of ndings
This thesis consists of two parts. Part I deals with the impact of the spouse on
individual economic decisions. In contrast, the second part analyses the inuence
of economic factors on the decision to divorce.
Chapter 2 (\ \Honey, why don't you see a doctor?" { The spousal
impact on health behavior" - co-authored by Hendrik Schmitz) contains an
analysis on how two spouses inuence each other's health behavior. Married in-
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dividuals are usually found to be in better health than singles but it is not fully
known why this is the case. We test one possible explanation, namely that both
spouses encourage each other to a health-promoting behavior and keep an eye
on each other. Family health production models predict that spouses invest in
each other's health since they, on the one hand, care about each other and, on the
other hand, depend on each other's wage earning and housework capacity. We re-
gard own health behavior as a good proxy for control eorts and expect therefore
a positive correlation between the two spouses' health activities. Nevertheless,
any observed correlation can be induced by other factors than the direct eect.
In addition to observable characteristics like the health status, age, and income,
unobservable elements like the shared environment and assortative mating could
account for it. Therefore, we estimate the probability to observe a certain health
behavior as a function of the spouse's behavior and various other socio-economic
factors. Moreover, in order to rule out biases in the partner's direct eect due
to shared environmental factors and correlated preferences we use simultaneous
equations models incorporating xed eects. Furthermore, since individuals with
a healthy lifestyle might have a higher probability to be in a relationship, we ad-
dress this potential bias by including sample selection corrections. Our indicators
of health behavior are the probability to go to the doctor within a period of three
months, to do sports at least once a week, and to follow a health-conscious diet.
While we nd no causal eect regarding eating-habits, the impact of the partner's
being engaged in sports is substantial. Moreover, females aect their male spouses
in seeking medical advice but not vice versa. The latter result may explain why
men usually benet more from marriage than women.
In Chapter 3 (\The spousal impact on labor force behavior: New evi-
dence for older married couples in Germany"), the working behavior of
married couples aged 50 to 65 is described and investigated. The analysis focuses
on the relationship between the individual decision to retire and the spouse's
characteristics, in particular, the partner's employment status. Since two spouses
usually share resources and care about each other to some degree, they probably
face a dierent optimization problem than a single person. Moreover, they may
have a preference to spend leisure time together and therefore, try to coordinate
their working behavior. Given the increasing proportion of dual-worker couples
it becomes increasingly important to know more about the interdependencies in
the labor force participation decision of older spouses.
Following Blau (1997, 1998) and Blau and Riphahn (1999), I estimate transition
probabilities out of discrete labor force states that depend on the employment
states of the two spouses. Thus, I estimate probabilities to stop and to start
working given the employment status of the spouse and controlling for a large
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set of nancial, health, and occupational characteristics of both partners. My
results suggest that the spouse is indeed an important factor in the employment
decision. Even after controlling for age, wage, health status etc., the probability
of one spouse to stop working is much higher if the other spouse is already out
of employment than if he/she is employed. By further dierentiating between re-
tirement and unemployment, I show that the probability to retire is substantially
higher if the spouse is also retired compared to the situation where the spouse is
employed. There seems to be a preference to share one's retirement. In contrast,
the husband's probability to become unemployed does not seem to depend on the
wife's labor force status. However, the wife's probability is higher if her husband
is still employed.
In addition, I nd evidence for cross-spouse eects, in particular for husbands.
Their probability to leave employment is signicantly aected by the wife's wage
and benets. The spouse's health status is another factor that alters the working
decision for both, men and women.
Part II deals with divorce determinants. Gary Becker's \Theory of Marriage"
(Becker, 1973; Becker et al., 1977) makes various predictions about spousal char-
acteristics and combinations that should increase marital stability. First, indi-
viduals can gain from marriage compared to staying single because spouses are
able to specialize in market and domestic work. By labor division, they can raise
their consumption of household commodities which in turn provides the major
incentive to stay together. Consequently, every factor that makes specialization
between two spouses less advantageous increases the risk of separation. He fur-
ther shows that positive assortative mating is optimal concerning all factors that
are complements in the household production. Examples are age, attitudes, and
intelligence. However, in particular for Germany, there is little empirical evidence
whether some of his major hypotheses actually hold.
In Chapter 4 (\Impact of educational and religious homogamy on marital
stability" - co-authored by Kornelius Kraft), we test whether spouses who are
similar to each other in certain respects have a lower probability of divorce than
dissimilar spouses. We focus on the eect of homogamy with respect to education
and church attendance. The impact of educational similarity is a priori not clear.
On the one hand, education has a huge impact on the individual's wage earnings
capacity. Since homogamy in this respect makes labor division less advantageous,
homogamy in education should increase the divorce probability. On the other
hand, education contains a social and cultural element. From this point of view,
similarity should have a stabilizing eect. Concerning religiousness, Becker's
household model predicts that positive assortative mating is optimal.
Our results, however, suggest that homogamy per se does not have a positive
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eect whereas higher education and religiousness do have. Two low-educated
spouses have a higher risk of separation than any other educational combination.
Moreover, marriages where both spouses attend church services are more stable
than those with two non-attending spouses or where only one partner participates.
In contrast to previous studies for US couples, our results suggest that it does
not matter whether the wife or the husband is higher educated.
In Chapter 5 (\Eect of labor division between wife and husband on the
risk of divorce: Evidence from German data" - co-authored by Kornelius
Kraft), we directly estimate the impact of labor division between husband and
wife on the risk of divorce. Becker's theory of marriage assumes that specializa-
tion in domestic and market work reduces the risk of separation. In principle, it
should not matter whether the husband or the wife participates in the labor force
as long as he or she is able to derive a higher wage income. In fact, female labor
force participation and wages have risen substantially in the last decades and
egalitarian gender attitudes are more common today. Nevertheless, traditionally,
the breadwinner role is assigned to the husband, whereas housework remains pri-
marily a female's domain.
In order to test the eect of specialization, we do not simple consider the wife's
labor force status. On the one hand, we dene her labor income as proportion
of total household income and on the other hand, we use the proportion of total
time used for housework as variables of main interest. Our results suggest that
the labor division can have an eect on the risk of divorce whereas specialization
per se is not stability-enhancing. We rather nd gender-specic dierences. Fe-
male breadwinner-couples have a substantially higher risk of divorce than male
breadwinner-couples. Moreover, marital stability is also considerably reduced if
the wife has to bear the double burden of market and housework which we cannot
nd if the husband bears it. Interestingly, an equal division does not signicantly
alter the probability of separation.
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Part I
Spousal impact on economic
decisions
10
Chapter 2
\Honey, why don't you see a
doctor?" { The spousal impact
on health behavior1
1This chapter is based on an unpublished manuscript of the same title, co-authored by
Hendrik Schmitz.
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2.1 Introduction
A great deal of research in economics but also other disciplines like medical
sciences, psychology, and sociology consistently nds that married people live
longer, and are healthier and happier than non-married individuals. For exam-
ple, Blanchower and Oswald (2004) estimate that the eect of being married
on happiness is equal to an extra income of $100,000 a year. Moreover, men
seem to benet more from marriage than women. For example, comparing death
rates from 16 developed countries Hu and Goldman (1990) nd that the relative
mortality rates of unmarried men compared to married range from 1.6 to 3 with
an average of 2. For women, the ratio is on average 1.5, with only Taiwan and
Japan having rates above 2.
This phenomenon can to some extent be explained by selection of healthier indi-
viduals into marriage. Nevertheless, despite methodological weaknesses that can
be found in the existing literature (Ribar, 2004), there is evidence that it cannot
be solely attributed to selection (see, e.g., Lillard and Panis, 1996; Brockmann
and Klein, 2004). Marriage itself seems to be health-promoting but it is not
fully understood how. Some see the emotional support as a key factor (see, e.g.,
Berkman, 1995), another explanation can be a higher real income for married
individuals (by using economies of scale and specialization gains) which in turn
improves the health status (Trovato and Lauris, 1989).2
In this paper, we analyze another factor that could further explain why couples
are in better health than singles: spouses encourage each other to a health-
promoting behavior and keep an eye on it. Family health production models
(e.g. by Jacobson, 2000, or Wilson, 2002) predict that spouses invest in each
other's wellbeing since they care about each other, and because they depend on
each other's wage earnings and housework capacity. Hazardous behavior leads
to a reduction in the family's income and, therefore, all family members have
an incentive to keep each other in good health, in particular the breadwinner's
status.
Own health behavior could be seen as a good proxy for motivation and control ef-
forts towards the partner. Therefore, a positive correlation in the spouse's health
activities would support theoretical predictions. However, this correlation might
result from other factors than the causal inuence of the spouse (see Manski,
1995; Wilson, 2002). First, two spouses share an environment that may induce
both to engage in healthy behavior. For instance, they receive the same informa-
tion about health risks from their environment, or they get reminders from the
same doctor for preventive check-ups. Another explanation for spousal similarity
2See Wilson and Oswald (2005) for a survey of the longitudinal evidence how marriage
aects physical and psychological health.
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is positive assortative mating. That is, individuals tend to marry a person who
has the same preferences and characteristics, in this case a healthy or unhealthy
lifestyle. There is clear evidence that spouses have similar characteristics and
behave similarly (see e.g. Nielsen and Svarer, 2006 for assortative mating in edu-
cation and Jenkins and Osberg, 2005 concerning leisure activities). With respect
to health, Clark and Etile (2006) nd that positive assortative mating is the only
relevant factor for the observed correlation in spouses' smoking behavior.
To our knowledge, no study has ever investigated direct spousal eects on health-
improving behavior. Health economists have largely neglected the marriage-
health relationship, whereas the sociological, psychological, and medical literature
has focused on dierences in mortality rates and physical health between married
and non-married people. There are only two studies by Umberson (1992) and
Markey et al. (2007) analyzing the individual's perception concerning the spousal
impact on own health behavior. Both nd evidence that people think that the
partner motivates to health-improving activities and monitors them. However,
both studies are based on cross-sectional data, and they do not account for spousal
interdependencies. Given the enormous challenges health care systems in all in-
dustrialized countries are faced with, it becomes increasingly important to get a
better understanding why some groups in a society have a higher probability to
fall ill than others. A great potential to contain health care expenditures consists
in reducing the incidence of wide-spread diseases like cardiovascular disease or
diabetes which can eectively be prevented by health-promoting behavior. In
order to design optimal programs to enhance the health-conscious behavior of
individuals, it is essential to get to know more about how family members aect
each other in that respect, in particular, given the increase in single households
in recent years.
Our aim is to analyze whether the partner's health behavior has any direct impact
on own health activities. Our indicators are the probability to go to the doctor
within a period of three months, to do sports at least once a week, and to follow
a health-conscious diet. Thus, we estimate the probability to observe a certain
behavior as a function of the spouse's behavior and various own characteristics
like health status or health insurance patterns. In order to rule out biases in
the partner's direct eect due to shared (unobserved) environmental factors and
correlated (unobserved) preferences we estimate simultaneous equations models
incorporating xed eects. Furthermore, since individuals with a healthy lifestyle
might have a higher probability to be in a relationship, we address this potential
bias by including sample selection corrections.
The database is the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) from 1995 to 2008.
For all three indicators, the probability of a health-improving behavior is pos-
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itively correlated with the spouse's behavior even after controlling for various
socio-economic factors. Simultaneous equations models with xed eects show,
however, that positive assortative mating can largely explain this correlation.
The shared environment is only relevant for the man's inuence on her proba-
bility to go to the doctor. Nevertheless, we also nd evidence for a direct eect
of the partner's behavior but not for all types of health activities. Doing sports
is largely inuenced by the partner's behavior for both, men and women. In
contrast, following a healthy diet does not aect eating habits of the partner
signicantly. As regards seeking medical advice, we nd a gender-specic dier-
ence: women induce their partner to go to the doctor but not vice versa. The
last result can explain the common nding that men benet more from marriage
than women. Moreover, since the male breadwinner model is still prevalent in
Germany, it conrms the theoretical prediction that the main earner's health
status is more relevant for the family.
The Chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 reviews theoretical foundations and
previous empirical studies of spouses' health behavior. Section 2.3 explains the
empirical strategy and data used, while Section 2.4 reports the estimation results.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical background and previous empirical
results
In the following, we briey discuss potential explanations for the observed correla-
tion in spouses' health behavior. These include a shared environment, assortative
mating, and a direct spousal inuence.
2.2.1 Shared environment and assortative mating
The rst argument that may account for the correlation is that a married cou-
ple usually lives together in the same environment. For example, an infectious
disease can be the reason that both spouses have to go to the doctor. Moreover,
spouses largely receive the same information about health risks which may result
in similar incentives for a medical check-up or for doing sports. They are also
likely to have the same health insurance, and to see the same physicians. Con-
sequently, they may be exposed to the same physician-induced demand (if there
is any) that might lead to a higher probability of visiting the doctor for both
spouses. In summary, there are several health-related environmental factors that
may aect both spouses at the same time. Some of them are observed and can
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be controlled for by the researcher like health status or type of health insurance.
In our estimations, the unobserved factors are captured by the time-variant error
terms in the wife's and husband's estimation equations that are allowed to be
correlated.
The interrelationship between two spouses' health behavior may also result from
assortative mating. The term is mainly determined by Gary Becker's theory
of marriage that provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of family's
decision-making (Becker, 1973, 1981). Positive assortative mating means that in-
dividuals tend to marry a person who has the same attitudes and characteristics.
Thus, it is very likely that two individuals match who have the same preference
for a health-conscious behavior. Since these preferences are usually unobserved,
we could misleadingly interpret a correlation in their activities as direct inuence
from the spouse even though it is due to assortative mating.
There is already a great deal of evidence showing that assortative mating is rel-
evant. Concerning health issues, Clark and Etile (2006) examine which factors
induce the observed correlation in spouses' cigarette smoking behavior. They
conclude that the correlation in smoking can be fully attributed to positive as-
sortative mating. We control for this potential bias in our analysis by including
individual-specic xed eects.
2.2.2 Spousal inuence: The family as health producer
Studies of health demand are usually based on the model of Grossman (1972).
He rst interprets health as human capital stock that, on the one hand, is subject
to depreciation and, on the other hand, determines the total amount of time an
individual can use for earning money and producing commodities. Investments
in own health consist of own time and market goods like medical services as
input factors. Health is demanded by the consumer for two reasons. First,
it directly enters the utility function, i.e. sick days are a source of disutility
(health as consumption commodity). Second, it determines total time available
for market and non-market activities (health as investment commodity). The
rst-order optimality condition for gross investment requires that the present
value of marginal investment costs must equal the present value of marginal
benets.
Jacobson (2000) analyzes the Grossman model from a family perspective. She
interprets the family as producer of health rather than the individual. That
is, each family member is the producer of own health and the health of other
family members.3 Moreover, not only own income and wealth but earnings of all
3In the following, we neglect the model's implication for child health.
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family members can be used in the production of health. As with investments in
own health, each individual receives investment and consumption benets from
investments in the spouse's condition. Investment benets arise because improved
health will decrease future time spent sick and increase family time available for
market work. Moreover, the health status may also aect the wage rate. Both
aspects should lead to a higher family income and hence, higher consumption
and investment possibilities for both spouses. Consumption benets result if an
individual derives direct utility from the spouse's health, i.e., he or she cares
about the mate's well-being.
Following Becker (1973), she assumes that all family members have common
preferences, i.e., a joint utility function. Her main result is that the family will
not try to equalize marginal benets and marginal costs of health capital for
each family member. They will rather invest in health until the ratio of marginal
(lifetime) utility of health to the eective price of health is equal for all family
members. They will not try to equalize the amount of health capital between
the two spouses. For example, the one whose wage income is more sensitive
to changes in health will enjoy higher investments. Bolin et al. (2001, 2002)
extend Jacobson's model by explicitly allowing for conicting preferences. They
also regard the family as producer of health but assume that spouses are Nash-
bargainers or act strategically. Their results support Jacobson's ndings: Both
spouses invest in own and the other spouse's health. Moreover, the one with the
higher wage will receive higher investments in health capital by the family.
Wilson (2002) also combines Becker's theory of marriage and Grossman's health
capital model. He develops a simple two-period life-cycle model about health
capital formation within a marriage that emphasizes the role of marital sorting.
He neither assumes a joint utility function nor does he explicitly model a bar-
gaining process. The individual utility functions of the two spouses are linked
because utility directly depends on the spouse's health and indirectly via the fam-
ily's budget constraint since the health status aects the wage income. His main
implication is that the spouses' health states are positively correlated because
of assortative mating, shared lifestyle and environmental risk factors, and direct
health eects. Examples for direct spousal inuences are infectious diseases or
stress induced by the illness of the partner. Wilson (2002) tests his hypotheses
by regressing the individual's and spouse's characteristics and health behavior in-
dicators (smoking, drinking, exercise) on the individual's health status. He nds
that the eect of spouse's characteristics and behavior are in general small and
statistically insignicant. However, his analysis is based on cross-sectional data
and does not account for endogeneity problems. Moreover, he focuses on health
status, not health behavior. Similarly, Khwaja et al. (2006) look at the eect of
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the spouse's health status on the individual's decision to smoke using data from
the Health and Retirement Study. They nd evidence that consumption exter-
nalities reduce smoking while altruism and learning have no eect. However, they
do not analyze interdependencies in health activities.
Concerning the impact of the partner's health behavior on own behavior, there
are, to our knowledge, only two empirical studies. Both analyze the individual's
feelings about the spouse's inuence and control eorts. Umberson (1992) uses
data from a US panel survey where interviewees were directly asked how often
anyone had monitored his or her health behavior and who had done this. She
shows that married people are more likely to be subject to health control eorts,
and the wife is more likely to be the controller of the husband than vice versa.
She argues that the latter can explain why men usually gain more from marriage
than women.
Using interview data from 105 US couples, Markey et al. (2007) also analyze
individuals' perception concerning the spousal impact on their health. Both,
men and women report experiencing more positive than negative health inuences
from their partners. The eects are highest for eating habits and physical activity
but they also nd a signicant impact on the probability to go to the doctor. Both
studies use cross-sectional data and do not consider spousal interdependencies.
2.3 Empirical strategy
2.3.1 Methodology
We want to estimate the spousal impact on health behavior as measured by the
probability of seeing a doctor, doing sports at least once a week, and following
a health-conscious diet. We capture the spousal's attitude towards preventive
behavior by his/her observed behavior.
We therefore estimate the following equations for males (m) and females (f ):
ymt = myft + x
0
mtm + cm + mt (2.1)
yft = fymt + x
0
ftf + cf + ft (2.2)
where ymt and yft are binary indicators of the health behavior at time t, xmt and
xft are vectors of socio-economic variables, cm and cf are time-invariant unob-
served eects, and mt and ft are time-varying error terms. We are particularly
interested in m and f that measure the eect of the spouse's on own health
behavior. In principle, (1) and (2) could be estimated separately (e.g. by OLS).
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However, it is very likely that the time-varying error terms are correlated due to
the shared environment as outlined in Section 2.2.1. For instance, spouses receive
the same information about health risks, potentially aecting their behavior at
the same time due to the same exogenous shocks. This would lead to biased
estimates in the single equation setting. Therefore, we use a simultaneous equa-
tions model (SEM), estimated by two-stage least squares, to solve this problem.
Identication is not a problem here since the xit mainly contain person-specic
variables. That is, when estimating equation (1) we compute y^ft as a function of
the complete list of xft (and vice versa when estimating equation (2)).
4
Although our indicators of health behavior are binary variables, we estimate lin-
ear models, that is, OLS as a benchmark and SEM to control for the simultaneity
bias. One drawback of the linear model is that the estimated coecients can im-
ply probabilities outside the unit interval [0,1]. However, we regard this problem
as less severe given that the linear model allows us to include a xed eect which
is potentially correlated with the explanatory variables.5 We assume that unob-
served individual frailty or time-constant preferences for a healthy lifestyle aect
own health behavior. Moreover, it is very likely that spouses with similar pref-
erences match. Consequently, the unobserved preferences of both partners are
potentially correlated and, thus, also cm and yft (and vice versa). Therefore,
we estimate a xed eects-SEM (FE-SEM) to rule out biases due to assortative
mating.
Obviously, we can only include couples in our analysis and cannot consider singles.
This might impose a selection problem. It is well known that married individuals
are in better health than comparable singles, either due to the positive impact
of marriage or due to selection of healthy individuals into marriage (or both).
The econometric challenge is to include a sample selection correction into a panel
data model that already accounts for xed eects and endogenous explanatory
variables. We follow the approach proposed by Semikyna and Wooldridge (2005)
which was also used by Jaeckle and Himmler (2010). Therefore, we outline the
method only briey and refer to Semikyna and Wooldridge (2005) or Jaeckle and
Himmler (2010) for a more detailed description. First, we estimate the selection
equation which is represented as in Mundlak (1978), Chamberlain (1984), or
4The F-statistics of the rst stage-regressions show that the person-specic variables are
always highly jointly signicant.
5Only in 0.2 % to 5 % of all observations (depending on the dependent variable) the predicted
values after OLS-regression fall outside the range of [0,1]. This low number justies using linear
models instead of a binary choice model. Also see Angrist (2001) who makes a case for using
2SLS even if the dependent variable is binary when the parameter of interest is a causal eect.
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Wooldridge (1995) to account for xed eects:
smt = z
0
mt1m + z
0
m2m + mt (2.3)
sft = z
0
ft1f + z
0
f2f + ft (2.4)
where smt is the indicator of having a spouse (binary variable), z
0
mt is a superset
of x0mt, and z0m are the individual means of the z0mt. The instruments we include
in z0mt, i.e., the variables that are assumed to aect the likelihood of having a
partner but not the health behavior are a complete set of dummy variables for
all 16 German federal states and indicators for the degree of agglomeration of
the individual's hometown. We distinguish between agglomerated, urbanized,
and rural areas with the latter as reference category. These variables also reect
regional dierences in males-females ratios and, thus, the possibilities to nd a
spouse. On the other hand, they are unlikely to have an eect on the individual
health behavior once we control for the full set of other important socio-economic
characteristics.6 Similar instruments were used by Clark and Etile (2006).
Equations (3) and (4) are estimated separately for each year by probit regression
models. The results are used to calculate inverse Mills ratios, mt and ft.
The nal estimation equations - where we again use the Mundlak-approach to
express the xed eect as a linear projection onto time averages of the explanatory
variables and an error-term - are
ymt = my^ft + 0m ^yf + x
0
mtm + x
0
m0m + m^mt + rmt (2.5)
yft = f y^mt + 0f ^ym + x
0
ftf + x
0
f0f + f ^ft + rft (2.6)
where y^ft are the predicted values of yft from the rst stage regression, ^yf are
the individual means of the y^ft, and x
0
m are the individual means of x
0
mt. Stan-
dard errors (clustered on individual level) are estimated by bootstrapping the
entire procedure 500 times, thus taking into account that the inverse Mills ratio
and the endogenous variables in (5) and (6) are predicted values from auxiliary
regressions.
A test for dierences in the coecients
Since we interpret the changes in the coecients across the dierent estimation
techniques as indicator for the importance of assortative mating, the shared en-
vironment, and selection, we test whether the dierences are signicant. Using
6No further restrictions on the correlation between mt and ms, s 6= t have to be imposed,
as well as on the correlation between mt and ms, s 6= t. See Jaeckle and Himmler (2010),
Semikyna and Wooldridge (2005), or Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007) for a further
discussion about the underlying assumptions.
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a bootstrap approach, we repeat the following procedure 500 times: (1) generate
a bootstrap sample (while taking into account that individuals may have sev-
eral observations in the panel); (2) estimate all four regressions and store the
four coecients on the spousal behavior; (3) calculate the pairwise dierences
in the coecients. Finally, we sort the dierences and check whether the 0 lies
within the central 95 % of the dierences. If this is the case we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the two parameters are equal.
Note that this test is in the spirit of a Hausman-test for dierences between the
sets of coecients of two dierent regressions. There is a general concern with
the Hausman-test because it tests for dierences in the coecients as a group.
Thus, it is likely that it rejects the equality of the group of parameters even if
only one coecient - not necessarily the one of major interest - diers strongly
between the two regressions (see, e.g., Frondel and Vance, 2010). Since we are
only interested in one coecient, this property is undesirable in our case and
therefore, we use the above outlined approach.
2.3.2 Data
The database for the empirical analysis is the SOEP. We use data from 1995-2008
because the self-rated health status that we include as a control variable is not
available before 1995. Unfortunately, our three indicators of health behavior are
not asked each year. Table 2.1 shows the availability of each indicator across
time.
Table 2.1: Availability of Variables
Year Doctor Visit Weekly Sport Healthy Diet
1995 x x
1996 x x
1997 x x
1998 x x
1999 x x
2000 x
2001 x x
2002 x
2003 x x
2004 x x
2005 x x
2006 x x
2007 x x
2008 x x x
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Although the SOEP asks for the total number of doctor visits within the previous
three months, we only use the binary information of having had at least one visit.
The major reason is to use this variable as a proxy for prophylactic behavior.
Although we do not have explicit information on preventive doctor visits, we
assume that, conditional on the individual's health and insurance status, people
who care more about their own health are also more likely to see a doctor. This
eect can better be captured by the 0/1-decision than by the total number of visits
in a quarter. Moreover, one usually interprets the observed number of doctor
visits as a result of a two-stage decision-making process with the patient deciding
about the rst doctor visit (rst stage) and the doctor - maybe together with the
patient - deciding about the number of recalls, given at least one visit (second
stage). Since the second stage also captures supply-side factors like physician-
induced demand, we focus on the rst stage where the individual has full control
(Manning et al., 1981).
The question about the frequency of exercises was asked in most of the years.
We consider doing sports at least once a week as engaging in healthy behavior.
Following a health-conscious diet was only asked in 2004, 2006, and 2008. This
binary variable takes on the value one when the extent to which the respondent
follows a health conscious-diet is \much" or \very much" and a zero in case of
\not so much" and \not at all".
Table 2.2 displays mean values of all three variables for males and females that
live together with a partner compared to singles. We do not distinguish between
married and unmarried but consider all couples where the two spouses live in
the same household.7 However, even though it would be interesting, we do not
include same-sex couples since the number of observations would be too small
to get any reasonable results. In total, we observe up to 13,277 couples with up
to 85,791 couple-year observations. Since not each wave contains information on
doing exercises and being on a healthy diet, the number of observations is smaller
in these cases. The raw data do not give clear evidence that individuals who have
a relationship behave in a healthier way than singles. For instance, single men
are less likely to go to the doctor and to follow a healthy diet. However, their
probability for doing sports is higher. In contrast, while women generally exhibit
a healthier lifestyle than men, a large dierence between singles and women with
partners can only be found for eating habits. Single women are less likely to
follow a healthy diet but, similar to men, have a slightly higher probability of
engaging in sport activities. There is no dierence in their likelihood of seeking
medical help.
7Therefore, if we sometimes use the terms \husband" and \wife" we nevertheless refer to
married and unmarried spouses in our sample.
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Table 2.2: Sample means of health variables
Men Doctor visit Weekly sport Healthy diet
cohab. single cohab. single cohab. single
Mean 0.646 0.551 0.267 0.409 0.433 0.333
Person-year 85,791 32,977 55,334 21,245 20,091 7,761
Individuals 13,277 7,104 12,033 6,378 8,668 3,970
Women Doctor visit Weekly sport Healthy diet
cohab. single cohab. single cohab. single
Mean 0.753 0.754 0.286 0.308 0.622 0.539
Person-year 85,791 41,317 55,334 26,655 20,091 9,971
Individuals 13,277 8,420 12,033 7,607 8,668 4,914
Source: SOEP, own calculations
In our estimations, we control for an extensive set of factors that are also very
likely to aect health behavior.8 As health status indicators, we include the self-
rated health status (dummies for \very good", \good", \bad", and \very bad",
with \satisfactory" being the reference category), a dummy whether the individ-
ual had a hospital visit last year, and the degree of handicap. Furthermore, we
distinguish between privately and publicly insured. As socio-economic factors we
consider age, being a foreigner, years of education, number of children living in
the household, whether the household lives in West Germany, and the household's
log equivalence income. Concerning labor market behavior, we dierentiate be-
tween full- and part-time employed, and unemployed, as well as between blue-
and white-collar workers, self-employed, and whether the individual works in the
health sector. We also include year dummies.
2.4 Results
Table 2.3 reports the estimation results for all three health indicators. It shows
the dierent eects when using a simple OLS approach, OLS incorporating xed
eects (FE), simultaneous equations model with xed eects (FE-SEM), and the
FE-SEM-model controlling for selection. For the sake of brevity, we only report
the coecients for the spousal behavior. Full estimation results are reported in
Tables 2.6-2.11 in Appendix 2.6.2. Note that each cell in the table results from
8See Appendix 2.6.1 for descriptive statistics.
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a separate regression. Moreover, since we estimate linear probability models, the
estimated coecients are marginal eects.9
Table 2.3: Coecients of spouse's health behavior
Men
Health indicator OLS FE FE-SEM FE-SEM Sel. N
Doctor visit spouse 0.157*** 0.099*** 0.065** 0.064** 85,791
(0.005) (0.004) (0.027) (0.030)
Weekly sports spouse 0.308*** 0.188*** 0.199** 0.195* 55,334
(0.007) (0.004) (0.090) (0.102)
Healthy diet spouse 0.373*** 0.258*** 0.198 0.192 20,091
(0.007) (0.009) (0.156) (0.150)
Women
Health indicator OLS FE FE-SEM FE-SEM Sel. N
Doctor visit spouse 0.129*** 0.083*** -0.028 -0.029 85,791
(0.004) (0.003) (0.020) (0.021)
Weekly sports spouse 0.314*** 0.213*** 0.349*** 0.343*** 55,334
(0.007) (0.005) (0.074) (0.083)
Healthy diet spouse 0.365*** 0.259*** 0.158 0.159 20,091
(0.007) (0.009) (0.116) (0.123)
1) Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individuals. Bootstrapped
standard errors in selection models.
2) * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
3) Full estimation results in Tables 2.6-2.11 in Appendix 2.6.2.
The rst column (OLS) shows the spousal eect if we do not control for simul-
taneous exogenous shocks, assortative mating, and selection. We nd a strong
association between spouses' health behaviors. The likelihood of seeing a doctor
in a period of three months is 16 (13) percentage points higher for men (women)
if their partner also sees one. Even stronger are the results for physical activity
and eating habits: the likelihood increases by 31 to 37 percentage points if the
partner also engages in healthy behavior. As discussed before, these eects can-
not be interpreted as causal but they indicate strong interdependencies.
Column 2 (FE) displays the results if we take assortative mating into account. For
all indicators and for both sexes we nd that it largely contributes to the high
inter-spousal correlation. For example, concerning men's doing weekly sports
the marginal eect of the spouse reduces from 31 to 19 percentage points, for
9We do not report the results of the single probit regressions for the inverse Mills ratios.
They are available upon request. In almost all of these 54 regressions the instruments are highly
jointly signicant. Moreover, we do not present tables with the results of the tests for dierences
in the coecients but just comment on them. They are available upon request, too.
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women's healthy diet from 37 to 26 percentage points. The test for dierences
between coecients across estimations (see Section 2.3.1) conrms that there are
signicant dierences between the OLS and the FE coecients in all six cases.
Thus, positive assortative mating can explain the correlation to a large extent.
Nevertheless, the coecients of the spouse remain signicant and substantial in
all cases.
The third column (FE-SEM) shows the coecients if we estimate the two equa-
tions simultaneously, thus allowing for correlated time-varying error terms. At
rst glance, the eects of the shared environment on health behavior seem to be
important but the sign is not clear. Concerning doctor visits and a healthy diet,
the spousal impact further decreases indicating that the shared environment pos-
itively contributes to the inter-spousal correlation. For physical activity, we nd
the opposite. However, the tests reveal that there are no signicant dierences
between the FE and FE-SEM coecients except in the case of female doctor vis-
its. Thus, the shared environment does only play a signicant role in the man's
eect on the wife's probability to ask for medical help.
After controlling for xed eects and ruling out simultaneity bias the spouse has
no direct eect on the partner's eating behavior since the coecients become in-
signicant. There are several possible explanations for this nding. For example,
it could mirror that employed partners usually do not have lunch (and dinner)
together but with their colleagues. Therefore, there are only limited possibilities
for the partners to monitor and aect each other's eating habits. However, in
either way, these results must be interpreted with caution. On the one hand, the
still sizeable coecients indicate that there might be direct eects but they are
imprecisely estimated. Even though we observe 1,114 out of 8,668 couples where
both spouses alter their eating behavior this might be too low to get precise ef-
fects.10 Moreover, the test for dierences between FE and FE-SEM estimations
does not reject the hypothesis that both eects are the same. Thus, this result
should be interpreted carefully.
In contrast, we nd causal eects of the spouse for both seeing the doctor and
exercising regularly even after controlling for xed eects and the shared envi-
ronment. Regarding sports, we nd strong positive eects of both spouses on
the partner's physical activity, with an even stronger eect of males' behavior
on their partner. The husband's behavior increases the wife's probability by 35
percentage points, whereas the man's probability raises by 20 percentage points
if his partner does sports. However, the size of the eect probably also reects
the preference of couples to spend their spare time together since doing sports is
10The FE-results are only identied by those couples where both change their behavior at
least once in the observed time span.
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a leisure activity. Concerning doctor visits, we nd a gender-specic dierence.
Women induce their partner to go to the doctor (the probability increases by 6
percentage points) but not vice versa. The positive correlation in her OLS esti-
mation can be fully explained by assortative mating and the shared environment.
The reason for this might be that women already have a high likelihood to see
the doctor in Germany. Moreover, visits to the gynecologist are included in the
dependent variable which typically lead to regular doctor consultations. Thus,
there is little scope for the husband to inuence the wife's behavior. However,
given that the male breadwinner model is still prevalent in Germany, husband's
health status is also more important for the family from the economic point of
view. Thus, our ndings are in line with theoretical predictions by, e.g., Jacobson
(2000).
Column 4 (FE-SEM Sel.) shows the coecients if we additionally control for a
potential selection into partnership, i.e., if we consider that there are factors that
have an eect on health behavior and on the probability to be in a relationship
at the same time. A comparison of columns 3 and 4 makes clear that a potential
selection bias is not severe in our case. Not surprisingly, tests for dierences show
that the coecients do not signicantly change by the inclusion of the inverse
Mills ratio. The reason is probably that we already consider xed eects. Thus,
only selection conditional on all observed covariates and the unobserved xed
eects is relevant. Nevertheless, Table 2.4 shows the eects of these ratios on
health behavior. Note again that each cell in the table results from a separate
regression. With the exception of women's eating behavior, we cannot reject that
selection matters in our estimations. Remarkably, there seems to be positive and
negative selection. If we neglect the insignicant result we nd that women who
are more likely to be in a relationship have also a higher probability to follow
a healthy lifestyle. However, for men, the eects are mixed: men with a higher
probability to nd a partner are more likely to seek medical help but are less
likely to do sports regularly and to follow a healthy diet.
Table 2.4: Coecients of inverse Mills ratio
Health indicator Males Women
Doctor visit 0.023* (0.014) 0.028** (0.013)
Weekly sport -0.035** (0.018) 0.054*** (0.016)
Healthy diet -0.050* (0.030) -0.020 (0.030)
1) Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
2) * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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Since there might be dierences in the spousal impact depending on the length
of marriage we also ran the estimations on two subsamples: rst, the marriage
has lasted up to ten years at time t and second, it has lasted more than ten
years. Unfortunately, we have to drop cohabiting spouses in this case since we
have only information on the duration of marriage, not of cohabitation. While
the point estimates dier between both subsamples, condence intervals highly
overlap, probably due to increased standard errors because of smaller sample
sizes. Hence, we conclude that testing how the duration of marriage aects our
results would be interesting but is not feasible given our data base at the moment.
2.5 Conclusion
Family health production models predict that spouses invest in each other's health
since they care about each other and depend economically on each other. Haz-
ardous behavior leads to a reduction in the family's income and, therefore, all
family members have an incentive to keep each other in good health, in par-
ticular the breadwinner's status. These monitoring eorts can also explain a
phenomenon that is widely acknowledged but not yet fully understood in the
literature, namely that married individuals are healthier and live longer than un-
married people.
Using a large German household panel data set we analyze whether the part-
ner's health activities have any direct eect on own health behavior. We use
the spouse's health behavior as proxy for encouragement and control eorts. As
health indicators, we dene the decision to see the doctor within a period of three
months, to do sports at least once week, and to follow a health-conscious diet. For
all three measures we nd a high inter-spousal correlation. However, assortative
mating and the shared environment could also explain these patterns. Moreover,
there might be selection into a relationship that is connected with health behav-
ior which in turn would bias the results. Therefore, we estimate a simultaneous
equations model with individual xed eects and further control for a selection
bias by including inverse Mills ratios.
In fact, assortative mating matters in all cases, and even fully accounts for the
observed correlation in eating habits. However, regarding physical activity we
also nd a strong direct eect of the partner's behavior for both sexes. Men
and women induce each other to take exercise. Concerning doctor visits, we nd
gender-specic dierences. While the observed correlation in the women's be-
havior can be fully attributed to assortative mating and the shared environment,
women have a positive inuence on the men's behavior. Given that a typical
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German household still consists of a male principal earner, our results are in line
with theoretical predictions where breadwinners seem to benet more.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.5: Sample means of control variables
Men Women
Private insurance 0.157 0.094
Age  25 0.018 0.042
26  Age  35 0.155 0.185
36  Age  45 0.240 0.251
46  Age  55 0.210 0.213
56  Age  65 0.198 0.176
66  Age  75 0.133 0.106
Degree of handicap 8.025 5.266
Foreign 0.099 0.096
Children in household 0.379 0.379
West 0.748 0.748
Full-time 0.637 0.257
Part-time 0.016 0.210
Unemployed 0.065 0.066
Blue-collar 0.266 0.115
White-collar 0.252 0.330
Self-employed 0.089 0.045
Log. equiv. HH-income 7.269 7.269
Health job 0.015 0.058
Years of education 12.190 11.707
SAH very good 0.074 0.072
SAH good 0.411 0.407
SAH bad 0.128 0.141
SAH very bad 0.035 0.032
Hospital visit last year 0.109 0.134
Year = 1996 0.051 0.051
Year = 1997 0.050 0.050
Year = 1998 0.054 0.054
Year = 1999 0.054 0.054
Year = 2000 0.093 0.093
Year = 2001 0.084 0.084
Year = 2002 0.091 0.091
Year = 2003 0.085 0.085
Year = 2004 0.081 0.081
Year = 2005 0.077 0.077
Year = 2006 0.082 0.082
Year = 2007 0.076 0.076
Year = 2008 0.071 0.071
Observations 85,791 85,791
Means are exemplarily taken from the doctor
visits-sample.
SAH=self-rated health status
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2.6.2 Full estimation results
Table 2.6: Coecients of men's doctor visits
OLS FE FE-SEM FE-SEM Sel.
Doctor visit sp. 0.16*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.00) 0.07** (0.03) 0.06** (0.03)
Private insur. -0.04*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03** (0.01)
Age  25 -0.10*** (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
26  Age  35 -0.11*** (0.01) -0.02 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) -0.03 (0.02)
36  Age  45 -0.12*** (0.01) -0.05** (0.02) -0.05** (0.02) -0.05** (0.02)
46  Age  55 -0.10*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.02) -0.06*** (0.02) -0.06*** (0.02)
56  Age  65 -0.04*** (0.01) -0.03* (0.02) -0.03* (0.02) -0.03** (0.01)
66  Age  75 -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Deg. of handicap 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00)
Foreign 0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)
Kids in HH -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
West -0.02*** (0.01) -0.06** (0.03) -0.06** (0.03) -0.06 (0.04)
Full Time 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Part Time 0.03 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)
Unemployed -0.04*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Blue collar -0.07*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01)
White Collar -0.05*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01)
Self-employed -0.13*** (0.01) -0.10*** (0.01) -0.11*** (0.01) -0.11*** (0.02)
Log. eq. HH-inc. 0.05*** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01)
Health Job -0.10*** (0.02) 0.05 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.05 (0.04)
Years of educ. 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
SAH very good -0.28*** (0.01) -0.21*** (0.01) -0.21*** (0.01) -0.21*** (0.01)
SAH good -0.14*** (0.01) -0.11*** (0.00) -0.11*** (0.00) -0.11*** (0.01)
SAH bad 0.12*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01)
SAH very bad 0.11*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01)
Hosp. visits 0.12*** (0.00) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01)
Inv. Mills 0.02* (0.01)
Constant 0.29*** (0.04) 0.58*** (0.06) 0.61*** (0.07) 0.06 (0.06)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 85,791 85,791 85,791 118,768
1) Standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped standard errors in selection models.
2) * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
3) SAH=self-rated health status.
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Table 2.7: Coecients of women's doctor visits
OLS FE FE-SEM FE-SEM Sel.
Doctor visit sp. 0.13*** (0.00) 0.08*** (0.00) -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Private insur. -0.02** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01)
Age  25 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03)
26  Age  35 -0.02 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.04* (0.02)
36  Age  45 -0.06*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.02) -0.07*** (0.02) -0.07*** (0.02)
46  Age  55 -0.07*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.02) -0.07*** (0.02) -0.08*** (0.02)
56  Age  65 -0.04*** (0.01) -0.03* (0.02) -0.04** (0.02) -0.04*** (0.01)
66  Age  75 -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Deg. of handicap 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00)
Foreign 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04* (0.02) 0.04* (0.02) 0.04 (0.03)
Kids in HH -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
West -0.03*** (0.01) 0.06** (0.03) 0.06** (0.03) 0.06* (0.03)
Full Time -0.02*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Part Time 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Unemployed -0.03*** (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Blue collar -0.05*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01)
White Collar -0.00 (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01)
Self-employed -0.06*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04** (0.01)
Log. eq. HH-inc. 0.06*** (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Health Job -0.04*** (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
Years of educ. 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
SAH very good -0.22*** (0.01) -0.16*** (0.01) -0.17*** (0.01) -0.17*** (0.01)
SAH good -0.12*** (0.00) -0.09*** (0.00) -0.09*** (0.00) -0.09*** (0.00)
SAH bad 0.10*** (0.00) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.00)
SAH very bad 0.10*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01)
Hosp. visits 0.08*** (0.00) 0.04*** (0.00) 0.05*** (0.00) 0.05*** (0.00)
Inv. Mills 0.03** (0.01)
Constant 0.31*** (0.04) 0.67*** (0.06) 0.75*** (0.06) 0.00 (0.08)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 85,791 85,791 85,791 127,108
1) Standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped standard errors in selection models.
2) * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
3) SAH=self-rated health status.
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Table 2.8: Coecients of men's doing weekly sport
OLS FE FE-SEM FE-SEM Sel.
Weekly sport sp. 0.31*** (0.01) 0.19*** (0.00) 0.20** (0.09) 0.20* (0.10)
Private insur. 0.02** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
Age  25 0.24*** (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03)
26  Age  35 0.17*** (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03)
36  Age  45 0.15*** (0.01) -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
46  Age  55 0.10*** (0.01) -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
56  Age  65 0.08*** (0.01) -0.03* (0.02) -0.03* (0.02) -0.03* (0.02)
66  Age  75 0.06*** (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
Deg. of handicap -0.00 (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00)
Foreign -0.01 (0.01) 0.06** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.05* (0.03)
Kids in HH -0.02*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01)
West 0.05*** (0.01) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04)
Full Time 0.04** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01)
Part Time 0.08*** (0.02) -0.04** (0.02) -0.04** (0.02) -0.04** (0.02)
Unemployed -0.04*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01)
Blue collar -0.11*** (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
White Collar -0.07*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Self-employed -0.12*** (0.02) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02)
Log. eq. HH-inc. 0.06*** (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Health Job -0.03 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.05 (0.05)
Years of educ. 0.02*** (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
SAH very good 0.10*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01)
SAH good 0.04*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
SAH bad -0.05*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01)
SAH very bad -0.09*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01)
Hosp. visits 0.02*** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01)
Inv. Mills -0.04** (0.03)
Constant -0.53*** (0.05) 0.20*** (0.06) 0.20*** (0.06) -0.53*** (0.08)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 55,334 55,334 55,334 118,768
1) Standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped standard errors in selection models.
2) * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
3) SAH=self-rated health status.
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Table 2.9: Coecients of women's doing weekly sport
OLS FE FE-SEM FE-SEM Sel.
Weekly sport sp. 0.31*** (0.01) 0.21*** (0.01) 0.35*** (0.07) 0.34*** (0.08)
Private insur. 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03* (0.01) 0.03 (0.02)
Age  25 0.09*** (0.02) 0.07** (0.03) 0.07** (0.03) 0.07** (0.03)
26  Age  35 0.12*** (0.02) 0.06** (0.03) 0.06** (0.03) 0.06** (0.03)
36  Age  45 0.15*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.03) 0.08*** (0.03) 0.08*** (0.03)
46  Age  55 0.13*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02)
56  Age  65 0.13*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02)
66  Age  75 0.09*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02)
Deg. of handicap 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Foreign -0.10*** (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Kids in HH -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01)
West 0.07*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.03) 0.08*** (0.03) 0.08** (0.04)
Full Time -0.09*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01)
Part Time -0.04*** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) -0.02* (0.01)
Unemployed -0.02*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Blue collar 0.00 (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
White Collar 0.07*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Self.employed 0.05*** (0.02) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.02)
Log. eq. HH-inc. 0.09*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01)
Health Job -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02)
Years of educ. 0.02*** (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01* (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
SAH very good 0.09*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
SAH good 0.04*** (0.01) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
SAH bad -0.03*** (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) -0.01* (0.01) -0.01* (0.01)
SAH very bad -0.07*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01)
Hosp. visits -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
Inv. Mills 0.05*** (0.02)
Constant -0.80*** (0.05) -0.14** (0.07) -0.18** (0.07) -1.04*** (0.10)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 55,334 55,334 55,334 127,108
1) Standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped standard errors in selection models.
2) * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
3) SAH=self-rated health status.
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Table 2.10: Coecients of men's following healthy diet
OLS FE FE-SEM FE-SEM Sel.
Healthy diet sp. 0.37*** (0.01) 0.26*** (0.01) 0.20 (0.16) 0.19 (0.15)
Private insur. 0.02* (0.01) 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
Age  25 -0.27*** (0.03) 0.08 (0.08) 0.08 (0.08) 0.08 (0.08)
26  Age  35 -0.22*** (0.02) 0.07 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06)
36  Age  45 -0.18*** (0.02) 0.07 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05)
46  Age  55 -0.16*** (0.02) 0.08* (0.04) 0.08* (0.04) 0.08* (0.05)
56  Age  65 -0.09*** (0.02) 0.08** (0.04) 0.08** (0.04) 0.08** (0.04)
66  Age  75 -0.04** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.03) 0.08*** (0.03) 0.08** (0.03)
Deg. of handicap 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Foreign 0.04*** (0.02) -0.05 (0.07) -0.04 (0.07) -0.04 (0.07)
Kids in HH 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.014 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
West 0.01 (0.01) 0.08 (0.09) 0.08 (0.09) 0.08 (0.08)
Full Time -0.07*** (0.02) -0.06** (0.03) -0.06** (0.03) -0.06** (0.03)
Part Time -0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04) -0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.04)
Unemployed -0.06*** (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)
Blue collar -0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03)
White Collar -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03)
Self-employed -0.01 (0.02) 0.06* (0.03) 0.06* (0.03) 0.06* (0.03)
Log eq. HH-inc. -0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) -0.023 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
Health Job -0.02 (0.03) 0.09 (0.08) 0.09 (0.08) 0.09 (0.08)
Years of educ. 0.01*** (0.00) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
SAH very good 0.14*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02)
SAH good 0.05*** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01)
SAH bad 0.03** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01)
SAH very bad 0.09*** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.03) 0.11*** (0.03)
Hosp. visits 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
Inv. Mills -0.05* (0.03)
Constant 0.23*** (0.07) 0.39* (0.20) 0.43* (0.23) 0.31*** (0.09)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 20,091 20,091 20,091 118,768
1) Standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped standard errors in selection models.
2) * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
3) SAH=self-rated health status.
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Table 2.11: Coecients of women's following healthy diet
OLS FE FE-SEM FE-SEM Sel.
Healthy diet sp. 0.37*** (0.01) 0.26*** (0.01) 0.16 (0.12) 0.16 (0.12)
Private insur. 0.01 (0.01) 0.08** (0.03) 0.09** (0.04) 0.09*** (0.03)
Age  25 -0.09*** (0.03) 0.04 (0.07) 0.05 (0.07) 0.05 (0.07)
26  Age  35 -0.05** (0.02) 0.04 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06)
36  Age  45 -0.03 (0.02) 0.08 (0.05) 0.08 (0.05) 0.08* (0.05)
46  Age  55 -0.00 (0.02) 0.04 (0.05) 0.05 (0.05) 0.05 (0.05)
56  Age  65 -0.00 (0.02) 0.03 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04)
66  Age  75 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
Deg. of handicap 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Foreign -0.04** (0.02) 0.08 (0.07) 0.08 (0.07) 0.08 (0.07)
Kids in HH 0.03** (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
West -0.00 (0.01) 0.09 (0.09) 0.10 (0.09) 0.10 (0.10)
Full Time -0.09*** (0.01) -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Part Time -0.03** (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
Unemployed -0.06*** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Blue collar -0.04*** (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03)
White Collar 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Self-employed 0.06*** (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03)
Log. eq. HH-inc. 0.05*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Health Job 0.05*** (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.04)
Years of educ. 0.02*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
SAH very good 0.100*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02)
SAH good 0.05*** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
SAH bad 0.02* (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
SAH very bad 0.03 (0.02) 0.04* (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)
Hosp. visits 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Inv. Mills -0.02 (0.03)
Constant -0.13** (0.07) 0.29 (0.21) 0.36 (0.23) -0.07 (0.14)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 20,091 20,091 20,091 127,108
1) Standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped standard errors in selection models.
2) * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
3) SAH=self-rated health status.
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Chapter 3
The spousal impact on labor
force behavior: new evidence
for older married couples in
Germany
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3.1 Introduction
The public pension system in Germany causes a steady public debate. Dealing
with the demographic change in social security systems is one of the greatest pol-
icy challenges in most developed economies. Consequently, knowing more about
the determinants of the retirement decision is of high importance given the per-
manent decrease in labor force participation of men in the 1980s and particularly
the 1990s which could not be compensated by the increase of women's. Table 3.1
shows that the employment rates of men older than 54 decreased substantially
in the 1990s. In the age group 60{64, even less than 27 % were in employment.
However, in the last ten years, an increase could be observed so that the employ-
ment rates in 2008 were even higher than at the beginning of the 1990s: they
increased from 66.1 % in 2000 to 76.7 % in 2008 in the age group 55-59, and
from 27.2 % to 43.3 % for men aged 60 to 64. In contrast, the employment rate
of men aged 50 to 54 decreased from 89.5 % in 1991 to 80.9 % in 2005. Only
recently, this ratio rose again to 84.8 %. One reason for this rise in recent years is
probably the increase in statutory retirement ages in the public pension system
and the introduction of benets adjustments in case of early retirement.
Table 3.1: Employment rates of older men and women in Germany
Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64
Year Men Women Men Women Men Women
1991 89.5 60.3 73.1 37.8 31.3 9.9
1995 85.6 60.4 64.4 40.0 26.7 9.9
1997 82.8 60.3 62.9 43.2 26.8 10.8
2000 83.8 64.7 66.1 46.6 27.2 12.1
2002 82.3 67.0 68.6 50.1 30.2 14.5
2005 80.9 69.8 71.5 55.3 35.9 20.7
2008 84.8 74.1 76.7 61.4 43.3 27.3
Source: Eurostat (2009)
The labor force participation of German women has increased substantially in
the last decades - as in most developed countries. This rise is not restricted to
the young but women of all ages display this change in behavior. For example,
about 60 % of women aged 50{54 were employed in the beginning of the 1990s,
whereas the employment rate increased to 74.1 % in 2008. The employment rate
of women aged 60 to 64 almost tripled from 1995 to 2008.1
1Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that women often work part-time in contrast to men.
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A consequence of the rise in female labor force participation is the increasing pro-
portion of dual-worker couples among families approaching retirement. Hence,
learning more about the interdependencies between the spouses' retirement de-
cisions becomes increasingly important. How do certain characteristics of the
spouse inuence the individual decision to leave or to enter the labor force? In
particular, does the employment status of one spouse aect the retirement be-
havior of the other spouse? Since spouses usually share resources and care about
each other to some degree, they probably face a dierent optimization problem
than a single person. Moreover, they may have a preference to spend leisure time
together and therefore, try to coordinate their working behavior. Concerning
the individual retirement decision of men, there exists already a fair amount of
studies, whereas the literature on female and couples' retirement behavior is less
developed. Nevertheless, in the last 15 to 20 years, some economists and sociolo-
gists have started to analyze the working behavior of elderly couples taking into
account these interdependencies. They usually nd that the household context
plays a role and that spouses seem to have a preference to spend their spare
time together (see e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier, 2002; Blau, 1998). However,
for Germany, only a few studies exist providing evidence for cross-spouse eects
and dierences between dual-worker and male breadwinner-couples (see e.g. All-
mendinger, 1990; Drobnic and Schneider, 2000; Drobnic, 2003). However, they
often use cross-sectional data or restrict their analysis to wife's impact on the
husband's decision.
Blau and Riphahn (1999) use the SOEP and estimate transition probabilities for
four discrete labor force states that depend on the employment states of the two
spouses. They use data of older married West German couples from 1984 to 1994.
Their analysis of employment exit and entry behavior reveals strong patterns of
dependence in the labor force behavior of spouses.
Blau and Riphahn (1999) provide the basis of the present chapter. We use
monthly data provided by the SOEP for the years 1996{2007 and follow their
approach to estimate probabilities of status changes. Thus, we use recent data for
reunied Germany to analyze whether these patterns of dependence in spouses'
labor force behavior still hold despite of past reforms in statutory retirement ages.
In addition to an extensive set of nancial, health, and occupational variables,
satisfaction with leisure time is included to see whether and how this aects the
working decision. Our ndings are in line with previous results: the household
context plays a decisive role in the employment decision, and in particular, the
employment status of the partner seems to aect the labor force decision beyond
the nancial aspects. Even after controlling for age, wage, health status etc., the
probability of one spouse to stop working is much higher if the other spouse is
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already out of employment than if he/she is still employed. There seems to be
a preference to share one's retirement. Concerning the probability of going into
employment, we nd gender-specic dierences. For women, the probability to
enter is higher if the husband is also employed which is analogous to the ndings
for women's exit behavior. However, for men, we see the contrary: their prob-
ability to start working is higher if she is not employed. Maybe in these cases,
the need of a breadwinner dominates all other inuences on the working decision.
In addition, we nd evidence for cross-spouse eects, in particular for husbands.
Their probability to leave employment is signicantly aected by the wife's wage
and benets. The spouse's health status is another factor that alters the working
decision for both, men and women.
In a second step, we modify the general setting of Blau and Riphahn (1999) and
further dierentiate between unemployment and retirement. We show that the
probability to retire is substantially higher if the spouse is also retired compared
to a situation in which the spouse is still employed. This supports the interpreta-
tion that spouses prefer to retire together. In contrast, the husband's probability
to become unemployed does not seem to depend on the wife's labor force status.
However, the wife's probability is higher if her husband is still employed instead
of being retired.
The Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 contains a short review of the
relevant previous retirement literature and information about the public pension
system in Germany. In Section 3.3, the empirical approach and the data are
described. In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, empirical results of the basic and the modied
model are presented. A conclusion is provided in Section 3.6.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Previous literature
The German and the international literature on the individual's retirement deci-
sion is quite extensive. The basic idea of a typical theoretical retirement model
is that each worker chooses the best retirement date by comparing the expected
present value of future utilities. Due to the rather small percentage of working
women in the past, the vast majority of studies analyze only men's retirement
behavior. The models usually assume that man's utility depend on his market
wage, the accumulation of private pension assets or social security wealth, and
the value of leisure. Empirical studies usually nd large and signicant eects
of nancial incentives resulting from the social security system and from private
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pension plans.2 Any impact of the working behavior or attributes of the wife and
the family have been widely ignored in both, theoretical modeling and empirical
studies (see Lundberg, 1999). At least for the empirical literature, the reason is
usually the poor data availability of the wife's corresponding characteristics.
Because of the increase in the labor force participation rates of women, a few
studies emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s examining the individual retire-
ment decision of older women. Usually, these studies include household's or
husband's characteristics, however, they are usually assumed to be exogenous.
Their ndings are mixed. For example, McCarty (1990) and Vistnes (1994) nd
evidence that married women respond to a change in the one-year social secu-
rity accrual. In contrast, results from Pozzebon and Mitchell (1989) suggest that
family considerations are more important, while own earnings opportunities have
no impact.3
However, it is very likely that the working decisions of elderly spouses are interde-
pendent and therefore, analyses of the retirement behavior of married individuals
should take into account the spouse's situation. There are several possible sources
for interdependencies (see Hurd, 1990). First, spouses usually share nancial re-
sources like income and assets. Moreover, the income tax system in Germany
regulates that the tax burden of one spouse is aected by the income of the part-
ner. Another reason for a correlation in the spouses' working behavior can be
assortative mating, i.e. men tend to marry women (and vice versa) who have
similar abilities and preferences, in this case concerning retiring. A third source
is the complementarity of leisure, which means that spouses may prefer to spend
leisure time together. If so, the utility of own leisure increases if it is spent with
the partner.
Therefore, despite of data limitations in the beginning, some economists and so-
ciologists have started to focus on the joint retirement decision of a couple. Even
though all of the following studies are based on dierent data sets using dierent
estimation methods, their ndings conrm that retirement decisions are made
within the context of the family. A considerable fraction of husbands and wives
seems to coordinate their labor supply at older ages. Moreover, this coordination
seems to originate from complementarity of leisure and assortative mating.
Most studies use reduced form techniques to examine cross-spouse eects of eco-
nomic, health and other variables. For example, Hurd (1990) was the rst who
nds coordination of retirement dates by estimating Stone-Geary utility func-
2Exemplary for Germany is Borsch-Supan et al. (2004).
3However, all studies are based on data sets that are problematic in some respects. For
example, married women in the US-Retirement History Survey have not been asked the full
range of questions. See Weaver (1994) for a more detailed review of the literature on women's
retirement decision.
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tions. His results give evidence for complementarity of leisure as the main rea-
son. Only recently, Pozzoli and Ranzani (2009) use data from the Survey of
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to analyze the joint retire-
ment of couples in Europe with duration models. They nd that joint retirement,
i.e. spouses retire within one year, is signicantly correlated with own education,
age, and health status as well as the partner's employment status, age, and health
status.4 Nevertheless, a few structural bargaining models of couple's retirement
behavior have also been developed. Gustman and Steinmeier (2000, 2002) apply
a non-cooperative game, whereas, e.g., Maestas (2001), Michaud and Vermeulen
(2004), or Jia (2004) develop a cooperative model. These authors typically nd
that complementarity in leisure plays an important role. Moreover, Jia (2004)
shows that wife's leisure is valued more by couples than husband's leisure.
Blau (1997, 1998) uses a unitary framework in order to analyze the joint labor
force behavior of older married couples. He estimates transition probabilities
among a set of discrete joint labor force states, where one status is dened by
the two employment states of husband and wife. He nds a strong association
between the transition probabilities of one spouse and the status of the other
spouse. He concludes that this is probably due to complementarity of leisure
since he has accounted for other factors like assortative mating in his model.
Michaud (2003) and Mastrogiacomo et al. (2004) extend Blau's approach but use
dierent data sets. In general, they conrm his results.
For Germany, only a few studies exist. Allmendinger (1990), Wagner (1991),
Pischner and Wagner (1992), and Wagner (1996) examine mainly cross-sectional
data in order to describe retirement patterns. They provide rst evidence for
cross-spouse eects and a tendency to retire together. Both Drobnic and Schnei-
der (2000) and Drobnic (2003) use the SOEP in order to examine the retirement
timing using a piece-wise constant hazard model. Drobnic and Schneider (2000)
estimate the probability to retire for wives and husbands of dual-worker couples
separately. They nd that husbands' decision is based only on the nancial situ-
ation of the household, whereas wives also consider the labor force status of the
husband and household size. In contrast, Drobnic (2003) looks for dierences in
the determinants of the retirement decision between unmarried and married men,
and between married men with a working and a non-working wife. She concludes
that the existence and the labor force status of a wife matters in the men's retire-
ment decision. Namely, unmarried men and husbands with non-employed wives
strongly respond to nancial incentives, whereas household's economic well-being
4Other examples of reduced form estimations are Zweimuller et al. (1996) for Austria, Baker
(1999) for Canada, Johnson and Favreault (2001) using the US-HRS data set, or An et al. (2004)
for Denmark. Jimenez-Martn et al. (1999) use the European Community Household Panel to
describe and analyze couples' retirement patterns for the EU12 countries.
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is secondary in the retirement decision of married men with a working wife.
Blau and Riphahn (1999) follow Blau's approach, and estimate transition proba-
bilities from one joint labor force state into another. They nd that the predicted
probability of leaving employment is higher if the spouse is not employed and the
probability of entering employment is higher if the partner is employed. More-
over, the spouse's characteristics seem to inuence the working decision but not
in the same way for men and women.
3.2.2 The public pension system in Germany
The basic structure of today's German public pension system were established in
1957.5 It is characterized by a pay-as-you-go scheme and a very broad mandatory
coverage of workers. In 1992 and 2001, two major reforms were carried out,
with additional modications afterwards. In 1992, adjustments of benets to
early retirement and an increase in statutory retirement ages were introduced.
However, the change in statutory ages took place with a long delay starting in
1997, and the adjustments of benets are not fully actuarial. With the reform of
2001, a multipillar pension system has been introduced that will be fully phased
in by 2050. Thus, current retirees' income is still shaped by a monolithic pension
system.
The system is mainly nanced by contributions that are administered like a pay-
roll tax (up to an upper earnings threshold), levied equally on employees and
employers. Around 25 % of the budget are nanced by subsidies from the federal
government (see Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2008). There are three types of
pensions: old-age pensions, disability benets, and survivor benets for spouses
and children. Old-age pensions are further dierentiated into one "normal" retire-
ment and four opportunities of early retirement. With the exception of survivor
benets, there are no benets for spouses like in the US. Benets are strictly
work-related. The only special regulation regarding married couples was the in-
troduction of dierent mandatory retirement ages for men and women in 1957.
According to Ehmer (1990), the main motivation for this dierence was to enable
couples to retire jointly, given the common age dierence between husband and
wife which amounted to three years at that time. The ocial reason was to give
employed women a bonus for their double burden of market and domestic work.
However, with the reform of 1992, this discrimination in the normal retirement
age has subsequently been abolished (see Table 3.2).
5The following section is based on the more detailed description of the system and reforms
by Borsch-Supan and Wilke (2003).
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Benets are computed on a lifetime basis and adjusted according to the type of
pension and the retirement age. They are the product of four elements: 1. the
so-called earnings points that reect the employee's earnings position relative to
the average German worker in each working year, 2. the years of service life,
3. adjustment factors for pension type and retirement age, and 4. a reference
pension value (current pension value). Hence, the level of benets is strongly
inuenced by the individual's lifetime earnings history. Redistribution has never
been an important factor.
Table 3.2: Pre-1992 and current statutory retirement ages
Type of Age of Age of Period of
Old-Age Retirement Retirement phasing
Pension (pre-1992 reg.) (post-1992 reg.) in
Normal 65 65 -
Long Service 63 65 2000{01
Life (35 years)
Women 60 65 2000{04
Sev. 60 63 2001{03
Handicapped
Unemployed 60 65 1997{2001
Table 3.2 shows statutory retirement ages of the ve types of old-age pensions
with full benets before and after the implementation of the 1992 reforms. Be-
tween 1997 and 2004, the opportunities to go into retirement before age 65 with-
out any adjustments to the benets were abolished successively. Only to older
people with a severe handicap, full benets are paid as of age 63. Nevertheless,
retirement below age 65 is still possible but only at the cost of benet adjust-
ments. For women and severely handicapped early retirement is possible as of
age 60, whereas men with long-term contributions can exit as of age 63. For
unemployed the minimum age for early retirement was increased from 60 to 63
between 2006 and 2008.6 Only recently, further increases in statutory ages have
passed the German Bundestag that will be fully phased in 2029. The new law
regulates that the normal retirement age is 67. Early retirement without benet
adjustments is only possible as of age 65 for severely handicapped and those with
45 service life years. For disabled individuals, there is no minimum retirement
age.
In addition to these ocial pathways to retirement, many people used to exit the
labor force via unemployment. Firms often laid o older workers as many months
before age 60 as the worker's unemployment benets would run. Sometimes they
6To qualify for normal and early retirement benets, certain conditions must be satised
like minimum years of contribution. For more details, see e.g. Borsch-Supan and Wilke (2003).
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oered a severance payment. This quite common scheme of retirement in the
1990s helps to explain the low labor force participation rate among men of age
55{59 during that time.
3.3 Empirical approach
3.3.1 Multinomial logit model
The empirical strategy is to dene four discrete states depending on the (self-
assessed) labor force states of the two spouses, and to estimate the probabilities
to change a given status. Ultimately, we compare the results when the partner is
employed with those when the partner is not employed.
The discrete states are dened as follows:
1: Both spouses are employed.
2: The husband is employed, the wife is not employed.
3: The husband is not employed, the wife is employed.
4: Both spouses are not employed.
Hence, at this stage, we only distinguish between employment and non-employment
(and not between participation and non-participation). This is a strong simpli-
cation because it neglects dierences between full-time and part-time workers as
well as between unemployed and retired individuals. Moreover, we group indi-
viduals searching for a job and those that are not participating, e.g. housewives.
In Section 3.5, we further dierentiate between unemployment and retirement
in order to analyze the exit behavior in more detail. Nevertheless, any further
dierentiation makes estimation problematic because we do not have enough ob-
servations for each possible transition. Therefore, we start our analysis with the
general exit and entry behavior out of and into employment, where exit denotes
to stop working and entry to start working.
For our estimations, we make use of the calendars of the SOEP that provide
the labor force status in each month of last year. Thus, we use discrete time-
data to estimate the monthly transition probabilities from one state into another
controlling for various individual factors of the spouses and household character-
istics. We apply the multinomial logit model (MNL). By using this approach we
avoid a selection of couples based on labor force participation, especially of wives.
In many previous empirical studies, e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier (2000), only
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couples were chosen where both spouses had a strong labor force attachment.
Moreover, we do not include the partner's labor force status as supposedly ex-
ogenous regressor (like e.g., Drobnic and Schneider, 2000), which is questionable
if spouses coordinate their working decision.
The MNL approach computes the predicted probabilities to observe outcome m
of J possible alternatives given a vector of exogenous regressors x by
Pr(y = m jx) = exp(xmjb)PJ
j=1 exp(xjjb)
;
where b is the base category. We estimate four multinomial logit equations (one
for each of the four dened states) separately. In principle, each of the four
original states has four possible outcomes in the next period: neither of the
spouse changes the employment status, only the husband changes, only the wife
does, or both spouses change their status. However, we restrict our analysis to the
rst three alternatives since we have too few observations in which both spouses
change (see Section 3.3.2 for more details).
The MNL model assumes independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Whether
this assumption actually holds can be checked with various tests like the Hausman
and McFadden (1984) or the Small and Hsiao (1985) test. Whereas the Hausman-
McFadden test cannot reject independence in any case, the Small-Hsiao test
rejects it in three of eight cases. Even though the tests do not give clear evidence
they suggest that the IIA assumption is not problematic. Moreover, McFadden
(1974) proposed that the MNL model should only be used if the alternatives were
distinct and could be weighed independently by the decision maker (see Long and
Freese, 2006, ch. 6). In our opinion, the alternatives to work or not to work, given
that the spouse also either works or does not work, are distinct from each other.
Therefore, the potential violation of the IIA assumption should not be a problem
in our setting.
3.3.2 Sample
In our data set, we make use of the West and East German sample provided by
the SOEP. Due to transitory retirement regulations after reunication, we only
use data for the years 1996 to 2007. Since we are only interested in the behavior
of older couples, the sample is further limited to married couples in which at least
one spouse is in the age range from 50 to 65. Observations are censored upon
dissolution of marriage, death of one spouse, both spouses being older than 65,
or panel attrition. Finally, all observations are censored after 2007. The sample
consists of 2,620 couples with 5,013 spells and 2,393 transitions observed for a
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total of 133,050 months.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 describe the employment behavior of men and women in the
sample. Figure 3.1 shows the probability of employment by age for husbands and
wives, separately. Between husband's age 50{56, the employment rate decreases
from 90 % to 80 %, whereas for wives, the rate drops from 74 % to 58 %. They
further decrease to 40 % and 17 % at age 61, respectively.7 At the normal age of
retirement for men, age 65, only 9 % of husbands (and 4 % of wives) are still in
employment.
Figure 3.1: Probability of labor force participation by age for husbands and
wives in the sample
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Figure 3.2 describes the distribution of couples' joint labor force states by hus-
band's age. From age 50 to 59, it is most common to observe both spouses work-
ing. However, from age 52 onwards the percentage is steadily decreasing from 67
% to 33 %. Already after husband's age 59, the most frequently observed state
is state 4, when both spouses are not employed (31 %). The proportion increases
to 71 % at age 65. From age 50 to 59, the second largest proportion of couples
is in state 2 with a working husband and a non-working wife (22 % to 34 %). In
contrast, status 3 is very common when the husband is of age 58 to 65. The pro-
portion increases from 13 % at age 57 to more than 20 %. Compared to the Blau
and Riphahn (1999) sample from 1984 to 1994, the incidence of states 3 and 4 is
in our sample much higher at younger ages of the husband. From age 50 to 58,
the fraction of couples in state 3 was constantly about 5 % in the Blau/Riphahn
760 was the "normal" age of retirement for women, severely handicapped and unemployed.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of joint labor force states by husbands' age in the
sample
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sample, whereas we observe a proportion of 5 % to 16 %. Moreover, it had a
peak below 20 % at age 62. State 4 was the most frequently observed state only
after age 61. Hence, despite of the recently introduced disincentives for early re-
tirement, the probability to observe a couple with a non-working husband who is
younger than 60 is higher in the present sample. These ndings might be driven
by the unemployment rate of East German men that was about twice as high
as for West German men over the last 15 years (see Statistisches Bundesamt,
2009c). East German couples were not included in the Blau/Riphahn sample.
Table 3.3: Reclassications of transition states
Original transition in t New transition in t{1 New transition in t
1 ! 4 1 ! 3 3 ! 4
2 ! 3 2 ! 1 1 ! 3
3 ! 2 3 ! 1 1 ! 2
4 ! 1 4 ! 2 2 ! 1
Our empirical strategy is to estimate transition probabilities. In our data set, we
observe more than 2,300 changes of states in total. However, only 34 involve both
spouses changing employment status within one month. Since these numbers of
joint transitions are too small for estimation, these cases are reclassied. We
follow Blau and Riphahn (1999) and assume that one spouse changes the status
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in period t   1 and the other one in t. The \rst-mover" is assumed to be the
one with the higher unconditional transition probability. Table 3.3 shows the
reclassication patterns. Since one period is only one month in our setting, this
data modication should not be severe.
Table 3.4 displays the unconditional transitions from one state into another after
reclassication. Percentages are given in parentheses. There is a high incidence of
remaining in the original state (97 % to 99 %), which is not surprising given that
we use monthly data. However, these gures provide a rst hint for a possible
interrelationship between the labor market behavior of two spouses. The average
monthly probability that a husband stops working is much higher if the wife is
not employed (2 ! 4: 1.21 %) than if she is still working (1 ! 3: 0.75 %). The
same holds for wives: the exit probability is much higher if the husband is already
out of the labor force (3 ! 4: 1.26 %) than if he is employed (1 ! 2: 0.73 %).
Concerning the entry behavior, analogous patterns can be found: the probability
of entering the labor market is lower if the partner is not working. However, these
numbers do not control for age, nancial aspects, health status etc.
Table 3.4: Employment status transitions
State of Destination State
Origin 1 2 3 4 Total
1 44,847 332 343 0 45,522
(Both employed) (98.52) (0.73) (0.75) (0.00) (100.00)
2 400 25,717 0 319 26,436
(Only H employed) (1.51) (97.28) (0.00) (1.21) (100.00)
3 331 0 19,519 253 20,103
(Only W employed) (1.65) (0.00) (97.09) (1.26) (100.00)
4 0 235 180 40,574 40,989
(Both OLF) (0.00) (0.57) (0.44) (98.99) (100.00)
Total 45,578 26,284 20,042 41,146 133,050
(34.26) (19.75) (15.06) (30.93) (100.00)
1) OLF: Out of labor force = unemployed, retired, housewife/-husband;
2) H: Husband, W: Wife;
3) Percentages in parentheses.
Table 3.5 describes the distribution of spells by couples. For the majority of
observations (48 %), the couple remain in one spell over the sample period, i.e.
they do not change their status. In contrast, for 23 % of all observations, they
change their status once, and for 14 % twice.
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Table 3.5: Distribution of no. of spells per couple
No. of spells No. of obs. Obs. in %
1 63,428 47.67
2 30,799 23.15
3 18,139 13.63
4 8,571 6.44
5 5,791 4.35
6 2,849 2.14
7 937 0.70
8 1,172 0.88
9 to 10 596 0.45
More than 10 768 0.58
Total 133,050 100.00
3.3.3 Explanatory variables
In the MNL estimations, we control for various factors that should aect the
decision to start and to stop working. Table 3.6 lists the explanatory variables
used in the estimations. We distinguish between individual characteristics and
variables on a household level. To allow for cross-spouse eects, individual factors
of both mates are included. Descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 3.7.1.
Table 3.6: Explanatory variables
Subject Individual variables Var. on HH level
Finances Predicted wage and benets Non-labor income
Health Handicap
Occupation Blue-/white-collar worker,
public-/self-employed,
tenure, hours worked
Human capital Education
Satisfaction With leisure time, with job
Others Age No. of persons in HH,
spell duration, East,
year dummies
Key factors for the working decision are the nancial incentives, namely the wage
income if the individual is employed and benets if he/she is not employed. We
expect that a higher wage induces an individual to stay in employment or to
enter employment. Analogously, higher benets should increase the exit prob-
ability and decrease the entry probability. Since wages are not observable for
non-workers, and benets are not observable for workers, we estimate Heckman
selection models for husbands and wives separately. From the resulting estimates
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we predict monthly wages and benets for each observation.8 Our approach is a
simplication, in particular for the benets, because we do not account for non-
linearities in the German public pension system. However, for a more descriptive
rather than structural analysis like this, it should be justiable to use this ap-
proach. In addition to predicted wages and benets of both spouses, we consider
the household's net non-labor income.
Two other important determinants of the employment decision are age and health
status. The labor force participation usually decreases with age. Similarly, a
worsening health status should lead to a lower probability to be in employment,
in particular given the opportunity of early retirement for severely handicapped.
Consequently, we include a dummy variable whether the individual has a handi-
cap or not as well as the individual's age.9
Several authors have suggested that spouses might prefer to spend leisure time
together and as a consequence, we would observe interdependencies in their re-
tirement decisions. Unfortunately, we do not know how the couples value the
time spent together. Nevertheless, we do know how satised somebody is with
its own leisure time. In the SOEP, satisfaction is measured on a 11-point scale
from 0 (very low) to 10 (very high) which we combine to four dummies: very high
(8 to 10), high (5 to 7), low (3 to 4), and very low (0 to 2). These dummies may
also capture how important spare time is for the individual and how important
it is to share it with the partner. Since the satisfaction with leisure time is to
some extent linked with working time, we also include the actual hours worked
per week.
Another individual characteristic we control for is education. We follow Bloss-
feld and Timm (2003) and dene three hierarchical education levels: "low"
if somebody has no schooling degree, a Hauptschul - or Realschul -degree but
no vocational degree; "medium" if the individual has no schooling degree, a
Hauptschul - or Realschul -degree and additionally a vocational degree or if he/she
has Abitur/Fachhochschulreife, with or without a vocational degree. "high"
means a university degree or a degree from a university of applied sciences.
As there are probably dierences between industry sectors, in particular con-
cerning the risk of unemployment, we distinguish between white- and blue-collar
workers, between publicly employed (vs. privately) and self-employed. Moreover,
we include rm tenure (in years). As subjective measure, we consider satisfac-
tion with the job, ranging from \very high" and \high" to \low" and \very low".
Additional controls include the number of individuals living in the household, a
quadratic in the duration of the current spell, a dummy variable for couple living
8Details about the wage and benets estimations can be found in Appendix 3.7.2.
9The use of dummies with age groups reecting the thresholds for early retirement does not
lead to any improvement.
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in East Germany, and year dummies. All covariates are given on an annual basis
except the spell duration which is monthly data.
3.4 Results
The unconditional transition probabilities indicate that the labor force status of
the spouse aects the labor market behavior. In the following, we rst examine
the predicted probabilities to stop and to start working from the MNL regressions
to see whether this pattern still holds if we control for age, nancial variables,
health status etc. Because of the large number of results, we restrict the discussion
in Section 3.4.2 to a selection of variables. Moreover, we only interpret eects on
the probability to stop working. Full estimation results are given in Appendix
3.7.3.
In order to stress the impact of spouse's labor force status, those results are
directly compared in which one spouse changes the status, rst, if the partner
is employed, and second, if the partner is not employed. For example, if the
husband leaves employment, marginal eects are compared from transition from
state 1 into 3 (wife remains employed) with transition from state 2 into 4 (wife
is not employed). Table 3.7 illustrates which transitions we compare.
Table 3.7: Comparison of transitions
Husband Wife
Wife empl. Wife OLF Husb. empl. Husb. OLF
Exit 1 ! 3 2 ! 4 1 ! 2 3 ! 4
Entry 3 ! 1 4 ! 2 2 ! 1 4 ! 3
OLF: Out of labor force = unemployed, retired, housewife/-husband.
3.4.1 Predicted transition probabilities
Table 3.8 shows the predicted probabilities to stop and to start working based on
the MNL regressions. Since the four samples dier in the covariates' distributions,
we do not take the means but specify certain values for prediction. Hence, we
compare predicted transition probabilities for individuals that only dier in the
labor force status of the spouse. Moreover, we assume the same values for husband
and wife. The last columns in Tables 3.13, 3.14, and 3.15 in Appendix 3.7.1
present all the values that we assume.
Our results mainly support the hypothesis that married people prefer to be in
the same labor force status as the spouse. The exit probability is higher for
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Table 3.8: Predicted probabilities
Husband Wife
Wife empl. Wife OLF Husb. empl. Husb. OLF
Prob. stop working 0.0046 0.0445 0.0478 0.0697
Prob. start working 0.0003 0.0015 0.0067 0.0008
1) OLF: Out of labor force = unemployed, retired, housewife/-husband;
2) Assumed values for covariates are given in Appendix 3.7.1.
both, husbands and wives, if the spouse is already out of employment. Moreover,
the wife's probabilities are much higher than the husband's (0.0478 and 0.0697
compared to 0.0046 and 0.0445). Similarly, for wives, the probability to start
working is higher if the husband is also employed. However, we do not nd this
pattern for husband's probability to go into employment. For them, the entry
probability is higher if the wife is out of the labor force. Maybe the need to have
a breadwinner dominates in these cases.
3.4.2 Impact of selected covariates
Since the estimated coecients of a multinomial logit model provide little infor-
mation, we present average marginal eects on the predicted transition proba-
bility. The standard errors of them are computed with the delta method. Table
3.9 shows selected marginal eects. Since we estimate monthly transition prob-
abilities the eects are usually quite small. However, relative to the predicted
transition probabilities (see Section 3.4.1) the inuence of the variables is often
quite substantial.
In general, the eects of own wage and benets are as expected. Higher wages
and lower benets lead to a stronger labor force attachment, where reactions
of women are always stronger than of men. Moreover, the size of the eects
diers depending on the labor force status of the spouse. The negative eect of
own wage on the probability to stop working is always higher if the spouse is
still employed, whereas the positive eect of benets is stronger if the spouse is
not employed. For instance, if the wife's own wage increases by 1,000 Euro, her
probability to stop working increases by 0.03 percentage points if the husband is
employed and by 0.01 if he is not employed. Concerning the nancial incentives of
the spouse we nd gender- and income type-specic dierences. The wife's wage
reduces the husband's probability to stop working, whereas her benets increase
the likelihood. In contrast, the husband's nancial incentives do not have any
signicant eect on the wife's transition probability. In contrast to intuition,
the household's other non-labor income usually decreases the probability to stop
working, in particular if the spouse is not employed.
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The eect to be handicapped is not as expected. Only wife's handicap raises
the risk to leave employment if the husband is employed. In all other cases,
the eect is negative and not signicant. This pattern might be explained by
a stronger protection against dismissal for severely handicapped which probably
compensates the positive eect of a bad health status.10 More strikingly, the
spouse's health status has often a huge and signicant impact on the behavior
of the partner. The motive to care for the spouse apparently plays a role in the
own employment decision at older age. However, we nd again gender-specic
dierences. For wives, the bad health status of the husband seems to induce
them to leave employment, in particular if he is already out of employment. For
husbands, the sign depends on her employment status. If she is, despite of the
handicap, still employed his probability to stop working is lower, however, if she
is not in employment, his probability is higher.
Table 3.9: Average marginal eects on exit probabilities for selected variables
Husband Wife
Variable W empl. W OLF H empl. H OLF
Financial aspects
Own wage -0.000298** -0.000105** -0.001125* -0.000893**
Own benets 0.000749 0.002086* 0.004926*** 0.007488**
Spouse's wage -0.002250* -0.004906*** 0.000149 0.000001
Spouse's benets 0.009852*** 0.002646 -0.000374 -0.000650
HH's other income -0.000281 -0.000520** 0.000140 -0.000459
Health
Handicap -0.000503 -0.000715 0.000984*** -0.003854
Spouse has handicap -0.001969*** 0.002709*** 0.000252 0.002755***
Leisure satisfaction
Own leisure sat high 0.000180 0.000841 -0.000058 0.000076
Own leisure sat low -0.000394 0.001675*** 0.000010 -0.000256
Own leisure sat very low 0.001114 0.002071*** -0.000194 0.000079
Other variables yes yes yes yes
No. of observations 45,522 27,085 45,522 20,103
No. of couples 1,186 872 1,186 678
1) OLF: out of the labor force = not employed; H: husband, W: wife, HH: household;
2) * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Stand. errors estimated by the delta method.
3) Ref. groups: leisure satisfaction very high.
4) Wage and benets are given in 1,000 Euro.
The results for own leisure satisfaction do not give clear evidence concerning
the eect on labor force behavior. Only husbands' unhappiness seems to induce
them to leave employment, but only if the wife is also already out of the labor
10An alternative, more technical explanation can be that stating to be handicapped is en-
dogenous to employment transitions and therefore, the MNL regressions are biased.
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force. We cannot observe this pattern for wives. Maybe husbands have a stronger
preference to spend leisure time together with the wife than vice versa.
3.5 Modication: Distinction between retirement and
unemployment
3.5.1 New denition of states
The model of the previous section does not distinguish between unemployment
and retirement, or part-time and full-time employment. The main reason is to
have more observations for each transition and thus, to have better estimates.
However, it is very likely that the determinants of a transition into unemploy-
ment or into retirement are dierent. On the one hand, unemployment is often
involuntary. On the other hand, even though it was a common scheme of rms
to induce older workers at age 58 or 59 to retire via unemployment or special
rm schemes, those individuals probably behave dierently than people who go
directly into retirement. Therefore, we modify the model and distinguish be-
tween unemployment and retirement. Hence, an individual can either stay in
employment, become unemployed or retire while his or her spouse is employed,
unemployed or retired.11 Now, the possible states are dened as follows:
1: Both spouses are employed.
5: Husband is employed, wife is retired.
6: Husband is employed, wife is unemployed.
7: Husband is retired, wife is employed.
8: Husband is unemployed, wife is employed.
9: Both spouses are retired.
10: Both spouses are unemployed.
11: Husband is retired, wife is unemployed.
12: Husband is unemployed, wife is retired.
As before, if both spouses change the status in month t, these observations are
reclassied such that one spouse changes in t   1 and the other in t. Given
11Non-participating individuals are included in the group of retirees.
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that in some states, there are too few observations to get reasonable estimates,
the analysis is restricted to retiring and becoming unemployed provided that the
spouse is either employed or retired. Thus, we look at transition probabilities out
of state 1, state 5, and state 7 (see Table 3.10).
Table 3.10: Analyzed transitions into retirement
Husband Wife
W empl. W ret H empl. H ret
Retiring 1 ! 7 5 ! 9 1 ! 5 7 ! 9
Becoming unemployed 1 ! 8 5 ! 12 1 ! 6 7 ! 11
Table 3.21 in Appendix 3.7.5 illustrates the number of observed transitions for
these three states. The general estimation strategy remains the same.
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of some of the newly dened joint labor force
states by husband's age. For the sake of clarity, only the most important four
states (1, 5, 7 and 9) are included. It looks very similar to Figure 3.2 which
demonstrates that states 5, 7, and 9 are the prevalent ones in the previously
dened states 2, 3, and 4. The fractions of states 6, 8, 10, 11, and 12 never
exceed 7 %. From age 50 to 60, it is most common to observe state 1 in which
both spouses are employed. After age 60, it is most common to observe state
9 in which both spouses are retired. The proportion sharply increases from 20
% at age 60 to 67 % at age 65. The percentage of couples in state 5 (husband
employed, wife retired) ranges from 18 % to 26 % between age 50 and 61. After
age 61, the proportion decreases from 17 % to 6 % at age 65. The proportion of
couples in state 7 (husband retired, wife employed) increases steadily from 7 %
at age 57 to 19 % at age 62, and has another peak at age 65 with almost 20 %.
3.5.2 Predicted transition probabilities
Table 3.11 shows the predicted probabilities of retiring and becoming unemployed.
We assume the same values for the covariates as in Section 3.4.1. As expected,
we nd substantial dierences between the predicted probabilities of becoming
unemployed and of retiring.
Concerning retirement, our previous results are conrmed: the probability to go
on pension is higher if the spouse is already retired, indicating again a preference
to share one's retirement. Whereas the transition probabilities per se are much
higher for wives than for husbands (0.0704 and 0.0866 compared to 0.0010 and
0.1545), the relative dierence depending on the spouse's employment status is
more pronounced for husbands (0.0010 compared to 0.1545 and 0.0704 compared
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Figure 3.3: Parts of the distribution of new joint labor force states by hus-
band's age
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to 0.0866). The probability to become unemployed is in each case much smaller
than to retire. Nevertheless, the transition probabilities are once more higher
for wives than for husbands. Concerning the impact of the spouse's employment
status, we also nd gender-specic dierences. The husband's risk does not seem
to be aected by the wife's status, however, for wives the probability is higher if
the husband is still employed.
Table 3.11: Predicted probabilities modied model
Husband Wife
W empl. W ret H empl. H ret
Prob. of retiring 0.0010 0.1545 0.0704 0.0866
Prob. of becoming unemployed 0.0001 0.0001 0.0023 0.0003
Assumed values for covariates are given in Appendix 3.7.1.
3.5.3 Eects of nancial incentives
Because of the large number of results Table 3.12 presents only the average
marginal eects of the own and the spouse's predicted income on the proba-
bility to retire and to become unemployed. Full estimation results are given in
Appendix 3.7.6.
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Table 3.12: Average marginal eects of nancial incentives in modied mod-
els
Husband Wife
Variable W empl. W ret. H empl. H ret.
Retiring
Own wage -0.000631* -0.000745** -0.000935* -0.000750*
Own benets 0.000445 -0.000817 0.003534** 0.000435*
Spouse's wage -0.000846 0.000617 0.000970*** 0.000001
Spouse's benets 0.001168 -0.001207 -0.000929 -0.001610
Becoming unemployed
Own wage -0.001442*** -0.003426*** -0.001932** -0.003645*
Own benets 0.001073 0.005163** 0.008519 0.017957***
Spouse's wage 0.000909 0.000058 0.000132 0.000001
Spouse's benets -0.002619 0.006247* 0.000340 0.002639*
1) H: husband, W: wife;
2) * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Stand. errors estimated by the delta
method.
3) Wage and benets are given in 1,000 Euro.
Analogue to the rst results, own wage decreases both the probability to retire
and to become unemployed, whereas own benets usually increase them. How-
ever, in contrast to the undierentiated regression results, we now nd that the
husband's reaction to own nancial incentives is stronger if his wife is retired
than if she is employed (except own benets in case of retiring). The same holds
for wives in case of becoming unemployed. The probability to retire, however,
is stronger aected by changes in own wage and benets if her husband is still
employed. Concerning the spouse's income even the wife's eect on the husband
are not signicant anymore. This can probably be attributed to the small number
of transitions since the impact is often quite substantial although being impre-
cisely estimated. For instance, in case of retiring, a higher wage of the spouse
usually increases the probability, whereas higher benets usually decrease it. The
exception are husbands with an employed wife, for them, it is the opposite. The
probability of becoming unemployed is in almost all cases positively aected by
a higher income, independent of the type. Thus, the dierences in predicted
probabilities as well as the eects of dierent covariates suggest that it is im-
portant to distinguish between unemployment and retirement. Moreover, men
and women seem to behave dierently in some respects. Women react stronger
to own nancial incentives. Furthermore, the increase in the men's probability
due to a change in own wage or benets is higher if the wife is already retired.
However, this only holds for the wife's probability to become unemployed. Her
likelihood to retire rises more by an increase in wage and benets if the husband
is employed.
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3.6 Conclusion
To retire or not to retire is a decision that is not easily made by most individuals.
Many dierent factors determine whether people leave employment for good or
whether they rather stay a few years longer in the labor force, e.g. economic
aspects, social security regulations, the health status, the need to feel useful, or
the importance of leisure. In the present paper, we analyze which role the spouse
plays in that decision. Spouses' working decisions are very likely interdependent
since they share resources like income and assets as well as their leisure time.
Given the growing proportion of dual-worker couples, it becomes increasingly
important to know more about spouses coordinating their retirement decision.
Therefore, we estimate probabilities to stop and start working for older married
men and women as a function of an extensive set of individual as well as spouse's
socio-economic factors like wage and benets, health status, and occupational
characteristics. We further look for dierences in these transition probabilities
depending on the employment status of the spouse.
Our ndings indicate that there is a relationship between the labor force states
of two spouses that go beyond nancial and health aspects. They rather seem
to have a preference for shared retirement which also conrm previous research.
The probability to leave employment is higher if the spouse is also not employed
than if he/she is employed. If we explicitly distinguish between retirement and
unemployment we nd that only the probability to retire depends positively on
the spouse being already retired. Husband's risk to become unemployed is not
aected by the wife's employment status, whereas the wife's probability of becom-
ing unemployed is higher if her husband is still employed. Furthermore, we nd
evidence for cross-spouse eects that, however, dier between men and women.
For instance, the wife's wage reduces the husband's probability to stop working,
whereas her benets increase it. In contrast, the husband's nancial incentives
do not have any signicant eect on the wife's probability to leave employment.
The spouse's health status has also often a major and signicant impact. The
need to care for the partner apparently aects the individual's working decision
at older age. However, we nd again gender-specic dierences. For wives, a
bad health status of the husband increases the probability to stop working, in
particular if he is already out of employment. For husbands, this only holds if
she is not in employment. If she is still employed despite of her handicap his
probability to stop working decreases.
Thus, the other spouse's employment status, income and health status are par-
ticularly important for the individual decision to retire or not. Nevertheless, the
sign and the size of the impact dier between husband and wife.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Descriptive statistics
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3.7.2 Estimation of wages and benets
Since we can neither observe the wage of individuals who do not work nor the
benets of those who do work, we have to predict them. Therefore, we use a
Heckman selection model.
Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009) (ch. 16), we assume two latent variables
y1 and y2. Let y2 denote the wage (benets) that we can only observe if y1 = 1,
that is, if the individual works (does not work). Thus, the two-equation model
we use consists of a selection equation for y1:
y1 =
8<:1 if y1 > 00 if y1  0;
and an outcome equation for y2:
y2 =
8<:y2 if y1 > 0  if y1  0:
We further assume a linear model with additive errors:
y1 = x
0
11 + 1
y2 = x
0
22 + 2;
with 1 and 2 possibly correlated. Since it is expected to be more robust than
the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, we use the two-step method which
assumes a univariate normal distribution of the errors. Nevertheless, we compute
standard errors by bootstrapping with 300 replications.
Moreover, the two-step method is based on the conditional expectation:
E(y2jx; y1 > 0) = x022 + 12(x011);
where () = ()=(). The rationale behind this model is that because y2 =
x022 + 2, the conditional expectation is E(y2jx; y1 > 0) = x022 + E(2jy1 > 0)
and, given normality of the errors, E(2jy1 > 0) = 12(x011).
The ()-term can be estimated by (x01^1), where ^1 is obtained by a probit
regression of y1 on x1. To get estimates of (2; 12) we regress y2 on x2 and the
inverse Mills' ratio (x01^1) with OLS.
We estimate ln(wage) and ln(benets) for men and women separately. Tables
3.16 and 3.17 show the results. Because of missing values in crucial explanatory
variables, the total number of observations in the MNL estimations is smaller
than the number of observations used for the wage and benet estimations. As
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explanatory variables, the wage equations include years of education (years of
schooling plus years of training/university), a quadratic term in labor force expe-
rience (sum of full- and part-time experience), rm tenure, and age, a dummy if
he/she has a handicap of a degree  50 % (here called \severely handicapped"), a
dummy whether the household lives in East Germany and the number of kids age
0 to 18 living in the household. However, the selection equations do not contain
rm tenure and only include a linear term of labor force experience and age.
Due to the dierent retirement regulations, the benets estimation equations
slightly dier for husbands and wives. For both, we include years of education, a
quadratic term in labor force experience, a dummy whether he/she is handicapped
(that is, degree > 0 %), a dummy for being a foreigner, a dummy for living in
East Germany, and year dummies (reference group: 1996). We include year
dummies as a simplistic way to control for changes in retirement regulations.
Since the level of benets depends on the age of entry into retirement we also
consider dummies for dierent age groups when the individual retired. For both
sexes, the control group is retirement before age 60. However, in the husband's
estimation we further distinguish between age 60{62 and retirement after age 62.
Unfortunately, we do not observe the age of retirement for all individuals (e.g. if
she retires before the sample period). We control for that with a dummy variable.
Since children also aect the retirement benets of women, we include the total
number of births over their life course.
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Table 3.16: Heckman two-step estimation of wages
Husband Wife
ln(wage) Sel. eq. ln(wage) Sel. eq.
Years of education 0.0452*** 0.1789*** 0.1085*** 0.1024***
(0.0091) (0.0150) (0.0119) (0.0137)
Lab. market exp. -0.0290* 0.0966*** 0.0439*** 0.0656***
(0.0162) (0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0030)
Lab. market exp.2 0.0001 -0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Firm tenure 0.0285*** 0.0270***
(0.0031) (0.0046)
Firm tenure2 -0.0004*** -0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Age 0.1981*** -0.2487*** 0.0189 -0.1543***
(0.0576) (0.0118) (0.0414) (0.0060)
Age2 -0.0015*** -0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0004)
Sev. handicapped 0.0978 -0.8587*** -0.0543 -0.6807***
(0.0753) (0.0764) (0.1044) (0.0818)
East -0.3309*** -0.3779*** 0.0361 -0.4900***
(0.0339) (0.0540) (0.0549) (0.0638)
No. of kids in HH 0.0127 0.1167 -0.0568* -0.2171***
(0.0153) (0.0570) (0.0338) (0.0496)
Constant 1.3125 9.3915*** 4.6304*** 5.9833***
(1.5903) (0.4105) (1.0387) (0.3253)
 -0.4943*** 0.1591
(0.1204) (0.1828)
No. of observations 156,263 162,995
No. of clusters 2,717 2,836
Chi2 1,181.131 722.428
1) In parentheses: bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clustering,
repl.: 300.
2) * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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Table 3.17: Heckman two-step estimation of benets
Husband Wife
ln(benet) Sel. eq. ln(benet) Sel. eq.
Years of education 0.0685*** -0.0060 0.0711*** -0.0864***
(0.0063) (0.0107) (0.0132) (0.0150)
Lab. market exp. 0.0103 -0.1859*** 0.0221** 0.0124
(0.0179) (0.0192) (0.0090) (0.0113)
Lab. market exp.2 -0.0001 0.0039*** 0.0001 0.0005**
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Handicapped -0.0390 0.9621*** 0.2319* 1.1217***
(0.0893) (0.0570) (0.1288) (0.0630)
Foreigner -0.4115*** -0.3358* -0.3232 -0.2782
(0.1610) (0.1766) (0.2019) (0.2664)
H: Retired betw age 60{62 0.0477 0.0552
(0.0341) (0.0633)
H: Retired after age 62 0.0059 0.0463
(0.0594) (0.0806)
W: Retired after age 59 -0.0714 0.7990***
(0.1016) (0.0599)
Age of Ret. unknown 0.0739** -0.0823**
(0.0348) (0.0399)
Total Number Of Births -0.0279** 0.0355
(0.0115) (0.0236)
East -0.3969*** 0.2428*** 0.0271 0.4900***
(0.0340) (0.0490) (0.0690) (0.0605)
Year 1997 0.0604*** 0.1176*** 0.0158 0.0044
(0.0217) (0.0345) (0.0246) (0.0371)
Year 1998 0.0723** 0.1817*** 0.0443 0.0982**
(0.0282) (0.0406) (0.0292) (0.0450)
Year 1999 0.0719** 0.2207*** 0.0659** 0.0004
(0.0319) (0.0457) (0.0292) (0.0493)
Year 2000 0.0747** 0.2207*** 0.0755** 0.0651
(0.0317) (0.0457) (0.0336) (0.0520)
Year 2001 0.0456 0.1366*** 0.0235 -0.1342**
(0.0314) (0.0514) (0.0365) (0.0580)
Year 2002 0.0220 0.1829*** 0.0021 -0.0932
(0.0325) (0.0479) (0.0361) (0.0606)
Year 2003 0.1112*** 0.2040*** 0.0422 -0.1045*
(0.0336) (0.0523) (0.0372) (0.0628)
Year 2004 0.0971*** 0.1931*** -0.0130 -0.1430**
(0.0354) (0.0537) (0.0390) (0.0628)
Year 2005 0.0889** 0.1467*** -0.0210 -0.2018***
(0.0347) (0.0573) (0.0441) (0.0623)
Year 2006 0.0620* 0.1012* -0.0515 -0.2684***
(0.0360) (0.0580) (0.0519) (0.0649)
Constant 5.8488*** 0.8741*** 4.7919*** -1.0913***
(0.2310) (0.3310) (0.3414) (0.2082)
Continued on next page
64
Table 3.17 { continued from previous page
Husband Wife
ln(benet) Sel. eq. ln(benet) Sel. eq.
 0.1584 0.1758
(0.1578) (0.1841)
No. of observations 170,933 170,933
No. of clusters 2,923 2,923
Chi2 463.306 283.837
1)In parentheses: bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clustering, repl.: 300.
2) * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
3.7.3 Full MNL estimation results
Table 3.18: MNL estimation results for states 1 and 2
Original status 1 Original status 2
2 3 1 4
H: Age -0.001143 0.015636 -0.020539 0.024224
H: Handicapped -0.143782 -0.289869 0.175189 0.006235
H: Pred. wage in 1000 -0.081017 -0.811779*** 0.027670 -0.841109***
H: Pred. benets in 1000 0.203106 0.627004 -0.547337 0.817779*
H: Blue-collar -0.213649 0.161611 0.057935 -0.418469
H: White-collar 0.049959 -0.127984 -0.062295 -0.455588**
H: Public empl 0.040392 -0.461861** 0.135582 0.127234
H: Self-empl -0.300071 -0.902318** -0.162627 -0.713557**
H: Firm tenure 0.001420 0.004380 -0.010918 0.000360
H: Actual hours worked 0.012042** -0.007935 0.005078 -0.007452
H: Med.-educ 0.456947 0.609523* 0.245911 0.323990
H: High-educ 0.762587** 1.215915*** 0.273106 0.567967
H: Leisure sat high 0.048660 -0.325593** -0.222749 -0.109278
H: Leisure sat low -0.111511 -0.653563*** -0.516695** -0.214769
H: Leisure sat very low 0.267947 -1.012440 -0.705339** -0.185424
H: Job sat high 0.029042 0.216354 0.140797 0.152253
H: Job sat low -0.223295 0.995624*** 0.298022 0.293733
H: Job sat very low 0.300523 1.218322*** 0.554175* 0.814311**
W: Age 0.044370** 0.072160*** -0.043578** 0.001544
W: Handicapped -0.669911** 0.248725 -0.974330*** -0.074343
W: Pred. wage in 1000 -0.610595* 0.734883** 1.287166*** -0.626606
W: Pred. benets in 1000 2.673376*** -1.124980 -0.694142 0.568209
W: Blue-collar 0.289730 0.698534
W: White-collar -0.135660 0.471776
W: Public empl -0.207422 0.180059
W: Self-empl 0.103413 1.256483
W: Firm tenure -0.012119 -0.006737
W: Actual hours worked -0.017048** 0.002703
Continued on next page
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Table 3.18 { continued from previous page
Original status 1 Original status 2
2 3 1 4
W: Med.-educ -0.142629 -0.415640* -0.283959 0.158052
W: High-educ -0.150381 -1.103995*** -0.732287* 0.614274
W: Leisure sat high 0.031530 0.376492** 0.202554 -0.045334
W: Leisure sat low -0.005360 0.294228 0.122183 0.384683
W: Leisure sat very low 0.100760 0.679025** 0.283324 -0.060556
W: Job sat high 0.050558 0.199946
W: Job sat low 0.692180*** -0.070108
W: Job sat very low 0.978711*** -0.868057
No. of persons in HH 0.173682 0.347804*** 0.132896 -0.231482*
HH's other income in 1000 -0.076114 -0.037836 0.136390** 0.068878
Duration -0.010467*** -0.010138*** -0.019887*** -0.004317**
Duration sq. 0.000020*** 0.000021*** 0.000034*** 0.000010**
East -0.127146 -0.133978 -0.112373 -0.163894
Year 1997 0.281848 -0.353890 -0.063580 -0.454671
Year 1998 -0.026217 -0.453879 -0.165530 -0.043491
Year 1999 0.030853 -0.625715 0.173810 -0.406049
Year 2000 0.251706 0.074597 0.164708 -0.643345**
Year 2001 0.361071 -0.293486 0.066993 -0.130925
Year 2002 0.358666 -0.287525 -0.118602 -0.479360
Year 2003 0.264970 -0.497804 -0.484554 -0.353237
Year 2004 -0.120746 -0.216741 0.027748 -0.615871**
Year 2005 0.002349 -0.206576 0.132758 -0.668291**
Year 2006 0.319073 -0.580539 0.018994 -0.861843**
Constant -7.056131*** -9.463445*** -0.300197 -3.881970
No. of observations 45,522 26,436
No. of clusters 1,186 848
Pseudo R2 0.0889 0.1211
1)In parentheses: bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clustering, repl.: 300.
2) * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
Table 3.19: MNL estimation results for states 3 and 4
Original status 3 Original status 4
1 4 2 3
H: Age -0.091251** 0.017694 -0.064873** 0.044099
H: Handicapped -0.818247** 0.278703 -0.564860** 0.238494
H: Pred. wage in 1000 0.186756 0.236594 0.244641 0.092780
H: Pred. benets in 1000 0.156026 -0.196058 0.067302 -0.616831
H: Med.-educ 0.270601 0.004035 0.413187 0.380482
H: High-educ 0.272408 -0.217048 0.097920 0.326227
H: Leisure sat high 0.254733 -0.088115 0.451094** 0..247101
H: Leisure sat low 0.409304 -0.285092 1.063556** -1.079340
H: Leisure sat very low 0.491338 -0.164455 1.450273*** 0.237250
Continued on next page
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Table 3.19 { continued from previous page
Original status 3 Original status 4
1 4 2 3
W: Age 0.028979 0.060259 -0.002489 -0.074119***
W: Handicapped 0.690461 -1.357834*** 0.608786** -0.279434
W: Pred. wage in 1000 0.214482 -1.294565*** 0.236614 2.120118***
W: Pred. benets in 1000 -1.798457 3.615767*** -0.069062 -0.733401
W: Blue-collar 0.188170 -0.406815
W: White-collar 0.469469 -0.400636
W: Public empl -0.306487 0.109100
W: Self-empl 0.645249 -0.511346
W: Firm tenure 0.004296 0.000468
W: Actual hours worked 0.006100 -0.004063
W: Med.-educ 0.098132 -0.056231 0.194961 -0.047076
W: High-educ -0.409742 0.393762 0.804908 -0.865487
W: Leisure sat high -0.018261 -0.222953 -0.085588 -0.105476
W: Leisure sat low 0.060202 -0.672993** -0.180139 0.172949
W: Leisure sat very low -0.019079 -0.422648 -1.506499 0.466432
W: Job sat high -0.022050 0.244575
W: Job sat low 0.226129 0.527532
W: Job sat very low 0.050062 1.042673**
No. of persons in HH 0.172423 -0.097976 0.131438 -0.114649
HH's other income in 1000 0.110243 0.114360 0.072236 0.094460*
Duration -0.059904*** -0.025846*** -0.054697*** -0.043790***
Duration sq. 0.000225*** 0.000092** 0.000233*** 0.000163
East 0.250606 0.154325 0.027109 0.423047
Year 1997 -0.052845 0.010212 0.559315 0.587826
Year 1998 0.154503 -0.472696 0.076108 0.965261
Year 1999 0.156343 -0.056619 0.164199 0.318068
Year 2000 0.069044 -0.218488 -0.073354 0.332488
Year 2001 -0.020699 -0.238108 0.211737 0.421471
Year 2002 -0.073200 -0.231816 0.020414 0.505676
Year 2003 0.012126 -0.213515 -0.354725 0.635099
Year 2004 0.042412 -0.078950 -0.047048 0.825160
Year 2005 0.203006 -0.272351 -0.092218 0.550965
Year 2006 0.091833 -0.241730 -0.142548 0.473480
Constant -0.816806 -7.305611** -1.118519 -3.776343
No. of observations 20,103 40,989
No. of clusters 678 1,178
Pseudo R2 0.1307 0.1233
1)In parentheses: bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clustering, repl.: 300.
2) * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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3.7.4 Tests of IIA
In the following, we present the results of two tests for the IIA assumption,
namely a Hausman-McFadden-type test for clustered data and the Small-Hsiao
test (see Hausman and McFadden, 1984; Small and Hsiao, 1985). The results of
the Hausman-McFadden test suggest that the IIA assumption is not problematic
in our estimations, whereas the Small-Hsiao test does not give clear evidence.
However, for the majority, independence cannot be rejected.
Table 3.20: Hausman-McFadden test and Small-Hsiao test
Hausman-McFadden Small-Hsiao
Omitted Chi2 P>Chi2 Evidence Chi2 P>Chi2 Evidence
Original Status 1
2 35.72 0.959 for H0 61.33 0.176 for H0
3 41.50 0.851 for H0 55.65 0.339 for H0
Original Status 2
1 29.08 0.948 for H0 39.33 0.631 for H0
4 40.53 0.579 for H0 40.06 0.600 for H0
Original Status 3
1 24.43 0.990 for H0 164.60 0.000 against H0
4 25.15 0.986 for H0 61.12 0.036 against H0
Original Status 4
2 22.78 0.928 for H0 112.54 0.000 against H0
3 23.41 0.914 for H0 22.48 0.935 for H0
H0: Odds(outcome J vs outcome K) are independent of other alternatives.
3.7.5 Transitions in the modied model
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3.7.6 Full MNL estimation results of modied models
Table 3.22: MNL estimation results for state 1 (modied)
Original status 1
5 6 7 8
H: Age 0.028912 -0.048686** 0.012217 0.026153
H: Handicapped 0.065315 -0.430636 -0.014663 -0.443477
H: Pred. wage in 1000 0.052152 -0.444580* -0.865720*** -0.620238***
H: Pred. benets in 1000 0.144264 0.314175 0.644831 0.361928
H: Blue-collar -0.265183 -0.141187 -0.011524 2.180299**
H: White-collar 0.159516 -0.020124 -0.430581 1.981084*
H: Public empl -0.368923* 0.441097* -0.101122 -0.619344**
H: Self-empl -0.590028* 0.178133 -0.439545 0.335940
H: Firm tenure -0.000664 0.011419 0.028978*** -0.026594***
H: Actual hours worked 0.012760* 0.004692 -0.022199** 0.002489
H: Med.-educ 0.763875* 0.244887 0.015822 1.107515**
H: High-educ 1.143777** 0.591291 0.458669 1.611239***
H: Leisure sat high -0.037347 0.117400 -0.211708 -0.468155**
H: Leisure sat low 0.095227 -0.727719* -0.141100 -1.166075***
H: Leisure sat very low 0.427661 0.120594 -0.746428 -1.844771***
H: Job sat high -0.033039 0.038389 -0.059964 0.564930**
H: Job sat low -0.183694 -0.068182 0.347054 1.527386***
H: Job sat very low 0.090133 0.766680** 0.647305* 1.742241***
W: Age 0.052796* 0.024316 0.071443** 0..088353***
W: Handicapped -0.766253** -0.455316 0.486476 0.213067
W: Pred. wage in 1000 -0.806831** -0.596336 0.542015 1.188094**
W: Pred. benets in 1000 3.556027*** 0.829709 -1.559577 -1.523270
W: Blue-collar 0.086500 0.057950 1.378246*** 1.329704*
W: White-collar -0.404301 -0.187188 0.895275* 1.153044*
W: Public empl -0.040762 -0.352631 0.165898 0.244306
W: Self-empl 0.302210 -1.164809* 1.432323*** 2.147648***
W: Firm tenure 0.006634 -0.063211*** 0.011359 -0.025709**
W: Actual hours worked -0.028958** 0.006914 -0.005783 0.010924
W: Med.-educ -0.252438 0.116351 0.186062 -1.093997***
W: High-educ -0.346055 0.207472 0.011314 -2.232063***
W: Leisure sat high -0.009021 0.188095 0.375886* 0.307221
W: Leisure sat low -0.350249 0.317767 0.214209 0.303175
W: Leisure sat very low 0.334075 -0.161184 -0.267954 0.966604***
W: Job sat high 0.103370 0.069681 0.231124 0.081002
W: Job sat low 0.354631 0.809781*** 0.057891 -0.146387
W: Job sat very low 1.023998*** 0.965063** -0.492403 -1.549740*
No. of persons in HH 0.284649** -0.044449 0.294565** 0.472423***
HH's other income in 1000 -0.051301 -0.007743 0.000282 -0.196378
Duration -0.011459*** -0.007777*** -0.004047 -0.013733***
Duration sq. 0.000023*** 0.000015** 0.000010* 0.000026***
East -0.591674** 0.264112 -0.426813 0.219796
Year 1997 -0.024647 1.012751 -1.121292 0.123459
Continued on next page
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Table 3.22 { continued from previous page
Original status 1
5 6 7 8
Year 1998 -0.320318 0.839817 -0.839895 -0.236181
Year 1999 -0.147395 0.750391 -0.888073 -0.403390
Year 2000 -0.088039 1.121095* -0.048926 0.282998
Year 2001 -0.152772 1.408014** -0.235402 -0.336321
Year 2002 0.444699 0.767741 -0.792437 -0.097016
Year 2003 0.067538 0.906317 -0.730853 -0.254941
Year 2004 -0.311055 0.661268 -0.667655 0.175687
Year 2005 -0.009677 0.537419 -0.345262 -0.186481
Year 2006 0.476496 -0.091719 -0.453072 -0.657850
Constant -9.667030*** -4.298355 -10.102629*** -14.849578***
No. of observations 45,521
No. of clusters 1,186
Pseudo R2 0.12311
1)In parentheses: bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clustering, repl.:
300.
2) * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
Table 3.23: MNL estimation results for states 5 and 7
Original status 5 Original status 7
9 12 9 11
H: Age 0.039005 0.026521 -0.050053 0.127260***
H: Handicapped 0.028470 0.425680 0.055055 0.940972***
H: Pred. wage in 1000 -0.660909*** -0.916695*** 0.023404 0.583386
H: Pred. benets in 1000 0.994292* -1.505059* 0.601643 -1.851119**
H: Blue-collar -0.803646*** 14.629289***
H: White-collar -0.564166** 14.383273***
H: Public empl 0.016022 -0.401334
H: Self-empl -0.822338** 14.354930***
H: Firm tenure 0.011320* -0.031160*
H: Actual hours worked -0.012724 0.001403
H: Med.-educ 0.332728 0.576480 0.105892 -0.136787
H: High-educ 0.457912 0.579042 -0.056357 -0.844220
H: Leisure sat high -0.322953* 0.335672 -0.010425 -0.200825
H: Leisure sat low -0.880277** -0.040293 -0.874172 0.466550
H: Leisure sat very low -0.095903 0.847978 -0.269247 -13.922768***
H: Job sat high 0.027965 0.472955
H: Job sat low 0.117489 1.097076**
H: Job sat very low 0.905099*** 0.894628
W: Age 0.033448 -0.041498 0.169494*** 0.006005
W: Handicapped -0.324145 0.337640 -1.322019*** -1.000091
W: Pred. wage in 1000 0.016305 -1.099676 -0.833226* -0.988373
W: Pred. benets in 1000 1.201600* 0.595561 4.084369*** 0.432215
W: Blue-collar -0.269034 -0.267194
Continued on next page
71
Table 3.23 { continued from previous page
Original status 5 Original status 7
9 12 9 11
W: White-collar -0.098381 -0.331735
W: Public empl 0.374211* -0.519418
W: Self-empl -0.199707 -2.169771**
W: Firm tenure 0.004714 -0.037040
W: Actual hours worked -0.019284** 0.038463***
W: Med.-educ -0.000010 0.428141 -0.300931 0.512497
W: High-educ 0.375958 1.647640 0.167825 -0.300511
W: Leisure sat high 0.072940 -0.180793 -0.319414 -0.017935
W: Leisure sat low 0.336847 -0.241396 -0.296580 -0.758895
W: Leisure sat very low 0.494892 -16.091586*** -0.399215 0.223650
W: Job sat high 0.260803 0.478941
W: Job sat low 0.191658 0.194475
W: Job sat very low 0.521554 1.489327**
No. of persons in HH -0.288207 -0.026013 0.090203 -0.015958
HH's other income in 1000 0.085175 -0.039682 0.264983** -0.009770
Duration -0.002235 -0.010185** -0.017889*** -0.002671
Duration sq. 0.000005 0.000027*** 0.000065** -0.000211
East -0.609884** 0.155395 -0.168540 0.802513*
Year 1997 -0.544202 0.987040 0.141134 -0.087844
Year 1998 -0.344208 1.093957 -0.583376 -0.911087
Year 1999 -0.493555 1.260657 -0.383791 0.213422
Year 2000 -0.955261** 0.927647 -0.084822 -0.800463
Year 2001 -0.326107 0.259437 0.196246 -0.818353
Year 2002 -0.607488* 0.689769 -0.297021 -0.866337
Year 2003 -0.671066* 0.670453 -0.223871 -0.811819
Year 2004 -0.746985** 0.650589 0.212275 -0.674620
Year 2005 -1.048569*** 1.256069 -0.139045 -0.559414
Year 2006 -0.950419** -0.705163 0.234399 -0.956799
Constant -6.541910** -19.044689*** -11.223680** -12.573393**
No. of observations 21,833 15,486
No. of clusters 714 506
Pseudo R2 0.15286 0.16034
1)In parentheses: bootstrapped standard errors adjusted for clustering, repl.: 300.
2) * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
3) Results for destination states 1 and 6 out of state 5 and 1 and 8 out of state 7 are
not presented.
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Part II
Divorce determinants
73
Chapter 4
Impact of educational and
religious homogamy on marital
stability1
1This chapter is based on the IZA Discussion Paper No. 4491 of the same title, co-authored
by Kornelius Kraft.
74
4.1 Introduction
Over the last 40 to 50 years, most Western societies experienced dramatic changes
in common family structures. Cohabitation, for example, is no longer a lifestyle
disapproved of by many people and has become rather common among couples
before marriage. Another remarkable phenomenon is the large increase in divorce
rates. In West Germany, the number of divorces per 10,000 marriages rose from
35.7 in 1960 to 118.4 in 2004 (see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005). However, di-
vorce is usually a quite painful and far-reaching experience in life for all persons
involved. It is a decision of serious consequences. Given the steady increase in
recent decades, many researchers from dierent elds like economics as well as
genetics, sociology or psychology have tried to shed light on the determinants of
this decision. Other studies focus on the nancial and non-nancial consequences,
in particular for women and children.
The present paper refers to one strand of the economic literature that tries to
nd out which factors make an optimal match of husband and wife. That is,
which personal characteristics and which combinations of those have a stabilizing
eect on marriage? Do marriages between individuals who are similar to each
other generally have a lower divorce probability? Gary Becker's household theory
predicts that negative assortative mating (that is, mating of unlikes) is optimal
concerning wage earnings capacity because it increases gains from specialization
in market and domestic work, respectively. For all other factors that are com-
plements in household production, homogamy should have a stabilizing impact
on marriage. Therefore, similar age, height, attitudes etc. should decrease the
probability of divorce (see Becker, 1973, 1974a; Becker et al., 1977).
Our empirical analysis concentrates on the eects of similarity in religion and
education on the risk of divorce. The reason for our choice is that education's
impact is, from theory, a priori not clear. On the one hand, education has a large
impact on the individual's wage earnings capacity so that homogamy increases the
divorce probability. On the other hand, education contains a social and cultural
element. In this respect, similarity should have a stabilizing eect. Moreover, ed-
ucation is also related to the timing of marriage, labor supply, fertility as well as
to preferences concerning the optimal labor division between husband and wife.
Hence, education may inuence marital stability in many ways and an empiri-
cal test is necessary to obtain a better understanding which aspects dominate.
Does the traditional pattern of a higher educated husband promise a lower risk of
disruption or are modern relationships with two equally educated spouses more
stable? What happens if the wife is better educated than the husband? These
questions have been largely neglected by the economic literature but have been
discussed more intensively by sociologists. Nevertheless, neither the international
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nor the (small) German literature give clear evidence. Some nd educational ho-
mogamy a stabilizing factor (e.g. Weiss and Willis, 1997), whereas other studies
conclude that it is less a matter of similarity but the question of educational level
and whether the husband or the wife has a better education (e.g. Charles and
Stephens, 2004).
In our opinion, religiousness is a good indicator to assess the extent to which
similar attitudes (here towards God, marriage and family) aect the risk of sepa-
ration. In general, individuals that attend church services have probably a more
traditional view on marriage and family and are therefore less prone to divorce
than non-religious people. The question is, however, what eects dissimilar pref-
erences in this respect have. Do couples of two non-religious spouses have a
lower risk of separation than couples with only one spouse being religious be-
cause of their homogenous preferences in this respect? For US couples, Charles
and Stephens (2004), Bumpass et al. (1991), and Bumpass and Sweet (1972) nd
that couples with the same religious denomination have a lower probability of
separation. However, to our knowledge, no empirical study exists that analyze
this question for Germany.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) from 1984 to 2007
we investigate the eects of individual educational level, church attendance, and
spousal combinations of those on the risk of separation. We apply complementary
log-log (cloglog) regression models with couple-specic random eects to control
for unobserved heterogeneity. We restrict our analysis to West German couples
that have been observed since the beginning of their marriage. Even though we
focus on the eects of education and church attendance, we, nevertheless, control
for various other important factors like age at marriage, number of children, or
hours worked. Concerning education, we do not only distinguish whether or not
both have the same degree as commonly done in the literature but we also dif-
ferentiate between three levels. In contrast to the few existing German studies,
information about church attendance is available for both spouses. In either case,
we consider changes in the explanatory variables over the course of marriage and
do not restrict our analysis to the situation at the beginning of marriage.
Our results do not generally conrm the stabilizing eect of homogamy. Ap-
parently, positive assortative mating with respect to education does not enhance
the stability of marriage even after controlling for hours worked and unemploy-
ment experience. It rather depends on whether one or both spouses are only
low-educated since these couples have a higher risk of divorce. Moreover, we do
not nd gender-specic dierences. As expected, people that attend religious
events have a lower divorce probability. The stabilizing eect is even stronger
if spousal combinations are considered. Couples where both spouses participate
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in religious activities are signicantly more stable than any other combination.
However, homogamy per se once more does not lower the risk of divorce.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 contains a discussion about the
eects of education and religious aliation on marital stability in the context of
the two most important theoretical frameworks. Section 4.3 reviews the relevant
empirical literature, whereas Section 4.4 describes the empirical approach and
the data used. In Section 4.5, empirical results are presented. A conclusion is
given in Section 4.6.
4.2 Theoretical discussion on the eects of education
and religious aliation
There are two classes of theoretical frameworks modeling the decision-making
of a family. So-called unitary models or traditional household models assume a
joint utility function for all household members, whereas the second class is based
upon bargaining theory.2
In the following, the two types are shortly presented in the context of marital
stability. The focus is on the models' predictions concerning the relationship
between the risk of divorce on the one hand, and education and religiousness
on the other hand. Nevertheless, other factors are also discussed since they are
inuenced by education, e.g. labor supply or age at marriage.
4.2.1 Unitary models
Gary Becker is one of the most important contributors to the advancement of
family economics. With his "Theory of Marriage" and later extensions (Becker,
1973, 1974a; Becker et al., 1977), he provided a framework that is still the basis
for many analyses concerning the behavior of families.
The main implication of his model is that the family acts as if it were maximizing
a joint utility function that incorporates the preferences of all family members.
Utility depends on household goods like children, love, and aection. They are
produced within the household with market goods and time of household mem-
bers as input factors. Their productivity is inuenced by environmental variables
like household's human capital or individuals' health status. The model implies
that two persons marry when the expected utility from being married exceeds
the expected utility from remaining single. Analogously, married couples sepa-
rate when the expected utility from remaining married falls below the expected
2For a more detailed review of theories of family decision-making, see e.g. Bergstrom (1997).
77
utility from divorcing and possibly remarrying. One reason for this turnover in
expected utilities can be an unpredictable change in personal traits of the spouse
that may cause the partner to reconsider the marriage decision. Thus, in such a
stochastic framework, the probability of divorce depends on the expected gains
from marriage and the distribution of unanticipated gains/losses from marriage.
One objective of Becker's household model is to nd characteristics and spousal
combinations that minimize this probability of divorce by inuencing the gains
from marriage and their uncertainty.
In the Beckerian world, the gains from marriage do not only rely on economies
of scale by joining households. The main factor is the complementarity of a man
and a woman in the home production of household goods. Thus, these gains rise
with increasing complementarity of inputs, namely market goods and time. This
implies that the one with the higher wage earnings capacity should specialize in
market work so that the household can aord more market goods. The other one
should use his or her time for home production. This specialization gain is larger
the higher the wage dierence between the two spouses. Moreover, specialization
implies a mutual dependence between the both mates. According to Becker, this
aspect is the major incentive for partners to marry and, in the periods following,
to stay together. Thus, every factor that makes the division of labor between
husband and wife less advantageous decreases the mutual dependence and there-
fore raises the risk of marital disruption. Hence, negative assortative mating
concerning wage earnings capacity (or other factors that are substitutes in the
production of household commodities) is optimal.
In principle, Becker's theory is gender-neutral. However, the economic provider
role is traditionally assigned to husbands and the homemaker role to wives, this
is to a certain degree due to the lower investments in human capital by women in
the past. Consequently, the increase in educational attainment and labor market
activity of wives can be partially responsible for the rise in divorce rates in the
last decades. By growing equalization of men and women, the incentives to marry
and if married to stay together are reduced.3
Becker also provides an extensive analysis of optimal sorting with respect to other
factors. He nds that positive assortative mating, i.e. mating of likes, is opti-
mal for all other characteristics that are complements in household production.
Hence, homogamy with respect to interests, religiousness, age, etc. should sta-
bilize a partnership. He further shows that, given positive assortative mating is
optimal, gains from marriage are higher for people with higher values of charac-
teristics.
3There is also evidence, however, that educational institutions are very ecient marriage
markets that lower search costs. See e.g. Lewis and Oppenheimer (2000) or Nielsen and Svarer
(2006).
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In our opinion, religious aliation is a good candidate to get information about
the impact of harmony in preferences. On the one hand, it stands for a traditional
attitude towards marriage. Religious people also usually live in an environment
with religious peers that may stigmatize divorced couples more than unreligious
people. On the other hand, probably even more important than the individual
attitude is the conformity of the spouses' preferences in this respect. It is very
likely that individuals prefer a spouse who is of the same opinion concerning the
importance of religion and hence, of marriage. Their relationships should there-
fore be more stable than between spouses with dierent views.
In contrast, the impact of education is not that straightforward: education de-
termines wage earnings capacity so that homogamy makes specialization and
consequently marriage less advantageous. However, education is part of the gen-
eral process of socialization and may represent individual's preferences for the
way of living. In this respect, similarity has a stabilizing eect that would fur-
ther increase with higher education. The impact of the individual level is not
obvious either: a good education improves the opportunities on the labor market
which in turn makes an individual more independent from the partner. Hence,
high education can destabilize a relationship. However, individuals with higher
education are supposed to be more intelligent than others. This might imply
that they are better able to form expectations about their spouse and his or her
future characteristics. Therefore, they are less likely to become disappointed.
An alternative interpretation is that they are better in nding a partner who is
suited for lifetime. Both explanations would imply an inverse relationship be-
tween education and risk of divorce. In summary, the eects of education and its
spousal combinations on marital stability are ambiguous. Moreover, the aspect
of preferences concerning the educational level of the spouse is less clear than in
the case of religiousness. Some may still prefer the traditional labor division and
therefore look for a partner with a dierent education than the own. Others may
search for an equal spouse. Hence, the eect of education on marital stability via
preferences is a priori also not clear.
Another uncertainty-reducing factor is the search duration on the marriage mar-
ket. A longer or more intensive search should enhance the match quality because
an individual gathers more information about potential mates and own pref-
erences concerning the optimal partner. In empirical estimations, this factor is
usually captured by age at the time of marriage. A higher age at marriage should
stabilize a relationship because it usually implies a longer search history.4 Nev-
4The eect may not be continuously negative. There might exist an age threshold from
which on a person accepts a match of lower quality in order to save further search costs. As
a consequence, chance of divorce would be higher. However, we did not nd evidence for a
non-linear relationship in our data.
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ertheless, there is no way to fully eliminate uncertainty. A typical example for
unmet expectations is unemployment. It can be interpreted as a negative shock
for each employed person that cannot only lower household's income but also
self-esteem and self-condence. These consequences aect marital stability neg-
atively if gains from marriage are substantially reduced for at least one partner.
As other labor force behavior variables, the risk of unemployment is also aected
by education. Higher educated individuals have a lower probability of losing the
job. Another important aspect of marriage that is related to (women's) education
is fertility. The Becker model considers children as marital-specic investments
that stabilize a relationship. These "commodities" increase the gains from mar-
riage since they make divorce more costly and thus, lower the probability that it
occurs. Children from previous relationships, however, are usually not subsumed
under marital-specic investments.
Some of the main assumptions of the unitary framework are subject of criticism.
For example, it is not explicitly modeled in which way the individual preferences
are incorporated in the joint utility function. Becker (1974b, 1981) suggests that
it represents the utility function of the altruistic head of the family. In this
case, the marital good is divided equally between the two spouses (neglecting
other family members for simplicity reasons). Alternatively, one interprets the
family utility function as the consensus between the members. On the whole,
each interpretation is quite restrictive. Moreover, pooling of income is dicult to
justify if each family member has dierent outside options. Furthermore, in times
of increasing education and labor force participation rates of married women it is
questionable that specialization still (if ever) constitutes the most important part
of the gains from marriage. Nevertheless, despite their limitations, unitary models
are still often used due to their simplicity and less stringent data requirements.
4.2.2 Models with household bargaining
The second class of models based on bargaining theory allows explicitly for con-
icts of interest and provide a mechanism by which family behavior is formed from
individual preferences. It distinguishes between cooperative and non-cooperative
bargaining solutions.5 Most popular is, however, the cooperative Nash-bargaining
model which we present in the following (see Nash, 1950). Some authors have
questioned cooperative and have favored non-cooperative models. However, in
our opinion, if marriage is not suited for a cooperative solution, then the Nash-
bargaining solution may not be used for any situation. Members of a family
5Chiappori has formed the term collective models for his cooperative models. See e.g.
Chiappori (1992); Blundell et al. (2005).
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should be able to make binding agreements. Nevertheless, Binmore et al. (1986)
derive the Nash-bargaining solution as the approximation of a non-cooperative
game and show that this solution has a quite general theoretical foundation.
The Nash-solution to distributional problems between two spouses, m and f, is
the allocation of goods (xm; xf ) that maximizes the product of the two persons'
utility gains over the outcome in case of disagreement (sm; sf ):
max
xm;xf
(xm   sm)(xf   sf )1  (4.1)
subject to
xm + xf = X: (4.2)
 is a parameter representing the (potentially asymmetric) relative bargaining
power between both partners. X stands for the output of a marital production
process dened as the output of home produced commodities (e.g. cooking, wash-
ing, child care) and consumption goods. In principle, both could be measured
in monetary terms but often home produced goods are not. The outcome in
case of disagreement (si) is also often called threat point. The exact denition
is problematic and at the same time crucial for the outcome of these models.
In their analyses about household decision-making in a bargaining framework,
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) dene the individual
situation in case of divorce as the threat point. Even though the credibility of a
divorce-threat is questionable in day-to-day decisions, its use in studies of divorce
probabilities should be appropriate.6 Non-marketable goods like trust and mu-
tual support are not included in X even though they are very important factors
for a successful partnership.7 It can be assumed that they either do not require
time as input but other resources or that the time invested in the production of
these particular goods is not associated with disutility like working in the labor
market. Nevertheless, if these goods are absent, living together with a partner
could create a public bad instead of a public good. In these cases, a spouse
makes forecasts about the permanence of this situation and evaluates the utility
derived from monetary as well as non-monetary factors. Marriage does only end
in divorce if there is no monetary compensation high enough for the unhappy
situation. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to measurable factors but keep in
mind the existence of unobservable causes of divorce.
6Other authors, e.g. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) as well as Konrad and Lommerud (1995),
favor non-cooperative behavior within the household as the relevant threat point.
7Manser and Brown (1980) also include the partner's personal characteristics to those factors
that determine the systematic utility of each individual. According to them, personal attributes
of the partner like education and religion may also aect the utility out of consumption.
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Solving the above optimization problem with respect to xm and xf yields:
xm   sm = X   (sm + sf ) (4.3)
and
xf   sf = (1  )X   (1  )(sm + sf ): (4.4)
It becomes obvious that the division of the marital output is probably not the
same for husband and wife. It is determined by the relative bargaining power
within marriage as well as the threat points.
Similarly to the unitary model, the eect of education is not clear in this frame-
work. Higher education improves labor market opportunities which in turn raises
the threat point as well as the bargaining power. From this point of view, ed-
ucation and marital stability are negatively related. On the other hand, better
labor market opportunities of both spouses may lead to a higher family income
and thus, to a higher systematic utility out of consumption for both. As already
discussed in Section 4.2.1, the aspect of preferences concerning the educational
level of the spouse (as modeled in Manser and Brown, 1980) is ambiguous.
The threat point is also determined by the probability of nding a more suitable
partner than the current one. It can be reasoned that living in the city raises
the probability of nding a better match which in turn increases the probability
of marital disruption. Similarly, a working spouse might not only have a higher
risk of divorce due to his or her nancial independence but also because of a
higher probability to meet a more suitable partner. Our previous discussion on
the eects of religiousness applies to the bargaining model as well.
4.3 Literature review
Due to the steady increase of divorce rates in the last 50 years, the literature on
divorce is quite extensive. Studies coming from dierent elds like economics,
sociology, psychology, or genetics have analyzed various factors that may account
for this trend and examined the consequences for the people involved. In contrast,
our analysis is related to the literature about marital sorting and its impact on
divorce which is far from being extensive in economics. More empirical studies
can be found in the sociological literature that, however, does not provide clear
evidence concerning the eects of educational homogamy and only little is known
regarding religious homogamy in European countries (see Kalmijn et al., 2005).
As shown in Section 4.2.1, Becker et al. (1977) derived numerous hypotheses con-
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cerning the eect of various spousal characteristics on the risk of divorce. How-
ever, they were not able to test all of them because of data restrictions. With
respect to own education, they do not nd any statistically signicant eect for
the US which conrms their predicted ambiguity. In contrast, marrying outside
one's own religion increases the probability of dissolution signicantly. Weiss
and Willis (1997) distinguish between the eects of an initially bad match and
unexpected events while being married using data from the US-National Longi-
tudinal Survey of High School Class 1972. In their empirical analysis, homogamy
with respect to religion as well as education stabilizes a marriage. In addition,
they observe a lower divorce probability the higher the education of at least one
spouse. In contrast, Charles and Stephens (2004) conclude that \the eect of
education on marriage stability is less a matter of the similarity in schooling be-
tween husbands and wives as whether the couple is highly educated or not and
whether it is the husband or wife with higher level of schooling" (Charles and
Stephens, 2004, p. 507). Namely, the reduction in divorce probability compared
to the reference group is even higher for couples with a higher-educated husband
than for couples with a higher-educated wife.
Sociologists also usually refer to Gary Becker's household model if they analyze
divorce determinants.8 Bumpass and Sweet (1972), one of the earliest studies
on the impact of homogamy, and Bumpass et al. (1991) use the 1970 National
Fertility Study and the National Survey of Families and Households (1987{1988)
for the US, respectively. They nd an inverse relationship between wife's edu-
cational attainment and the probability of divorce. However, their ndings do
not generally support the hypothesis that educational heterogamy is associated
with a higher divorce risk. Instead, results of Bumpass et al. (1991) suggest that
couples with a better educated wife have the highest risk of dissolution, followed
by couples of the same education, whereas couples with a higher-educated hus-
band have the lowest divorce probability. In contrast, Tzeng and Mare (1995),
using US data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth, of Young Men,
and of Young Women, show that more education reduces the probability of dis-
solution, whereas heterogamy does not aect it. Finnas (1997) nd this pattern
with Finnish data, too. In contrast to Charles and Stephens (2004), they do not
observe a dierence whether the husband or the wife is higher educated. These
mixed results are also reected in an international comparison of nine countries
initiated by Blossfeld and Muller (2002). The analysis for West Germany (Muller,
2003) shows a (weakly) signicant higher probability of divorce if the husband is
higher educated than the wife compared to educationally homogamous couples.
Previous research has, however, arrived at dierent conclusions with German
8For a detailed overview of the German research on divorce determinants, see e.g. the
German meta-analysis by Wagner and Weiss (2003).
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data. Hall (1997) does not nd a statistically signicant impact of educational
homogamy (schooling degree) on risk of divorce, whereas Kopp (2000) shows that
homogamy with respect to schooling degree increases marital stability but with
respect to vocational and university degree it has no eect. Both use data from
the Mannheim divorce study but dierent samples.9 Koch (1993) looks for these
patterns using data from the rst ve SOEP-waves from 1984 to 1988. She ana-
lyzes divorce probabilities for marriages already existing in 1984. She nds that
the dierence in education does not aect marital stability. However, couples
in her sample are not observed from the beginning of their marriage on so that
the sample may consist of relatively stable couples having already mastered their
rst years of marriage. Moreover, all studies mentioned so far do not distinguish
between dierent levels of education which, given empirical ndings for the US,
probably makes a dierence. Only Wagner (1997) dierentiates between three
hierarchical levels in his analysis for West and East Germany with data from the
German Life History Study. He does not nd any general evidence for a stabiliz-
ing impact of educational homogamy. However, his results are based only on a
sample of couples from birth cohorts 1919{1921.
The impact of religion seems to be clearer. A stabilizing eect if two spouses
have the same religious denomination can be found in e.g. Charles and Stephens
(2004), Bumpass et al. (1991), and Bumpass and Sweet (1972) for US-couples.
However, for European countries, less research has been done on this topic.
Kalmijn et al. (2005) nd for the Netherlands that couples with only one unal-
iated spouse do not have a higher risk of divorce than homogamously unaliated
marriages. To our knowledge, no study exists that explicitly look for the eect of
dissimilarities in religious behavior for Germany. Wagner (1997) and Diekmann
and Klein (1991) nd that people without denomination have a higher divorce
probability than people with denomination. Muller (2003) nds the opposite.
However, they all do not look for the impact of religious homogamy. Only Hall
(1997) includes a dummy variable if both spouses go to the church at least once a
month compared to all other possible combinations. She nds a stabilizing eect.
4.4 Empirical approach
4.4.1 Complementary log-log model
The focus of our analysis is on the impact of certain explanatory variables on
the conditional probability of getting divorced, i.e. the probability of getting
9For example, Kopp (2000) includes also couples wedded in the former GDR.
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divorced in time interval t given that the couple has not separated until then. In
most cases a proportional hazard model like the Cox model is used for these kind
of questions. However, given the data we use, discrete-time models are better
suited since they do not rely on the assumption that at most one transition per
period occurs. Several authors have considered the discrete-time variant of the
continuous proportional hazard model (e.g. Kiefer, 1988; Meyer, 1990). However,
we follow an alternative approach and use a binary choice model. Duration data
models and models for binary choice are closely related. The hazard function
as the rate of leaving the initial state during a period can also be interpreted
as the probability to observe a specic binary outcome. Sueyoshi (1995) shows
that the popular logit and probit models with period-specic dummy variables
yield similar results to the discrete-time proportional hazard model. In fact, the
complementary log-log model (cloglog) is perfectly equivalent to it (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005) and therefore, we apply this approach.
The discrete time hazard function j is the probability of transition (exit) at
discrete time tj , j = 1; 2; : : :, given survival to time tj :
j = Pr(tj 1  T < tj jT  tj 1):
The survivor function is the probability of staying in the same state until t and
is obtained recursively from the hazard function as
S(t) = Pr(T  t) =
tY
j=1
[1  j ]:
The natural parametric starting point is the exponential as a Poisson process has
durations that are exponentially distributed. The exponential duration model
has a constant hazard rate that does not vary with t. This distribution has been
regarded as being too restrictive in practice and as an alternative the complemen-
tary log-log model has been proposed. It is based on the type 1 extreme value
distribution which is asymmetric in contrast to the logistic or standard normal
distribution of the logit and probit model, respectively. This asymmetry makes
cloglog models superior for the analysis of rare events like divorce. The cloglog
hazard function for observation i in period j is:
j(tj jxi) = 1  exp(  exp[ln0j + x0i]);
where 0 is called the baseline hazard.
It is well established in the literature on duration data that neglecting unobserved
heterogeneity leads to biased results (see Heckman and Singer, 1984; Lancaster,
1990). One solution is the introduction of a random variable i into the hazard
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specication by so-called mixture models. The heterogeneity term is assumed to
be time-invariant and independently distributed of x. The complementary log-log
model is then given by:
j(tj jxi) = 1  exp(  exp[ln0j + x0i + i]):
Conditional on i, the individual densities are the probabilities to leave a certain
status for each observation computed at x0it + i, which is just a general model
for random eects within a binary choice framework. Butler and Mot (1982)
propose to integrate out the random component. The discrete-time likelihood
function that incorporates the unobserved heterogeneity term is then obtained
by summing up the discrete-time likelihood functions of each individual i which
is given by
Li =
Z 1
 1
TiY
t=1
[F (yit; x
0
it + i)]
yit [1  F (yit; x0it + i)]1 yit g di:
g is the density of the unobserved heterogeneity term. In case of the probit model
Butler and Mot (1982) posit the straightforward assumption of a normally
distributed term which leads to:
Li =
Z 1
 1
e 2i =22p
2
TiY
t=1
[F (yit; x
0
it + i)]
yit [1  F (yit; x0it + i)]1 yit di:
We follow this idea and also assume a random eect i with distribution N(0; 
2
)
in our complementary log-log model. Its integral is approximated by using adap-
tive Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 20 quadrature points. Retting the model
with dierent numbers of quadrature points did not yield any substantial changes
in the results10 Nicoletti and Rondinelli (2006) show that the results of comple-
mentary log-log models are robust to a possible misspecication of the distribu-
tion of the unobserved heterogeneity component.
4.4.2 Sample
We use data for West German couples provided by the SOEP from 1984 to 2007.
It is possible to identify the time period when a marriage has begun and hence,
we are able to account for the length of marriage. Couples are observed until
separation or divorce (whichever is stated rst) or until observations are right-
censored. In the following, we do not distinguish between separation and divorce
10For more details about the approximation method, see e.g. Liu and Pierce (1994) or in the
context of random eects logit models, see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008).
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and use them interchangeably. We restrict our sample to couples where both
spouses are in the age range from 18 to 65 at the time of marriage. Moreover,
we pool rst and later marriages: for 299 husbands (23.34 %) and 306 wives
(23.89 %), we observe a second or later marriage. In total, there are 454 couples
(35.4 %) in which at least one spouse is not married for the rst time. Finally,
the sample consists of 1,281 couples with 11,337 couple-years and 284 divorces.
Hence, the observed probability of divorce is 2.51 %, and 22.17 % of the couples
nally separate.
Figure 4.1: Kaplan-Meier survivor distribution function
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the Kaplan-Meier survivor function for the sample. It es-
timates the conditional probability of remaining married by period t given that
the couple has not separated until t. We see that the probability of remaining
married decreases by ten percentage points within the rst four years of mar-
riage. It further falls by ten percentage points in the following ve years. After
a marriage duration of ten years, the probability to stay together is about 76 %.
After the maximum observation time of 22 years, the likelihood to stay married
is still 63 %.
4.4.3 Explanatory variables
In the following, we explain the denition of the explanatory variables and present
some descriptive statistics. Since the eects of education and religious aliation
are of main interest these variables are explained in more detail.
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Education
Following Blossfeld and Timm (2003), three hierarchical groups of education are
classied:
1. No schooling degree or Hauptschul - or Realschul -degree, without vocational
degree ("Low");
2. No schooling degree or Hauptschul - or Realschul -degree, but with voca-
tional degree or Abitur/Fachhochschulreife, with or without vocational de-
gree ("Medium");
3. University degree or degree of university of applied sciences ("High").
These three levels should reect the main dierences in labor market opportuni-
ties and earnings capacities and also regarding their cultural resources (Blossfeld
and Timm, 2003). Table 4.1 shows the distribution of educational levels at the
beginning of the marriage for husbands and wives separately. The great majority
of both sexes have medium education, 71 % of husbands and 73 % of wives. The
percentage of husbands with a high educational level at the time of marriage is,
however, much higher than for wives, 18 % compared to 11 %.
Table 4.1: Distribution of educational level at the time of marriage
Educ. Husbands Wives
level No. % No. %
Low 135 10.54 196 15.30
Medium 913 71.27 939 73.30
High 233 18.19 146 11.40
Total 1,281 100.00 1,281 100.00
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of the stated educational levels in each sample
year, not only at the beginning of the marriage. The rst part gives the number
of husbands/wives stating the respective educational level in their last sample
year. The second part presents the total number of observations where the hus-
band/wife reports it. A comparison with Table 4.1 reveals slight shifts towards
higher education. Hence, some individuals in the sample attain a higher educa-
tional level during the observation period by nishing their vocational training
or studies at university. For example, the percentage of highly educated hus-
bands rises to 22.1 % and to 12.6 % for wives. For the regressions, only the
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period-specic educational levels are used. Additional estimations using the edu-
cational levels at the time of marriage have shown, however, that the results are
not substantially altered.11
Table 4.2: Distribution of period-specic educational level
Educ. Husbands Wives
level No. % Obs. % No. % Obs. %
Low 126 9.84 1,010 8.90 184 14.36 1,623 14.32
Med. 872 68.07 8,048 70.99 936 73.07 8,488 74.87
High 283 22.09 2,279 20.10 161 12.57 1,226 10.81
Total 1,281 100.00 11,337 100.00 1,281 100.00 11,337 100.00
Number of husbands and wives refer to stated education in their last sample year.
Table 4.3: Distribution of period-specic educational combinations
Husband's Wife's education
education Low Medium High Total
Low 340 653 17 1,010
(47) (76) (3) (126)
Medium 1,214 6,529 306 8,048
(134) (694) (44) (872)
High 69 1,307 903 2,279
(3) (166) (114) (283)
Total 1,623 8,488 1,226 11,337
(184) (936) (161) (1,281)
First row shows total number of observations, whereas numbers in
parentheses refer to the number of couples as stated in their last
sample year.
Based on these three educational groups, we rst dene nine possible spousal com-
binations of education. Table 4.3 illustrates the distribution of period-specic
educational combinations. It can be seen that educational homogamy is most
common with a high proportion of two medium-educated partners (54 %). For
less than 10 % of the couples we observe a higher educated wife. Spouses with
strongly divergent education are even less common: only three couples consist of
a low-educated wife and a high-educated husband and vice versa. However, these
small numbers make regression analysis problematic and therefore, we assign
these couples to those with one low-educated and one medium-educated spouse.
Thus, in these cases, we group high-educated spouses with medium-educated
ones. Alternatively, the low-educated partner could be combined with his or her
11Due to the facilitated access to higher education in recent decades (in particular for women)
we expect dierences in the educational composition across cohorts. In Appendix 4.7.2, we
present some facts concerning this issue for our sample.
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medium-educated peers. However, given inherent labor market opportunities,
equating medium- and high-educated people are, in our opinion, less question-
able than merging low- and medium-educated individuals. Ultimately, we only
distinguish between seven spousal combinations of education.
Religion
As indicator for religiousness, we use the question whether the individual attended
church services or other religious events. It has been shown for the US that church
attendance is a superior indicator for religious aliation than denomination and is
more likely to aect marital stability (see e.g. Heaton, 1984).12 For our analysis,
we generated a dummy variable \No church attendance" for each spouse that
takes the value one if someone never attended church services and zero if someone
did so every week, every month or less frequently. For data reasons, we do not
distinguish between dierent types of religion.
Table 4.4: Distribution of church attendance
Husband Wife
Yes 5,907 6,850
(52.10) (60.42)
No 5,430 4,487
(47.90) (39.58)
Total 11,337 11,337
Percentages in parentheses.
Table 4.4 shows the distribution of the variable for wives and husbands. We see
that the majority state participation in religious activities, at least occasionally.
It becomes also clear that wives are slightly more involved than husbands: 60 %
of wives compared to 52 % of husbands went to church services or other religious
events.
In order to estimate the impact of homogamy, four groups are dened:
1. Both spouses attended church services or other religious events.
2. Both spouses did not attend.
3. Only the wife attended.
4. Only the husband attended.
12Both questions are not asked every year but for church attendance more frequently. For
these years in which the question is not asked, preceding information is carried over.
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Table 4.5 illustrates the spousal combinations in our sample. We nd a predom-
inance of couples with two spouses who went to religious events. Couples with a
participating husband and a non-participating wife are rather uncommon.
Table 4.5: Distribution of spousal combinations of church attendance
Church attend. Church attend. wife
husband Yes No Total
Yes 5,081 826 5,907
(44.82) (7.29) (52.10)
No 1,769 3,661 5,430
(15.60) (32.29) (47.90)
Total 6,850 4,487 11,337
(60.42) (39.58) (100.00)
Percentages in parentheses.
Additional explanatory variables
In addition to education and religion variables, we control for several other fac-
tors that potentially inuence the risk of divorce. Some of them are correlated
with our covariates of main interest. Table 4.9 in Appendix 4.7.1 summarizes
descriptive statistics of the variables used in our regressions (except education
and religion).
Age at marriage is one of the most important explanatory variables in previous
studies of marital stability. Nevertheless, it is also correlated with education.
Spouses with an academic degree tend to marry at a later age than others.13
Other factors related to both education and risk of divorce are income and un-
employment. For our analysis, the former is specied as the household's total
net income and the latter as the cumulated number of months in this state in the
past.
Another aspect of homogamy between two spouses is the age dierence. We de-
ne it as the absolute dierence between husband and wife, irrespective of who
is the older one. Similar to educational or religious homogamy, being of a simi-
lar age should stabilize the relationship between two spouses.14 In order to test
the hypothesis that urban life increases the risk of divorce because of the higher
13See Appendix 4.7.3 for more details about the relationship between education and age at
marriage in our sample.
14Various other specications of the model that distinguish between an older husband and
an older wife as well as between dierent degrees of the age dierence neither provide evidence
for a gender-specic dierence nor for a non-linear impact.
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probability to meet a better match, we include a dummy variable for living in the
city center. In contrast, children living in the household are expected to stabilize
a marriage. We distinguish between children of dierent ages, namely age 0{1,
2{7, and 8{15. However, we do not dierentiate between own children, adop-
tive children and children from previous relationships. Additional controls are a
dummy variable for a later marriage of at least one spouse, year of birth15, and
marriage duration dummies. Whether rst or later marriages are more stable is
a priori not clear. On the one hand, people have gained more experience if they
marry for the second time. On the other hand, people who marry several times
are maybe a selection of individuals that are in general quite unstable and revise
all their decisions more often.
All the variables mentioned so far are in each case measured in the period prior
to the potential divorce. Thus, we estimate Pr(yit 6= 0jxi;t 1). However, we
deviate from this denition in the case of labor supply. Working behavior is
an important potential risk factor of marital stability. It increases the nancial
independence as well as the opportunity to meet candidates for better suited
matches. Moreover, it is correlated with education. In order to separate the
direct inuence of education on the risk of divorce and the indirect eect via
labor supply, it is necessary to control for hours worked. Labor market behavior
can, however, be largely inuenced by the subjective probability of divorce (see
Johnson and Skinner, 1986). We expect a change in hours worked in the preceding
years to divorce, in particular by women to become nancially more independent.
This would then be, however, a case of reversed causality which would bias our
estimates. For that reason, we use hours worked of period t  3 instead of t  1
in order to circumvent this problem.16
4.5 Results
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present average marginal eects. In case of continuous vari-
ables, we show partial derivatives, whereas for dummy variables, the change in
the predicted probability of divorce due to the discrete change from zero to one
is shown. The eects seem to be quite small. However, relative to the predicted
probability of divorce of 0.025 per year many are quite substantial.
Section 4.5.1 illustrates estimation results if individual education and church at-
tendance behavior are included. The impact of spousal combinations follows
in Section 4.5.2. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 also include the likelihood-ratio (LR) test
15Replacing them by dummies of groups of cohorts did not alter the regression results.
16Results are, nevertheless, robust to the denition of hours worked. See Appendix 4.7.4 for
more details.
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statistic for the hypothesis that the proportion of the total variance that is con-
tributed by the panel-level variance, , equals zero. If  is zero the random eects
estimator does not dier signicantly from the pooled estimator. However, the
hypothesis can be rejected on a 5 % signicance level.
4.5.1 Eects of individual education and church attendance
In the following, we will rst briey describe the results for the other explanatory
variables before interpreting the eects of the variables of most interest.
In our estimation, the dummy variable for a later marriage does not show any
signicant eect on the probability of divorce. This also holds for the age at
marriage (and year of birth) variables. Maybe, the non-signicance of these
covariates reects a compensation of the stabilizing eect of a high age at marriage
per se by the destabilizing eect of a later marriage which, however, also usually
involves a higher age. In contrast, age homogamy has the expected stabilizing
eect. Children as marriage-specic investments are also supposed to stabilize a
relationship. Our results suggest that the eect depends on the age of children.
We nd a negative eect on the risk of divorce for newly born but not for children
in general. The number of children in the age range from 8 to 15 even raises
signicantly the probability of separation. Maybe spouses do not stay together
just for the sake of the children if those have reached a certain age. City life
lowers, as expected, marital stability considerably.
Household's net income, a factor related to education, has a positive but not
signicant impact on the risk of divorce. Concerning working hours and the
eect of unemployment, we nd gender-specic dierences. On the one hand,
husband's hours worked do not alter the likelihood of separation, whereas wife's
hours worked (weakly) destabilize a relationship. On the other hand, husband's
unemployment lowers signicantly marital stability. In contrast, if the wife loses
her job the risk of divorce is not signicantly aected.17 Thus, only husband's
employment seems to contribute to the gains from marriage, not the wife's.
However, of most interest is the eect of individual church attendance and edu-
cation. We expect religious people to have a more stable relationship, whereas
the eect of education is not clear a priori. On the one hand, high education
improves outside options and makes specialization less advantageous. On the
other hand, high-educated individuals are likely better able to form expectations
and have therefore a lower risk to become disappointed. In fact, we do nd that
couples with a religious husband have a lower probability of separation. Wife's
17These results conrm an earlier study of Kraft (2001) about the eect of unemployment
on the risk of separation.
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Table 4.6: Average marginal eects I
(1)
H: High-educated -0.0092**
H: Medium-educated -0.0071*
W: High-educated -0.0080**
W: Medium-educated -0.0099***
H: No church att. 0.0103***
W: No church att. 0.0033
Not rst marriage -0.0019
H: Age at marriage -0.0007
W: Age at marriage 0.0003
Absolute age dierence 0.0009**
H: Year of birth -0.0002
W: Year of birth 0.0004
No. of HH members age 0{1 -0.0129**
No. of HH members age 2{7 -0.0001
No. of HH members age 8{15 0.0065***
Live in City 0.0124**
HH net income 0.0016
H: Hours worked t-3 -0.0001
W: Hours worked t-3 0.0001*
H: No. months in UE cum. 0.0002***
W: No. months in UE cum. 0.0001
Rho 0.34589
p-value H0 : Rho = 0 0.025
Chi2 119.82
1) *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01; St.Err.
computed by the delta method.
2) "H:" stands for husbands, "W:" for wives, "HH"
for household.
3) Reference group: low education.
4) Eects for duration dummies not presented.
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behavior has no eect in this respect. Concerning education, our results suggest
that the aspect of expectation forming dominates. Medium- and high-educated
people have a lower risk of divorce than low-educated ones. The eects are also
approximately the same for husband's and wife's education. Thus, despite of the
gender-specic dierences with respect to unemployment and hours worked, we
do not nd them with respect to education.
4.5.2 Eects of spousal combinations
Table 4.7 illustrates the inuence of spousal combinations of education and church
attendance.18 The rst six rows show the education dummies. The rst letter
stands for the husband's and the second letter for the wife's education. In general,
we do not nd evidence for a stabilizing impact of homogamy neither concerning
education nor concerning religion.
Table 4.7: Average marginal eects II (Extract)
(2)
H { H -0.0163***
M { M -0.0239***
H/M { L -0.0114***
H { M -0.0168***
M { H -0.0132***
L { H/M -0.0129***
Both no church att. 0.0166***
Only H church 0.0138*
Only W church 0.0192***
Rho 0.31818
p-value H0 : Rho = 0 0.037
Chi2 124.79
1) First six rows refer to education. First letter
stands for husband's, second for wife's. "H"
denotes high education, "M" medium, and "L"
low.
2) Reference groups: both low-educated; both go
to church.
Even though we observe the highest decrease in risk of dissolution for homoga-
mous medium-educated mates, couples with two low-educated spouses (the ref-
erence group) have a signicantly higher probability of divorce than any other
combination. The smallest changes can be found for the combinations with one
low-educated spouse. Hence, our results suggest that not the combination of
18The results for the other control variables do not substantially dier from the rst estima-
tion. Therefore, we do not present them here.
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education but low versus medium and high education matters. Spouses with a
low educational level exhibit higher divorce risks than spouses with medium or
high education. This supports our previous ndings with respect to the impact
of individual education, however, the signicance is now much higher. In con-
trast to Charles and Stephens (2004), we do not nd evidence that it matters
who has a higher education attainment level. Regressions with alternating refer-
ence groups neither yield signicant dierences between \H{M" and \M{H" nor
between \H/M{L" and \L{H/M".19
Church attendance of both spouses has the expected stabilizing eect. Each of
the three other combinations has a substantially higher probability of dissolution.
However, couples with two non-attending spouses do not have a signicantly
lower divorce risk than couples where only one spouse goes to religious events
(see Table 4.8 for results with dierent reference groups). Thus, as in the case of
education, homogamy itself does not stabilize the relationship but religiousness
versus non-religiousness. One possible explanation could be that sharing leisure
time together is inherent in our variable \Both attended church service". This
might reduce the probability of separation. Moreover, religiousness itself seems to
matter because it implies a high valuation to be married by both spouses rather
than similarity in this attitude.
Even though the destabilizing eect is higher if only the wife attends church
service than if only the husband does so, we do not nd a signicant dierence
between the two groups in the direct comparisons (3a) and (4a). Hence, as for
education and in contrast to the results for individual church attendance, we do
not observe gender-specic dierences.
Table 4.8: Eect of reference group regarding church attendance (Extract)
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
Both no church att. 0.0166*** 0.0040 0.0001
Both church att. -0.0135*** -0.0100*** -0.0134***
Only H church 0.0138* -0.0037 -0.0036
Only W church 0.0192*** -0.0001 0.0041
4.6 Conclusion
In our analysis, we test the hypothesis that homogamy increases marital stability.
Becker (1973) assumes that earnings capacities should be dissimilar but traits like
intelligence, age, religion, and education (apart from its impact on wage earnings
capacity) should be positively correlated.
19Results are not presented.
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We place an emphasis on education and religiousness measured by attendance of
church services and other religious events. The eect of education is not clear
from the theoretical point of view because of its eect on the wage earnings ca-
pacity. Consequently, an empirical test is necessary to get a better understanding
about its impact on marital stability. In contrast, religious aliation expresses,
among others, views concerning the importance of marriage. How disharmony
in this respect aects the risk of dissolution is important to know since religion
can be interpreted as a proxy for other attitudes and preferences in general. As
we have information for both spouses about their church attendance behavior we
can test for the eects of similarity and dissimilarity of preferences.
Using a large German household panel data set, we estimate the probability of di-
vorce with complementary log-log models considering unobserved heterogeneity.
We nd that spouses who are similar to each other normally do not have a lower
risk of divorce than dissimilar spouses. Only for age we nd a stabilizing eect:
the risk of divorce increases with increasing age dierence. In contrast, a stabi-
lizing eect with respect to education and church attendance can only be found
for certain groups like couples with two medium- or two high-educated spouses,
or if both attend religious events. Our results suggest that not the combina-
tion matters but low versus medium or high education and church attendance of
both spouses versus no church attendance of at least one spouse. Spouses with a
low educational level and couples without religious aliation realize signicantly
higher divorce risks. Therefore, other aspects of these characteristics and activi-
ties seem to play an important role. Examples are sharing leisure time together
or the ability to form expectations.
So far, we have neglected important nancial aspects in addition to household's
total net income. It is, nevertheless, very likely that not only hours worked but
the associated individual wage as well as non-labor income and property inuence
the success of a relationship. Thus, future research should take these factors into
account.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.9: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
For at least one spouse not rst marriage 0.35 0.48
H: Age at marriage 32.19 8.28
W: Age at marriage 29.43 7.43
Absolute age dierence 4.06 3.98
H: Year of birth 1960 9.05
W: Year of birth 1962 8.17
Live in city center 0.09 0.28
No. of HH members age 0{1 0.14 0.36
No. of HH members age 2{7 0.57 0.75
No. of HH members age 8{15 0.39 0.71
HH's net income in 1,000 Euro of 2000 2.64 1.30
H: Cum. number of months in UE 5.41 14.52
W: Cum. number of months in UE 5.41 10.75
H: Hours worked (per week) in t-3 40.13 14.19
W: Hours worked (per week) in t-3 19.41 17.51
Total no. of observations 11,337 100.00
1)"H:" stands for husbands, "W:" for wives, "HH" for household, "UE" for
unemployment.
2) All variables refer to period t-1 except hours worked.
4.7.2 Changes in education across cohorts
The sample distribution of birth cohorts ranges from the 1920s to the 1980s.
Since younger cohorts (in particular of women) have had a much easier access
to higher education, we expect changes in the educational attainment of married
men and women across cohorts (see Tables 4.10 and 4.11).
A trend can only be found for the medium-educated husbands and wives. Their
fractions increase over cohorts (except 1950s cohorts for husbands) and at the
same time, the proportion of those with Abitur grows steadily. The percentage of
low-educated husbands is slightly smaller for 1960{1984 cohorts than for the pre-
1950 cohorts. Around 20 % of all husbands have a university degree. However,
this proportion is substantially higher for the 1950s cohorts (29 %) and smaller for
the most recent cohorts (16 %). The latter probably reects that high-educated
individuals defer marriage to a later age and are, therefore, underrepresented in
our youngest cohorts (see 4.7.3 for more details).
As expected, changes are more obvious for women. The fraction of wives with
low education is substantially smaller for post-1950 cohorts compared to the
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Table 4.10: Distribution of husbands' education by birth cohort
Husband's Husband's birth cohort
education 1920{49 1950{59 1960{69 1970{84 Total
Low 18 20 68 20 126
(11.84) (7.72) (10.00) (10.53) (9.84)
Medium 102 165 466 139 872
(67.11) (63.71) (68.53) (73.16) (68.07)
of which with Abitur 11 28 84 31 154
(10.78) (16.70) (18.03) (22.30) (17.66)
High 32 74 146 31 283
(21.06) (28.57) (21.47) (16.32) (22.09)
Total 152 259 680 190 1,281
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
1)Percentages in parentheses.
2) Figures refer to stated education in the last sample year.
Table 4.11: Distribution of wives' education by birth cohort
Wife's Wife's birth cohort
education 1927{49 1950{59 1960{69 1970{85 Total
Low 23 21 93 47 184
(28.75) (10.14) (13.84) (14.60) (14.36)
Medium 49 149 494 244 936
(61.25) (71.98) (73.51) (75.58) (73.07)
of which with Abitur 1 16 108 62 187
(2.04) (10.74) (21.86) (25.11) (19.98)
High 8 37 85 31 161
(10.00) (17.87) (12.65) (9.63) (12.57)
Total 80 207 672 322 1,281
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
1) Percentages in parentheses.
2) Figures refer to stated education in the last sample year.
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proportion of 29 % in cohorts born before 1950. In contrast, highly educated
wives are more common among the cohorts from 1950 to 1969 than among the
pre-1950 and most recent cohorts from 1970 to 1985. Again, the latter probably
reects the higher age at marriage and, in addition, a recent increase of never-
married women among the highly educated (Schwarz, 1999).
Table 4.12: Distribution of educational combinations by wives' birth cohort
Wife's birth cohort
1927{49 1950{59 1960{69 1970{85 Total
Both have same educ. 50 135 446 224 855
(62.50) (65.22) (66.37) (69.57) (66.74)
Husb. higher educ. 21 53 162 67 303
(26.25) (25.60) (24.11) (20.81) (23.65)
Wife higher educ. 9 19 64 31 123
(11.25) (9.18) (9.50) (9.63) (9.60)
Total 80 207 672 322 1,281
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
1) Percentages in parentheses.
2) Figures refer to stated education in the last sample year.
Table 4.12 illustrates the predominance of educational homogamy over (wives')
cohorts. The proportion of homogamous couples has increased steadily, whereas
couples with a higher educated husband have become much less common. In spite
of the relatively high percentage of high-educated wives among the cohorts from
1950 to 1969, the fraction of couples with a higher educated wife has not increased.
The latter conrms results by Blossfeld and Timm (2003) who have found that
the percentage of women who married less qualied men has been small and fairly
constant across cohorts. The increasing educational attainment of women from
younger cohorts have not changed this pattern. Blossfeld and Timm (2003) argue
that for women, the social and interactional pressure to marry upwardly or at
least homogamously still exist. As a consequence, high-educated women prefer
not to marry at all instead of marrying a lower qualied man.
4.7.3 Education and age at marriage
Tables 4.13 and 4.14 give an overview of the mean age at marriage by educational
level and type of marriage (rst or later). For rst marriages, we see that women
are usually one to three years younger than men given their educational level. For
later marriages, however, the dierence in the mean age between high-educated
husbands and wives is less than one year, whereas the dierence between medium-
and low-educated ones is about four to ve years.
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Moreover, it can be seen that the timing of rst marriage is deferred the longer
someone stays in the educational system. On average, men with a university
degree marry for the rst time aged 34, whereas men with low education marry
aged 28. Similarly, wives with a university degree marry for the rst time at age
32, whereas low-educated women are around 26 years old. However, one has to
consider that some of the low- and medium-educated persons have not nished
their training or studies at the time of marriage and thus, switch to higher-
educated groups during marriage. The ascending age with ascending education
can also be found for women's later marriages. In contrast, husbands' age at later
marriage is around 40 years, independent of educational attainment.
Table 4.13: Distribution of husband's age at marriage by educational level
Husb.'s First marr. Later marr. All
educ. Mean St.d. No. Mean St.d. No. Mean St.d. No.
Low 28.26 5.51 94 39.95 10.21 41 31.81 9.02 135
Medium 30.65 6.95 701 39.82 9.73 212 32.78 8.60 913
High 33.75 6.05 187 41.07 9.89 46 35.19 7.54 233
All 31.01 6.83 982 40.03 9.80 299 33.12 8.52 1,281
Table 4.14: Distribution of wife's age at marriage by educational level
Wife's First marr. Later marr. All
educ. Mean St.d. No. Mean St.d. No. Mean St.d. No.
Low 26.05 7.10 132 34.89 10.22 64 28.93 9.21 196
Medium 28.03 5.57 719 35.97 9.01 220 29.89 7.35 939
High 32.35 5.40 124 40.68 8.57 22 33.61 6.66 146
All 28.31 6.01 975 36.08 9.32 306 30.17 7.69 1,281
4.7.4 Denition of hours worked
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the development of average hours worked in the years
preceding divorce. The gures for divorced wives and divorced husbands refer to
the average hours worked of those couples that eventually divorce, but while they
are still married. The short-dashed lines give the mean of all female and male
observations, respectively.
It becomes obvious that wives and husbands that eventually divorce work gen-
erally more on average than the pool of all wives and husbands. However, the
dierence is almost negligible for husbands. For both sexes, we observe a change
in working behavior prior to divorce. Husbands work less while wives widen their
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Figure 4.2: Means of husbands' hours worked in years prior to divorce
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Figure 4.3: Means of wives' hours worked in years prior to divorce
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labor supply. In either case, the period-specic mean crosses the average of the
divorced between t 4 and t 3. Therefore, we use data of t 3 for our regressions
to diminish the endogeneity problem.
Nevertheless, we tested the eect of the denition of hours worked on our vari-
ables of interest. Tables 4.15 and 4.16 compare the marginal eects of random
eects estimations if hours worked of dierent periods from t   1 to t   5 are
used. We can see that the results are only slightly aected by the denition
of hours worked. Not surprisingly, the biggest changes can be observed for the
eects of children. The impact of new-born children in t   1 is insignicant if
hours worked of period t  1 is included. With labor supply of later periods, the
eect becomes larger and signicant. Apparently, this children variable captures
partly the eect of a non-working wife in period t  1.
Table 4.15: Eect of denition of hours worked on RE estimations I
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
Not rst marriage -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0017
H: Age at marriage -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006
W: Age at marriage 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Absolute age dierence 0.0009** 0.0009** 0.0009** 0.0009** 0.0009**
H: Year of birth -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
W: Year of birth 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003
No. of HH mem. 0{1 -0.0078 -0.0115** -0.0129** -0.0128** -0.0129**
No. of HH mem. 2{7 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0019
No. of HH mem. 8{15 0.0067*** 0.0063*** 0.0065*** 0.0059** 0.0055**
Live in City 0.0120** 0.0121** 0.0124** 0.0126** 0.0127**
HH net income 0.0012 0.0010 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015
H: High-educated -0.0082** -0.0089** -0.0092** -0.0091** -0.0090**
H: Medium-educated -0.0065* -0.0071* -0.0071* -0.0069* -0.0066*
W: High-educated -0.0088** -0.0083** -0.0080** -0.0077* -0.0077*
W: Medium-educated -0.0102*** -0.0100*** -0.0099*** -0.0094*** -0.0093***
H: No church att. 0.0099** 0.0100*** 0.0103*** 0.0103*** 0.0104***
W: No church att. 0.0035 0.0032 0.0033 0.0033 0.0034
H: No. months in UE cum. 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003***
W: No. months in UE cum. 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
H: Hours worked t-1 -0.0001
W: Hours worked t-1 0.0002***
H: Hours worked t-2 0.0001
W: Hours worked t-2 0.0002**
H: Hours worked t-3 -0.0001
W: Hours worked t-3 0.0001*
H: Hours worked t-4 0.0001
W: Hours worked t-4 0.0001
H: Hours worked t-5 0.0001
W: Hours worked t-5 -0.0001
Rho 0.36503 0.38060 0.34589 0.35017 0.34674
p-value H0 : Rho = 0 0.019 0.015 0.025 0.026 0.028
Chi2 120.76 115.74 119.82 113.83 114.43
1) Table shows marginal eects computed at the mean of each covariate except for dummies.
2) *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01; st.err. computed by the delta method.
3) "H:" stands for husbands, "W:" for wives, "HH" for household.
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Table 4.16: Eect of denition of hours worked on RE estimations II (Ex-
tract)
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) (5c)
H { H -0.0161*** -0.0161*** -0.0163*** -0.0157*** -0.0154***
M { M -0.0234*** -0.0238*** -0.0239*** -0.0223*** -0.0215***
H/M { L -0.0109*** -0.0111*** -0.0114*** -0.0106*** -0.0102**
H { M -0.0162*** -0.0164*** -0.0168*** -0.0163*** -0.0160***
M { H -0.0136*** -0.0133*** -0.0132*** -0.0128*** -0.0127***
L { H/M -0.0129*** -0.0126*** -0.0129*** -0.0121*** -0.0118***
Both no church att. 0.0164*** 0.0160*** 0.0166*** 0.0166*** 0.0169***
Only H church 0.0142* 0.0135* 0.0138* 0.0141* 0.0143*
Only W church 0.0187*** 0.0186*** 0.0192*** 0.0193*** 0.0195***
H: Hours worked t-1 -0.0001
W: Hours worked t-1 0.0002***
H: Hours worked t-2 0.0001
W: Hours worked t-2 0.0002**
H: Hours worked t-3 -0.0002*
W: Hours worked t-3 0.0001*
H: Hours worked t-4 0.0001
W: Hours worked t-4 0.0001
H: Hours worked t-5 0.0001
W: Hours worked t-5 -0.0001
Rho 0.33659 0.35570 0.31812 0.32711 0.32493
p-value H0 : Rho = 0 0.029 0.022 0.037 0.036 0.038
Chi2 125.74 120.19 124.79 117.89 118.26
1) Table shows average marginal eects.
2) *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01; st.err. computed by the delta method.
3) "H:" stands for husbands, "W:" for wives.
4) First six rows refer to education. First letter stands for husband's, second for wife's. "H"
denotes high education, "M" medium, and "L" low.
104
Chapter 5
Eect of labor division
between wife and husband on
the risk of divorce: Evidence
from German data1
1This chapter is based on the IZA Discussion Paper No. 4515 of the same title, co-authored
by Kornelius Kraft.
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5.1 Introduction
In the last decades, most developed countries were characterized by substantial
increases in divorce rates and in labor force participation rates of married women.
The extent to which these two developments are related has widely been ignored
by economists. However, Becker et al. (1977) already suggest a positive relation-
ship between female labor force participation and risk of divorce in their work on
marital stability. Their analysis is based on Becker's theory of marriage (Becker,
1973, 1974a) that hypothesizes that specialization of the two spouses in house-
work on the one hand and market work on the other hand constitutes the most
important factor to gains from marriage compared to staying single. Therefore,
the one with the higher wage earnings capacity should specialize in market work,
whereas the other one should specialize in doing housework. Due to their higher
gains from marriage, these specialized couples should consequently have a lower
risk of divorce than couples where both spouses are employed.
In theory, it should not matter whether the husband or the wife participates in
the labor force as long as he or she is able to derive a higher wage income. Nev-
ertheless, the breadwinner role is usually assigned to the husband. One reason
is probably that, on average, men still earn more than women. However, despite
the high female labor force participation and that egalitarian gender attitudes
have become more common today, husbands are also still expected to take on the
provider role for his family. Consequently, couples with a husband earning less
than the wife are more likely to be frustrated or to be subject to social sanctions
which in turn leads to a higher probability of separation. Moreover, while we
observe a higher female labor force participation today than in the past, house-
work is still primarily the wife's domain (see e.g. Bittman et al., 2003; Hersch
and Stratton, 1994). If one spouse is exposed to the double burden of domestic
and market work, this additional stress and the lack of spouse's support are also
very likely to reduce marital stability.
Since the Becker approach implies some strong assumptions, bargaining models
have been proposed (e.g. Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981).
Usually, the division of household goods is not symmetric but depends on the
two spouses' outside options and the relative bargaining power. Both are largely
aected by the individual's income.
Our questions of interest are whether the labor division between wife and husband
has any impact on marital stability and in what respect. Is specialization really
stability-enhancing? If so, can we observe dierences between the traditional
specialization \housewife, working husband" and the non-traditional \househus-
band, working wife"? Does the modern equal division imply a higher risk of
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separation? Previous empirical analyses are usually restricted to the impact of
the wife's income relative to total household income. The rst group of studies
nd a positive relationship between this ratio and the probability of divorce, e.g.
Kesselring and Bremmer (2006), or Liu and Vikat (2004). That is, the higher the
wife's income proportion, the higher the risk of separation. A second group of
analyses does not nd any statistically signicant eect (e.g. Sayer and Bianchi,
2000). Concerning the behavior of German couples only a few empirical stud-
ies exist that are usually limited to the eect of wife's employment status (e.g.
Bottcher, 2006; Ott, 1992). However, Hartmann and Beck (1999) nd that it also
matters whether the wife earns more than the husband, and whether there are
conicts about the division of housework or about time spent together. Stauder
(2005) instead concentrates on the eect of the division of market and domestic
work after childbirth. He nds that marital stability is only signicantly dimin-
ished if the wife bears the double burden of market and domestic work.
Using a rich panel data set from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
from 1984 to 2007, we try to shed new light on these issues. For our analysis of
divorce determinants, we use complementary log-log (cloglog) regression models
with couple-specic random eects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Our
SOEP sample consists of West German couples only that are observed from the
beginning of their marriage onwards until separation or right-censoring. The
analyses concentrate on the eects of labor division patterns, nevertheless, various
other factors are also considered like the number of children of dierent ages or
education that may inuence the risk of divorce as well as labor division patterns.
In order to test the eect of specialization, we dene the wife's labor income as
proportion of total household income on the one hand and her proportion of total
time used for housework on the other hand as variables of main interest. To our
knowledge, we are the rst analyzing jointly both factors of labor division as
modeled in Becker's household theory: to earn money and to do housework.
Our results suggest that the labor division can have an eect on the risk of divorce
but specialization per se is not stability-enhancing. We rather nd gender-specic
dierences. Couples with a female main earner and a husband doing most of the
housework have a substantially higher probability of separation than couples
with the traditional male breadwinner/housewife-pattern. Marital stability is
also considerably reduced if the wife has to bear the double burden of market
and housework which we cannot nd if the husband bears it. In contrast, the
equal division does not signicantly alter the risk of divorce.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 contains a discussion about the
theoretical eects of the labor division on the risk of divorce. Section 5.3 gives
an overview of the relevant empirical literature. Section 5.4 describes data used,
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and in Section 5.5, empirical results are presented. Finally, a conclusion is given
in Section 5.6.
5.2 Theoretical discussion on the eects of spousal
labor division on marital stability
In the following, we briey discuss the theoretical eects of the spousal labor
division and other factors, like education and children, on the risk of divorce in
the context of Gary Becker's household model (Becker, 1973, 1974a; Becker et al.,
1977) and bargaining theories.2
As already explained in Chapter 4.2.1, Gary Becker's theory of marriage regards
the household as a production unit. Household members produce household com-
modities like children, love or aection with market goods and time of household
members as input factors. While a household consisting of two persons allocate
market goods and the time of two members to maximize the household's output,
a single-person household can only allocate market goods and own time. Ratio-
nal individuals will only marry when both partners expect a higher utility from
being married than from remaining single, thus, if own consumption when be-
ing married is higher. Analogously, married couples separate when the expected
utility from remaining married falls below the expected utility from divorcing
and possibly remarrying. This turnover in expectation may result from negative
shocks, for instance, an unpredictable change in the partner's characteristics that
may provoke a reconsideration of the marriage decision. Thus, the probability
of separation depends on the expected gains from marriage compared to being
divorced and the distribution of unanticipated gains/losses from marriage.
Becker places an emphasis on the expected gains from marriage. He assumes
that the complementarity of the input factors in household production, namely
market goods and time, constitutes the main advantage of being married. Due
to complementarity, a couple can gain by specialization. Thus, the spouse with
the higher wage earnings capacity should specialize in market work. In this way,
the household can buy more market goods. The other one should use the time
for home production. Since this specialization gain increases with a higher wage
dierence between the two spouses, negative assortative mating concerning wage
earnings capacity is optimal. Moreover, since labor division makes up the major
incentive for partners to remain married in this model, every factor that lowers
the gains from specialization also substantially decreases marital stability.
In principle, it should not make a dierence whether the wife or the husband
2For a more detailed description of the models, see Chapters 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
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focuses on market work. Nevertheless, traditionally, the husband takes on the
economic provider role, whereas the wife is mainly responsible for housework.
According to Becker's theory, the increase in educational attainment and labor
force participation of both unmarried and married women accounts for the rise
in divorce rates in the last decades. The growing equalization of men and women
makes labor division and consequently marriage less advantageous compared to
staying single or getting divorced.
The aspect of preferences concerning the labor division between oneself and the
spouse is problematic. Some may still prefer the traditional labor division, oth-
ers may search for an egalitarian relationship, so that a priori the impact of the
chosen labor division is not clear. Moreover, if the choice does not meet the ex-
pectations of at least one spouse, because their preferences do not harmonize or
because of bad labor market and child care conditions, the gains from marriage
are reduced.
The Becker model considers children as marital-specic investments that stabi-
lize a relationship. These commodities increase the gains from marriage since
they make divorce more costly and thus, lower the probability that it occurs.
Nevertheless, it is often very dicult for wives to re-enter the labor market after
childbirth, in particular given the small supply of child care in Germany (see
Stauder, 2005). This results in unhappiness for women about the imposed labor
division between the husband and herself and thus, increases the risk of separa-
tion. In this case, the observed specialization does not lead to a higher marital
stability but to the contrary.
Becker (1973) also analyzes optimal sorting with respect to factors other than
wage earnings capacity. He concludes that positive assortative mating, i.e. mat-
ing of likes, is optimal for all other characteristics that are complements in the
production of household commodities. Homogamy with respect to interests, age,
height etc. should stabilize a partnership. Moreover, the gains from marriage
rise with increasing values of these characteristics.
The eect of education is not clear. A good education of both spouses makes
specialization less advantageous. From this point of view, (women's) high educa-
tion increases the risk of divorce. However, individuals with higher education are
probably more intelligent than others. This may improve their ability to form
expectations about their spouse and his or her future characteristics. Therefore,
they are less likely to become disappointed. Moreover, they may be better able
to nd a partner suited for lifetime. In both cases, we would observe an in-
verse relationship between education and risk of divorce. Therefore, an empirical
investigation is necessary to check which aspect dominates.
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Becker's theory is often criticized, because of the assumptions and/or because
of the implications. Models based on bargaining theory try to remedy some of
the major objections by providing, for instance, a mechanism by which family
behavior is formed from individual preferences (e.g. Manser and Brown, 1980;
McElroy and Horney, 1981; Chiappori and Weiss, 2007). However, these models
are not easy to test empirically.
Similar to Becker's household theory, the advantage to be married depends on
the dierence between own consumption if married versus if being divorced. This
dierence in turn is determined by the relative bargaining power within marriage
and the outside options. Own nancial means are usually interpreted as impor-
tant determinant of the relative bargaining power. That is, the higher own wage
income relative to the partner, the higher the bargaining power should be. Own
income should also raise the threat point so that divorce may be more likely if
both spouses work than if one spouse depends economically on the partner. More-
over, the threat point is also aected by the probability of remarriage. Individuals
participating in the labor force may be more likely to meet other potential part-
ners than those who focus on housework. On the other hand, if both spouses are
employed the family possesses a higher income which in turn may substantially
increase own consumption compared to being single. Thus, a priori, the eect of
labor division is not clear. Moreover, the model by Manser and Brown (1980)
assumes that the utility out of consumption depends on characteristics of the
spouse. However, it is not straightforward to see how preferences with respect to
labor division aect utility. Some may prefer the traditional specialization, other
may favor the equal division.
5.3 Literature review
Our question of interest is related to the research on the relationship between
female labor force participation and risk of divorce.3 From the international
perspective, it is quite common to use the wife's income as proportion of total
household income as variable of main interest. The eect of this ratio is, however,
not clear. Some studies nd a destabilizing impact, e.g. Kesselring and Bremmer
(2006) using a sample of the US Current Population Survey, Liu and Vikat (2004)
with register-based data for Sweden, or Jalovaara (2003) with register-based data
for Finland. Thus, despite of the fact that in particular Scandinavian countries
stand for egalitarian gender attitudes the authors show that if the female's earn-
ings account for a larger proportion of the total family income, the likelihood
3Since this problem has been discussed more extensively among sociologists than economists
and moreover, the hypotheses and estimation methods are usually quite similar we also review
some sociological studies.
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of divorce increases. This eect is not compensated by the stabilizing inuence
of a higher family income. In contrast, other analyses do not nd any statis-
tically signicant eect of this ratio (e.g. Sayer and Bianchi, 2000, Tzeng and
Mare, 1995). However, the latter show that a change in wife's earnings raises the
probability of divorce which cannot be found for changes in husband's earnings.
Similarly, Weiss and Willis (1997) suggest that an unexpected increase in wife's
wage earning capacity destabilizes a marriage, whereas an unexpected increase
in husband's wage earning capacity lowers the probability of divorce.
Regarding the behavior of German couples, only a few empirical studies exist.
With the exception of Hartmann and Beck (1999) and Stauder (2005), all studies
are limited to the eect of the employment status and refrain from analyzing the
dierent aspects of being employed. Ott (1992) nds a signicant destabilizing
impact of female full-time employment for West German couples. Similarly, in
her comparison of divorce probabilities in West Germany and the former GDR
until 1990, Bottcher (2006) shows a positive relationship between female full-
time employment and risk of marital dissolution for both countries. In contrast,
Wagner (1997) nds this pattern only for the former GDR. For West Germany,
there is no signicant eect for couples that married before 1975 and even a
stabilizing eect for marriage cohorts after 1975. Hartmann and Beck (1999)
provide a more detailed evaluation of the relationship between female employment
and risk of divorce using data from the Mannheim divorce study. They nd that,
controlling for the female's labor force status, if the wife earns more than her
husband marital stability decreases signicantly. However, by the inclusion of this
dummy, the destabilizing eect of her full-time employment is reduced. Conicts
about the division of housework and about time spent together also raise the
divorce risk but do not signicantly alter the eect of female employment. The
higher propensity among full-time employed women to stay childless and to delay
childbearing are two more destabilizing aspects related to full-time employment.
Stauder (2005) concentrates on the inuence of labor division between spouses
after childbirth. Division is measured in time used for domestic and market work.
According to his results, marital stability is signicantly diminished if the wife
has to bear the double burden.
In contrast to the majority of the existing literature, this paper considers not only
the labor force status or the relative income but a combination of the relative
income and the relative time used for housework. Thus, we include both aspects of
specialization as modeled in Becker's theory of marriage. Unlike Stauder (2005),
we do not restrict our sample to the time after childbirth. Moreover, we use the
nancial aspect of employment instead of time since the former should be more
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important in the context of divorce and furthermore, this choice is in accordance
with Becker's household model (see Sections 4.2.1 and 5.2).
5.4 Empirical approach
Our empirical approach is again to apply a complementary log-log model to
estimate the conditional probability of divorce. For a more detailed description
of the estimation method, see Chapter 4.4.1.
5.4.1 Sample
As in Chapter 4, we use data from the West German sample of the SOEP, waves
1984 to 2007. We only include couples that marry during the observation period
so that we are able to follow a couple from the beginning of the marriage onwards
until they separate or get divorced or until observations are right-censored. Again,
we do not distinguish between separation and divorce.
Even though it would be very interesting to extend this analysis to both parts of
Germany we restrict it to the West for two reasons. First, in the former GDR
it was a social norm for women to work even after childbirth. Along with the
ideological pressure, a low wage level, strong eligibility requirements for widow's
pension, and restricted possibilities to claim alimony from the (former) husband
in case of divorce forced women into full-time employment (see Berghahn and
Fritzsche, 1991). Public provision of cheap and extensive child care for children
of all ages made it easier to work full-time even after childbirth. In contrast,
in West Germany, the lack of child care, incentives by the income tax system
and stigmatization of working mothers have made it advantageous for wives to
stay at home or to work at most part-time. Therefore, it is not reasonable to
pool West and East German couples since the dierences in female labor force
participation and provision of public child care have continued to exist even after
reunication.4 Second, given our strategy to look only at couples that marry
during the observation period, the sample of East German couples is too small to
get reasonable estimates in separate regressions. Consequently, we only look at
the eect of labor division on the probability of divorce of West German couples.
Another sampling problem is the treatment of the unemployed. In our opinion, a
specic labor division induced by unemployment of one spouse is a special case.
Losing the job is usually an unwanted, negative shock that aects the nancial
situation of the family as well as self-esteem and self-condence of the individual
4For more information on family policies in West and East Germany, see e.g. Braun et al.
(1994); Cromm (1998); Kreyenfeld (2004).
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concerned (see e.g. Kraft, 2001; Charles and Stephens, 2004). In order to avoid
mixing up dierent eects, we drop those observations in which at least one
spouse is unemployed.5
We further restrict our data set to couples where both spouses are between age
18 and 65 at the beginning of the marriage. Our nal sample consists of 1,128
couples with 8,758 couple-years and we observe 204 divorces and separations.
Hence, the probability of divorce is 2.33 % per year, and 18.09 % of the couples
nally separate. Moreover, we consider both, rst marriages and remarriages.
For 34.75 % of the couples, at least one spouse does not marry for the rst time.
5.4.2 Explanatory variables
Labor division
We estimate the probability of divorce in period t given explanatory variables in
t  1: Pr(yit 6= 0jxi;t 1). However, concerning labor market behavior, there is a
potential reverse causality problem. If an individual suspects separation she will
probably change her labor supply (see Johnson and Skinner, 1986). Therefore,
we use lagged labor division variables of period t 3 instead of t 1 to circumvent
this problem.
In order to nd the eect of spousal labor division on the risk of divorce we dene
ve labor division patterns depending on the wife's proportions of total household
income and total time used for housework.6 Therefore, we rst generate the
wife's monthly gross labor income (wage plus income from self-employment) as
proportion of the household's monthly gross income to measure her economic
success relative to the husband's.7
Figure 5.1 illustrates the distribution of the wife's proportion of the household's
gross income. It shows that in the majority of observations the wife does not
contribute any labor income to the household's income (36.94 %) or only a small
fraction. In contrast, in only 0.67 % of all observations, the husband does not
contribute. For 14.76 %, husband and wife earn roughly the same, i.e. the wife's
proportion is between 40 % and 60 %.
5Nevertheless, our results are robust to the inclusion of the unemployed.
6With this strategy we follow Stauder (2005) who uses time used for market and domestic
work, respectively, to generate ve dierent labor division patterns.
7We decide to take the gross instead of the net income because of the special regulations for
married couples in the German tax system. If the gross wage income of both spouses dier, the
one with the lower income (usually the wife) pays a relatively high tax prepayment compared to
his or her spouse since all tax allowances are assigned to the one with the higher income. This
reduces the couple's overall sum of tax prepayments. However, it makes a direct comparison of
net incomes unfeasible since they suer from a systematic distortion by the German taxation.
For an example, see e.g. Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2008).
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of wife's proportion of gross income
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As second element of labor division, we generate the wife's proportion of total
time used for housework. "Housework" is an aggregate that subsumes time used
for housework (in a narrower sense) and shopping, for child care, and for crafts,
repairs, and gardening.8 We prefer the aggregate to the narrow denition of
housework since there may be an additional gender-specic specialization within
housework chores which is, however, not part of our analysis.
Analogously to gross income, Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of the wife's pro-
portion of total time used for housework. In this case, the distribution has not
such an extreme peak. The mode of the sample is the equal sharing of housework
(8 %). However, as expected, the wife's proportion is usually higher than the
husband's. For 72.22 % of all observations, the percentage is higher than 60 %.
For 4.56 %, the wife is solely responsible for the housework, whereas in only 0.37
% the husband is.9
In a next step, we dene three groups of wife's income and housework propor-
tions, respectively: The wife's proportion makes up 0 % to 40 %, 41 % to 60 %,
or more than 60 %.10 Then, we combine these income and housework-patterns
with each other and generate ve labor division combinations for our regressions:
1. Traditional labor division: wife's housework proportion is larger than
her income proportion;
8The SOEP asks for these activities separately.
9See Sections 5.7.2 and 5.7.3 for more details on wife's income and housework proportions
over the course of marriage.
10Our results do not change substantially if we use intervals 35 % to 65 % or 30 % to 70 %.
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of wife's proportion of housework
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2. Non-traditional: wife's income proportion is larger than her housework
proportion;
3. Equal: wife's and husband's shares are similar;
4. Double burden husband: wife's housework and income proportions are
both smaller than the husband's;
5. Double burden wife: wife's housework and income proportions are both
larger than the husband's;
Table 5.1 illustrates how the nine possible combinations of wife's income and
housework proportion are assigned to these ve groups, while Table 5.2 shows
the distribution of these combinations in our sample.
Table 5.1: Income and housework combinations
Wife's income Wife's housework proportion
proportion 0.00-0.40 0.41{0.60 0.61{1.00
0.00{0.40 double b. husb. trad.
0.41{0.60 non-trad. equal trad.
0.61{1.00 non-trad. double b. wife
For 82.06 % of all observations the traditional labor division can be found, whereas
the non-traditional and the equal division can only be observed in 6.17 % and
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5.71 % of all couple-years, respectively. As expected, there are only a few observa-
tions where one spouse is mainly responsible for both, earning income and doing
housework. In 2.69 %, the husband bears the double burden, whereas in 3.37 %
the wife does so. The traditional pattern is the reference group in regression (1).
Since the non-working wives constitute such a large group in our sample we subdi-
vide the pattern of traditional labor division. There may be a dierence between
wives that earn nothing and wives that earn at least some money. Therefore, we
dierentiate between wives with zero income and a housework proportion larger
than 40 % (Trad 1 ), and wives with some income up to 40 % and a housework
proportion at least 41 % (Trad 2 ). Trad 1 is the reference group in regression
(2).
Table 5.2: Descriptives of labor division variables
Variable No. of obs. in %
Traditional 7,187 82.06
of which:
Trad 1: wife's prop. = 0 % 3,209 36.64
Trad 2: wife's prop.  40 % 3,978 45.42
Non-traditional 540 6.17
Equal 500 5.71
Double burden husband 236 2.69
Double burden wife 295 3.37
Total no. of observations 8,758
All variables refer to period t-3.
Additional explanatory variables
In addition to the labor division variables, we include a set of important variables
that are likely to have a substantial eect on the risk of divorce. Some are also
related to our labor supply variables. In the following, we briey explain their
denition, descriptive statistics are given in Table 5.5 in Appendix 5.7.1.
First, in addition to the wife's income proportion, we also include the house-
hold's total gross income to control for level dierences. Two other important
aspects are education and the presence of children. Concerning education, we
follow Blossfeld and Timm (2003) and dene three hierarchical levels: "low"
if somebody has no schooling degree, a Hauptschul - or Realschul -degree but
no vocational degree; "medium" if the individual has no schooling degree, a
Hauptschul - or Realschul -degree and additionally a vocational degree or if he/she
has Abitur/Fachhochschulreife, with or without vocational degree. "high" means
116
a university degree or a degree from a university of applied sciences. Probably,
the educational level also captures (at least in parts) the preference concerning
the labor division. Women with higher human capital investments should be less
likely to prefer the traditional division of work. Reference group in our estima-
tions are low-educated spouses.
The presence of children is a very important factor in the labor supply decision
of men and particularly women.11 Therefore, we include the number of children
of dierent ages in our regressions. We distinguish between age 0{1, 2{7, and
8{15, but not between own, adoptive and children from previous relationships.
Since there may be dierences in the supply of child care that in turn would
aect female labor supply, we also consider a dummy for living in a city center.
Nevertheless, urban life may also increase the risk of divorce because of the higher
probability to meet a better match. Additional controls are age at marriage, the
absolute age dierence, a dummy variable if it is not the rst marriage for at least
one spouse, and marriage duration dummies that are all standard covariates in
the literature on divorce.12
5.5 Results
Table 5.3 shows all coecients of our random eects cloglog estimations. In
regression (2), we further distinguish between the two cases of the traditional
pattern when the wife has no income (reference group) and when the wife earns
some money (Trad 2). Since we estimate a random eects model, Table 5.3 also
includes , the proportion of the total variance that is contributed by the panel-
level variance. It ranges from 0.45 to 0.47. The hypothesis that  = 0, which
would imply that the random eects estimator is not signicantly dierent from
the pooled estimator, can be rejected on a 5 % signicance level. In the following,
we will rst briey discuss the results for the other control variables, and then
interpret the estimated eects of our labor division patterns on the risk of divorce
in more detail.
Our results suggest that remarriages have a lower risk of separation than rst
marriages. However, the eects are not statistically dierent from zero. The
same holds for age at marriage. As theory predicts, the coecients are negative,
i.e. the older someone is at the time of marriage, the more stable the relationship
is going to be. However, as the dummy for remarriages, the eects are in either
case not signicant. The age dierence between two spouses is a relevant factor.
11See Appendix 5.7 for dierences in the development of income and housework proportions
for women with and without children.
12For a more detailed discussion see Chapter 4.4.3.
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Heterogamy with respect to age has a destabilizing eect. Similarly, as expected,
city life reduces marital stability signicantly. The eect of education was a
priori not clear. On the one hand, high-educated have better outside options.
On the other hand, for high-educated individuals, it is probably easier to form
expectations and consequently, they have a lower risk to become disappointed.
In our sample, the latter dominates, in particular for husbands. Medium- and
high-educated people have a lower risk of divorce than the reference group of low-
educated. The predicted stabilizing eect of children as marital investments can
be found for new-born and small children, however, the latter is not signicantly
dierent from zero. For older children we nd a destabilizing eect which we
cannot explain with a marriage duration eect since we include marriage duration
dummies in our regressions. Maybe spouses do not stay together just for the sake
of the children if they seem to be old enough to cope with divorced parents.
Moreover, household's total gross income has a positive but insignicant eect
on the risk of separation.
Of main interest is the impact of labor division on the risk of divorce. We see that
two patterns do positively aect the risk of divorce, whereas the others only have
a relatively small and insignicant eect. The most striking result is that couples
with a wife bearing the double burden have a substantially higher risk of divorce
than couples with a male breadwinner and a housewife. Similarly, if the wife is
the main earner and the husband does most of the housework, marital stability is
considerably diminished. If both spouses share equally the jobs of earning income
and doing housework, the risk of divorce is not substantially aected compared
to the traditional labor division. In contrast, if the husband bears the double
burden, marital stability is even enhanced, although, the eect is not signicant.
If we further subdivide the group with a traditional labor division, we nd similar
results for the rst four patterns. The eects are, however, usually stronger. If
the wife works but earns only up to 40 %, marital stability is not signicantly
altered compared to a situation where she does not work.13
Table 5.4 shows the computed average marginal eects for the labor division
variables in regression (2). Given that the average predicted probability of divorce
is about 0.016 per year, we see that couples with a wife bearing the double burden
have a more than 135 % higher risk of divorce than couples with the traditional
labor division. Similarly, non-traditional couples have a 94 % higher probability
13If we assign those couples with wife's income proportion 41 % to 60 % and housework 0 % to
40 % or 60 % to 100 % to the double burden groups, respectively, we still nd the destabilizing
eect of non-traditional and double burden wife couples. If we separate those of the non-
traditional couples and those of the traditional couples who have an income proportion 41 % to
60 %, the coecients for the two non-traditional groups are still positive and weakly signicant.
The lower signicance can probably be attributed to the small number of observations (366 and
174).
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Table 5.3: Coecients of RE cloglog estimations
(1) (2)
Equal division, t-3 0.1868 (0.3004) 0.3691 (0.3335)
Non-trad. division, t-3 0.5525** (0.2735) 0.7277** (0.3082)
Double burden husband, t-3 -0.4541 (0.5311) -0.2607 (0.5530)
Double burden wife, t-3 0.7594** (0.3235) 0.9315*** (0.3532)
Trad 2, t-3 0.2599 (0.2009)
Not rst marriage -0.0141 (0.2111) -0.0341 (0.2150)
H: age at marriage -0.0075 (0.0208) -0.0069 (0.0212)
W: age at marriage -0.0132 (0.0207) -0.0112 (0.0212)
Absolute age dierence 0.0499* (0.0256) 0.0502* (0.0261)
Live in City 0.7948*** (0.2302) 0.8084*** (0.2333)
H: high educ -0.7021** (0.3540) -0.7113** (0.3588)
H: med educ -0.4656* (0.2665) -0.4826* (0.2702)
W: high educ -0.2981 (0.3895) -0.3265 (0.3963)
W: med educ -0.2569 (0.2353) -0.2697 (0.2388)
No. of HH members age 0-1 -0.8766*** (0.3074) -0.8652*** (0.3083)
No. of HH members age 2-7 -0.0762 (0.1200) -0.0216 (0.1271)
No. of HH members age 8-15 0.2405* (0.1266) 0.2558** (0.1283)
HH gross income, t-3 0.0447 (0.0334) 0.0386 (0.0349)
Constant -2.8445*** (0.6695) -3.1310*** (0.7195)
No. of observations 8,758 8,758
No. of couples 1,128 1,128
 0.44872 0.47020
p-value H0 :  = 0 0.028 0.020
Log-likelihood -931.823 -930.969
1) Standard errors in parentheses.
2) *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.
3) "H": husband, "W": wife, "HH": household.
4) Results of marriage duration dummies not presented.
5) Reference groups: Low educated; Traditional/Trad 1.
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Table 5.4: Average marginal eects
(2)
Equal division, t-3 0.0065
(0.0071)
Non-trad. division, t-3 0.0150*
(0.0089)
Double b. husband, t-3 -0.0034
(0.0065)
Double b. wife, t-3 0.0217*
(0.0126)
Trad 2, t-3 0.0039
(0.0034)
1) Table shows average eects of discrete change of each
dummy variable from 0 to 1.
2) Standard errors in parentheses, computed by the
delta method.
of separation. Hence, labor division does matter but specialization per se is not
stability-enhancing. We rather nd gender-specic dierences. On the one hand,
specialization has only a stabilizing eect if the traditional labor division between
husband and wife is chosen. On the other hand, if the wife bears the double
burden the risk of divorce is much higher unlike if the husband is in the same
situation. Given that about 2/3 of divorces in Germany are initiated by women
(see Bundesministerium fur Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (2003)), our
results suggest that nancial independence is a necessary precondition for her to
do so. Since the eect of "Trad 2" is not signicant, her income must exceed a
certain threshold for nancial independence. Frustration of one or both spouses
that the wife is the main earner and not the husband as traditionally expected is
another factor that explains our ndings.
5.6 Conclusion
Using a rich panel data set of German couples, we test the hypothesis that special-
ization in market work and housework increases marital stability. Gary Becker
assumes that gains from marriage mainly result from the complementarity of
man and woman in the production of home commodities. Therefore, one spouse
should specialize in earning money (traditionally the husband), and the other one
should specialize in doing housework (traditionally the wife) in order to reduce
the risk of divorce. However, it is questionable whether this aspect still (if ever)
matters. Nowadays, it is quite common for married women to work in the labor
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market. Moreover, some families rely on her income, at least temporarily, since
job histories of men are increasingly characterized by breaks with spells of unem-
ployment. In addition, only recently, German policy-makers reformed parental
leave-regulations in such a way that fathers have an incentive to take a share
of the legal parental leave. Thus, the traditional labor division with a working
husband and a housewife should be less prevalent and consequently less relevant
for marital stability.
Our data set provides rich information for both spouses about e.g. labor force
status, income, children, and time used for housework. Hence, we are able to test
for the eect of actual labor division on the risk of divorce. We show that it mat-
ters who does what. While the equal division does not signicantly alter the risk
of divorce, couples with a female breadwinner and a househusband have a higher
risk of divorce than couples with a male main earner and a housewife. Hence,
specialization per se does not enhance marital stability, only the traditional one.
Marital stability is also substantially reduced if the wife bears the double burden
which we cannot nd for husbands. Our results suggest that frustration that the
wife is the main earner and not the husband (so that the wife could stay at home)
as traditionally expected substantially reduces the gains from marriage.
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5.7 Appendix
5.7.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics of control variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
For at least one spouse not rst marriage 0.34 0.47
H: Age at marriage 31.92 7.96
W: Age at marriage 29.24 7.19
Absolute age dierence 3.91 3.79
Live in city center 0.08 0.28
H: High-educated 0.20 0.40
H: Medium-educated 0.72 0.45
H: Low-educated 0.08 0.27
W: High-educated 0.11 0.31
W: Medium-educated 0.76 0.43
W: Low-educated 0.13 0.34
No. of HH members age 0{1 0.12 0.34
No. of HH members age 2{7 0.64 0.78
No. of HH members age 8{15 0.45 0.76
HH's gross income in 1,000 Euro of 2000 3.87 2.42
Total no. of observations 8,758
1)"H:" stands for husbands, "W:" for wives, "HH" for household.
2) All variables refer to period t-1 except household's gross income.
5.7.2 Trends in wife's income proportion
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show how the mean of wife's income proportion evolves over
the course of marriage in our sample. Due to the increase in labor force participa-
tion of married women in the last decades we dierentiate in Figure 5.3 between
three dierent marriage cohorts: the time of marriage is between 1985 and 1989
(3,547 total observations), between 1990 and 1999 (4,431 total observations), and
the youngest cohorts from 2000 to 2007 (780 total observations). We expected
higher income proportions for younger cohorts. However, we see that there is
hardly any dierence in the development of wife's income proportion over the
course of marriage. For all cohorts, the average income proportion drops from
around 37 % at the beginning of the marriage to less than 18 % within the rst
eight to nine years of marriage. For the youngest cohorts it drops to approxi-
mately 22 %. After twelve years, the proportion slightly increases to more than
20 %.
Since the presence of children has a large impact on the labor supply of women,
we distinguish in Figure 5.4 between couples with children between age 0 and
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Figure 5.3: Mean income proportions over the course of marriage for dierent
marriage cohorts
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Figure 5.4: Mean income proportions over the course of marriage with and
without children
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15 (6,158 total observations) and without children (2600 total observations). We
see that the drop in the rst years of marriage can be mainly attributed to
the presence of children. It can be observed for all cohorts. In contrast, the
proportion of women without children remains relatively stable with about 35
% over the course of marriage. The decrease after 13 years of marriage could
either be induced by the drop-out of divorced couples since couples with a female
main earner display a higher probability of divorce. Another explanation could
be that the wage gap between husband and wife increases over life time if, e.g.,
he benets more from investments in his career than she does.
5.7.3 Trends in wife's housework proportion
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the development of the mean of wife's housework pro-
portion. In Figure 5.5, we dierentiate again between the above mentioned three
marriage cohorts. Analogously to the drop in gross income, the wife's proportion
of housework increases from around 58 % at the beginning of marriage to more
than 70 % within the rst seven years and remains at this level in the following
years. Once more, the cohorts do not substantially dier, nevertheless, the pro-
portion of the youngest cohorts is usually below the other cohorts' proportions.
In Figure 5.6, we see that, again, the development is mainly induced by the
couples with children. Nevertheless, even without children, the wife's propor-
tion increases steadily over the course of marriage. Thus, despite the ongoing
equalization of men and women, we observe an increase in the gender-specic
specialization over the course of marriage. This process seems to be (at least
partly) induced by the presence of children. However, these gures are only
descriptive and have to be interpreted very cautiously.
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Figure 5.5: Mean housework proportions over the course of marriage for dif-
ferent marriage cohorts
.
55
.
6
.
65
.
7
.
75
M
ea
n 
of
 w
ife
’s 
ho
us
ew
or
k 
pr
op
.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Marriage duration
Means of wife’s housework prop. marr. bef. 1990
Means of wife’s housework prop. marr. 1990−99
Means of wife’s housework prop. marr. after 1999
Figure 5.6: Mean housework proportions over the course of marriage with
and without children
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Chapter 6
Final remarks
The present thesis tries to obtain a better understanding how economic and
marriage-related decisions are linked to each other. The rst part deals with
cross-spouse eects on economic decisions, in this case on health behavior and
on labor force participation at older age. The second part examines the impact
of various economic factors on the risk of marital dissolution. In summary, all
chapters show that there are strong interrelationships between the two most im-
portant aspects in life, namely family and career. However, we also see that men
and women react and behave dierently. For instance, the wife has an eect on
the husband's probability to see the doctor but not vice versa. Moreover, a female
breadwinner increases the risk of divorce substantially which we cannot nd for
couples with a male main earner. Thus, the results suggest that economic theory
and empirical analyses do not only have to consider the family background but
also to distinguish between men and women.
Needless to say that there are still many open questions. For instance, except
in Chapter 2, we restrict the analysis to married couples since cohabitation is
less common among older people and moreover, separation has usually less se-
vere consequences if the couple is not married. Nevertheless, given the growing
acceptance and equal treatment under law, it becomes increasingly interesting to
extend the analyses to cohabiting couples.
Moreover, not only family structure has changed, work life is also changing. More
and more jobs, in particular for high-educated, require high exibility and mobil-
ity by both, men and women. Consequently, for a larger section of the population,
the success of a relationship is challenged by commuting and living apart together.
It is not fully known yet to what extent these factors alter the risk of separation.
Another interesting aspect is the new parental-leave regulation. The new law pro-
vides nancial incentives for fathers to take a share of the legal parental-leave.
However, given our result that female and male breadwinners do not seem to be
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perfect substitutes, the question is whether maternity and paternity leave have a
dierent eect on marital stability.
Thus, there are still many aspects we do not know but, to conclude with Tina
Turner, \some people gotta stay whatever and give one another shelter on a rainy
day".
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